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On the Transmission of Guilt Aversion and the Evolution of Trust*

Sebastiano Della Lena [†] Elena Manzoni [‡] Fabrizio Panebianco [§]

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Abstract

We model the endogenous evolution of trust and trustworthiness in a population where agents have heterogeneous levels of guilt aversion. We consider an overlapping generation model in which agents interact by playing the Trust Game and exert effort to transmit their level of guilt aversion to their offspring. In this setting, we investigate (i) the effects of the knowledge of the matched partner's guilt aversion in the Trust game, (ii) the consequences of having parents who care either about the materialistic payoff of their offspring (*materialistic parents*), or their overall psychological utility (*empathic parents*), and (iii) the interaction between these two aspects. We find that with incomplete information on the matched partner the level of trust/trustworthiness in the society is (weakly) lower than in the case of complete information. This effect is mitigated both by some type of empathic parents and by the presence of homophily.

Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, D3, D80, Z10

Keywords: Cultural Transmission; Psychological Games, Trust Game, Guilt, Incomplete Information.

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1 Introduction

Psychologists have long known that emotions influence human behavior and individual response to positive and negative events. Recently, also the economic literature has recognized that emotions matter for strategic behavior (Battigalli and Dufwenberg, 2021). However, the formation of the personal traits that affect emotional responses has never been formally investigated. In this paper, we propose a model that analyzes how the psychological trait of guilt aversion is transmitted from parents to children (as in Bisin and Verdier, 2001), shapes the dynamics of play in a Trust Game, and consequently determines the evolution of trust and trustworthiness in the society.

Trust and trustworthiness are of fundamental importance for different economic outcomes (Guiso et al., 2006) and, as pointed out by Alesina and Giuliano (2015), generalized trust towards others is, “the most studied psychological trait.”¹ Also, there is evidence that trust attitudes are transmitted across generations (Guiso et al., 2008a; Dohmen et al., 2012). In this paper, we take a step back and investigate the emotional foundations of trust attitudes, focusing on *guilt aversion* that, as shown by both the theoretical and experimental literature, fosters trust and trustworthiness (Charness and Dufwenberg, 2006; Attanasi et al., 2016, 2019).² Thus, we analyze the intergenerational transmission of guilt aversion and the derived dynamics of trust and trustworthiness.

The formal analysis of the effects of emotions on strategic behavior has been developed by what is called *psychological game theory* (Geanakoplos et al., 1989; Battigalli and Dufwenberg, 2009; Battigalli et al., 2019a, and references therein). Psychological game theory has provided a way of showing how emotions play a role in planning strategies and choosing actions, by allowing individual utility to depend not only on outcomes but also on (own and others’) beliefs. In detail, the individual emotional response to the strategic environment and to the co-players’ actions is described with the introduction of psychological traits — e.g., guilt aversion, (Battigalli and Dufwenberg, 2007; Battigalli et al., 2019a), frustration and anger (Battigalli et al., 2019b), or self-esteem (Mannahan, 2019). In the contest of the Trust Game, Attanasi et al. (2019) and Attanasi et al. (2013) show how, introducing guilt aversion and belief-dependent preferences, the theoretical predictions fit better with experimental evidences than the standard models do.

The issue of where these psychological traits stem from has not yet been analysed in psychological game theory. However, in the psychological literature, there is evidence that personality traits are formed in the early stage of human development (e.g., Bandura and

¹Many empirical studies show that culture and in particular social capital— which is mostly represented by trust and trustworthiness— has a huge impact on different economic phenomena, such as: economic growth (Knack and Keefer, 1997), size of firms (La Porta et al., 1997), financial development (Guiso et al., 2004, 2008b), the quality of institutions (Tabellini, 2008a, 2010).

²Note also that guilt aversion is the predominant psychological trait found in the data (Attanasi et al., 2013, 2019; Bellemare et al., 2017, 2019)

Walters, 1963; Erikson, 1993, 1994). In particular, the psychological trait of guilt aversion is already present in 10-12 years old children (Ferguson et al., 1991) and its development occurs during childhood (Kochanska et al., 2002). In this respect, our contribution is to endogenize and analyze the dynamics of guilt aversion taking into account the parental transmission of traits.

In this paper, we consider a population partitioned into two groups characterized by different levels of guilt aversion (*High* or *Low*) that impact on how agents play a Trust Game (as in Attanasi et al., 2016):³ two players, *A* and *B*, are matched and player *A* (she) is endowed with 2 monetary units. She has to decide whether to dissolve the partnership, choosing *Out*, and divide the money equally with player *B* or to remain in the partnership by choosing *In*. If she remains *In*, the money is doubled and transferred to player *B* (he) who can in turn decide to *Share* it equally with *A* or to *Take* the whole amount. We define *trust* as the share of agents choosing *In*, and *trustworthiness* as the share of agents choosing *Share*.

