In this paper I shall discuss Block’s distinction between phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness. I will argue that, although Block’s proposal has the merit of accounting for some important distinctive phenomena, it should nonetheless be given up, in favor of a single, graded notion of consciousness. There is only one consciousness, which one can possess in different degrees.
(2011). Reconstructing (phenomenal) consciousness [contribution in web site - contributo in sito web]. In philosophie.ch. Swiss portal for philosophy. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/10446/25825
Reconstructing (phenomenal) consciousness
PATERNOSTER, Alfredo
2011-01-01
Abstract
In this paper I shall discuss Block’s distinction between phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness. I will argue that, although Block’s proposal has the merit of accounting for some important distinctive phenomena, it should nonetheless be given up, in favor of a single, graded notion of consciousness. There is only one consciousness, which one can possess in different degrees.File allegato/i alla scheda:
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