We assume that guilt aversion is a trait that is acquired during an early socialization process and that it does not change during life, once acquired. We endogenize the formation of guilt aversion using the standard model of the intergenerational transmission of cultural traits (Bisin and Verdier, 2001, 2011). So, parents exert a *socialization* effort to transmit own traits to children, knowing that children themselves can be influenced by parental efforts and by traits of other individuals, randomly observed in the society. In detail, each agent acquires their trait during childhood through two main mechanisms: (i) *vertical* (direct) *transmission*, in which each parent exerts a socialization effort to transmit their own trait to the child; and (ii) *oblique transmission*, in which each child may acquire a random trait from the adult population in the society. This induces the dynamics of the shares of agents in the population displaying each of the two levels of guilt aversion.

The parental effort crucially depends on the relative advantage parents think their children will have if they will be of the parents' group versus the opposite group — called *cultural intolerance* in the literature Bisin and Verdier (2001). We model cultural intolerance by considering parents who care about different aspects of children's future utilities when choosing the socialization effort. In details, we define as *materialistic* the parents who exert efforts that only depend on how different levels of guilt sensitivity in the two groups induce higher or lower material payoffs. Then, we also consider societies in which parents care about that fact that children may experience guilt on top of material payoffs, and, thus, socialization efforts are chosen comparing the expected psychological payoffs gained by the children with high or low guilt sensitivity during the interactions. In particular, we consider both the cases in which all the parents are *perfectly empathic* — in the sense that they compute psychological payoffs of each group using the correct

³This type of game was introduced by Berg et al. (1995) with the name of investment game.

psychological parameter —, and the case in which they are all *imperfectly empathic*⁴ — namely they just use their own psychological parameter to compute the psychological payoffs of both groups. Since in these three cases parents differ in what they consider relevant to socialize children, we name them as different *parenting styles*. We borrow this terminology from [Doepke and Zilibotti \(2017\)](#), even if in our case styles refers to what parents care about children’s utilities, whereas [Doepke and Zilibotti \(2017\)](#) consider different aspects of parenting, focusing on authoritarian, authoritative, and permissive parents.

It is a well-known result ([Bisin and Verdier, 2001](#)) that, whenever cultural intolerance is independent on population share, the socialization effort displays *cultural substitution* —i.e., it decrease in own group’s population share— and, this phenomenon generally leads to long-run cultural heterogeneity ([Bisin and Verdier, 2011](#)). In our framework, as previously discussed, the cultural intolerance depends on the expected payoffs of the adult age game, i.e., the game played repeatedly when agents become adults, evaluated differently depending on the parenting styles and, thus, it may be affected by the shares of high and low guilt agents in the society. We show that the way in which cultural intolerance reacts to population shares may mitigate the standard baseline substitutability that arises from the will to transmit own trait. This new effect can make the socialization effort to be increasing in own group’s population share —i.e., *cultural complementarity* is displayed. In particular, there is cultural complementarity if and only if the cultural intolerance reacts positively to changes in the size of own group and it is elastic, so that, it is reactive enough to population shares to overcome the baseline substitutability.

We start by considering societies where the individual traits are observed by all the agents and, thus, every individual observes their partner’s trait. Then, only two equilibrium outcomes are possible: either the full cooperation path is observed; or player *A* chooses *Out* at the beginning of the game. In both cases, agents do not experience any guilt and, as a consequence, the social dynamics is independent of the parenting styles. Then, given complete information about the matching, individuals from the group with high guilt are weakly more often in pairs in which the cooperative path is chosen and, therefore, their average payoff is weakly higher than the one of low guilt individuals. Thus, in the long run, the share of high guilt individuals weakly increases as the levels of trust and trustworthiness do. We show that, in this case, there is always cultural substitution which is still compatible with long-run cultural homogeneity.

However, in many societies individual traits are not observable. In this case, the equilibrium path may have agents *A* trusting their partners and some of their matched

⁴Note that, we refer to *imperfectly empathic* parents in a slightly different way than in [Bisin and Verdier \(2001\)](#). Indeed, we refer to the incapacity of parents to use the correct guilt parameter to value their psychological utility, which can be possibly generated by their inability to fully empathize with agents who hold different preferences. Their standard assumption of imperfect empathy (i.e., paternalistic altruism), that always leads parents to attempt to socialize their children to their own trait, always holds in the paper.

partners B betray this trust. The existence of this equilibrium path has two effects. First, guilt may be experienced in equilibrium by agents from the low guilt group, hence, parenting styles matter. Second, low guilt individuals have high material payoffs when they betray their partners' trust. We find that, if parents are materialistic or perfectly empathic, the level of trustworthiness in the society weakly decreases over time, whereas, if parents are imperfectly empathic, it may decrease or increase depending on the maximum level of guilt present in the society. Moreover, we find that cultural complementarity may arise in equilibria in which betrayed trust is observed with positive probability, depending on parenting styles and guilt sensitivities. In particular, if high guilt agents are imperfectly empathic they exert positive socialization effort and the expected psychological payoffs of their offspring is increasing in the presence of high guilt agents in the society that choose the cooperative path. Conversely, if the guilt sensitivity of low guilt agents is high enough, the guilt of betraying their high guilt partner marginally reduce the psychological expected payoff, inducing cultural complementarity.

In the paper, we also acknowledge that the matching among agents may be somehow assortative —i.e., the interaction pattern displays *homophily*. Indeed, assortativity in forming social contacts has commanded a lot of attention and has been largely observed in many social contexts (e.g., Coleman, 1958; Currarini et al., 2009; Pin and Rogers, 2016). In such a case, we focus only on societies with materialistic parents, showing that, if homophily is low, the levels of trust and trustworthiness in the society weakly decrease over time, whereas if homophily is high, the levels of trust and trustworthiness increase (weakly decrease) for high (low) population shares.⁵

This paper contributes, on top of the psychological game theory literature discussed above, to the theoretical literature of cultural transmission that analyses the interactions between the intergenerational transmission of traits and the strategic environment. In detail, Bisin et al. (2004) and Tabellini (2008b), study the evolution of cooperation in a Prisoner's Dilemma, focusing on complete vs. incomplete information about the matching and the spatial interaction among agents, respectively. Della Lena and Dindo (2019) study the different dynamics of acculturation when agents interact in strategic environments with either complements or substitutes, considering both games with constant and random payoffs. Lastly, in Guiso et al. (2008a) and Okada (2020) agents interact in a Trust Game, as in this paper. In particular, in Guiso et al. (2008a) parents transmit their beliefs about the trustworthiness of others, whereas in Okada (2020) parents transmit the psychological benefit to have a “good conduct”. The main difference is that, in our work, parents transmit their level of guilt sensitivity which induces trustworthiness and

⁵We limited our analysis to the materialistic parents case as the standard analysis without homophily already show that imperfect empathy has a positive effect on trust and trustworthiness. Therefore, we preferred to investigate the effect of homophily on trust and trustworthiness without the confounding interaction with imperfect empathy.

consequently trust and the beliefs are determined in equilibrium.

The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the notation and the main features of the model: the Trust Game; the Social Dynamics; and the Parenting Styles. In Section 3, we show how parental socialization effort react to changes in population shares. In Sections 4 and 5 we characterize the equilibrium strategies of the adult age (trust) game and the implied social dynamics for different parenting styles with complete and incomplete information, respectively. Section 6 discusses what happens if we take into account the presence of homophily in interactions. All the proofs of the propositions in the main text are in Appendix A. Appendix B characterizes the equilibria of the trust game. Appendix C discusses equilibrium selection, whereas Appendix D provides the equilibrium characterization and selection with homophily.

2 The Model

We consider a society that, at each time $t \in \mathbb{N}_0$, is composed by a cohort of agents of mass 1 who are alive only at time t . Each agent has belief-dependent preferences which display guilt aversion, and, at time t , she/he is randomly matched infinitely many times with other agents to play what we called adult age game, which in our model is a trust game described in Section 2.1, maximizing her/his *instantaneous* expected utility. Each agent, before dying, asexually gives birth to one child (alive at $t + 1$). Each parent, given the outcome of their strategic interactions, chooses a socialization effort to transmit their own level of guilt aversion to the offspring (Section 4.1). Then parents die and the process starts again with a new generation.

2.1 Trust Game

We assume that the adult age game played in the population is a trust game (Berg et al., 1995; Attanasi et al., 2016). In the trust game player A (she)⁶ receives an amount 2 and has to decide whether to split this amount evenly with player B (he) by going *Out* (O) or to transfer the whole amount to B by choosing *In* (I). If player A transfers it, the amount is doubled, and player B can decide whether to *Share* (S) it evenly with player A or to *Take* (T) it all for himself. Figure 1 shows the Trust Game with material payoffs.

We assume that both players are randomly drawn from a population with heterogeneous levels of guilt aversion, described below. We assume that guilt is role-dependent, namely an individual may experience guilt only if he is drawn to play in the role of player B . This is a simplifying assumption, which is however consistent with insights from the

⁶For simplicity of exposition we think of player A being female and player B being male. Of course, this is just a convention, as every male and female individual in each population will play both roles with the same probability.




Figure 1: Trust Game with material payoffs

evolutionary psychology of emotions, where it is argued that when a single emotion operates in different situations its consequences are affected by contextual cues (Haselton and Ketelaar, 2006). Therefore, player A 's utility is not affected by guilt. Let us denote A 's strategies with $s_A \in \{O, I\}$ and B 's strategies with $s_B \in \{T, S\}$.⁷ We assume that player A 's utility is $u_A(\mathbf{s}) = m_A(\mathbf{s})$, where $m_A(\mathbf{s})$ denotes material payoff of agents in role A , after the terminal history induced by the strategy profile $\mathbf{s} := (s_A, s_B)$.

We model guilt aversion as Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2007) and Battigalli et al. (2019a). In order to model the effects of player B 's guilt aversion on his behavior we need to define players' first- and second-order beliefs. As in Battigalli et al. (2019a), we assume that players' plans are logically distinct from their behavior, and as a consequence we can meaningfully define players' beliefs on own strategies. In particular, let α_A, α_B denote players' first-order beliefs and β_A, β_B denote players' second-order beliefs. First-order beliefs are players' (probabilistic) beliefs on primitive uncertainty, such as own and partner's strategies; second-order beliefs are subjective probability measures about primitive uncertainty and about the partner's beliefs. In the analysis of the game we will introduce some features of these beliefs, for which we introduce a specific notation.

Player B , if guilt averse, suffers from guilt when he believes he is letting player A down. As a matter of notation let define, for a generic x , $[x]^+ := \max\{0, x\}$. With this, A 's **disappointment** is defined as

$$D_A(\mathbf{s}, \alpha_A) := \left[\mathbb{E}_{\alpha_A}[\tilde{m}_A] - m_A(\mathbf{s}) \right]^+, \quad (1)$$

which is the difference between A 's expected value of her material payoff and her realized material payoff given the implemented strategy profile \mathbf{s} , when the difference is positive. Note that \tilde{m}_A is, from A 's point of view, a random variable, as it depends on B 's choices as well. As in Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2007), we assume that player B feels guilty only for that component of player A 's disappointment that is due to his behavior. Player B has belief-dependent preferences over material payoffs represented by the following

⁷Note that we do so with a slight abuse of notation, as we call T (S) not only B 's action *Take* (*Share*) but also B 's strategy *Take* (*Share*) if I_n .

psychological utility function:

$$u_B(\mathbf{s}, \boldsymbol{\alpha}_A; \theta) = m_B(\mathbf{s}) - \theta \left[D_A(\mathbf{s}, \boldsymbol{\alpha}_A) - \min_{s'_B} D_A(s_A, s'_B, \boldsymbol{\alpha}_A) \right], \quad (2)$$

where: $\theta \in \mathbb{R}_+$ is player B 's **guilt sensitivity** — i.e., his level of guilt aversion—; $\min_{s'_B} D_A(s_A, s'_B, \boldsymbol{\alpha}_A)$ is the minimum level of disappointment B can deliver to A ; and $\left[D_A(\mathbf{s}, \boldsymbol{\alpha}_A) - \min_{s'_B} D_A(s_A, s'_B, \boldsymbol{\alpha}_A) \right]$ is the component of player A 's disappointment for which player B is responsible and feels guilty. Note that, in a two-period game without chance move, this model is equivalent in terms of best replies to a model in which player B experiences a guilt proportional to the full disappointment of player A , and not to his own contribution to it. However, the two models differ in terms of B 's utility after *Out*, which is relevant in our model, as it affects the average lifetime utility of players.

Let $\alpha_A^S = \mathbb{P}_A[S]$ be the probability that player A assigns to player B *Sharing*, and $\alpha_A^I = \mathbb{P}_A[I]$ the probability that player A assigns to herself going *In*. These are features of A 's first-order belief. Given that we assume that players' plans are logically distinct from their behavior (Battigalli et al., 2019a), players need not to be consistent with them. Therefore α_A^I , which is player A 's belief on his *In* choice, can take values different from 0 or 1, even though in the analysis we only focus on pure strategy equilibria. Hence, player A can be disappointed not only after terminal history (I, T) , but also after terminal history O (in case she planned to go *In* to obtain a higher payoff, but failed to do so). However, the only case in which player B can experience guilt is when player A 's disappointment is caused by player B 's choice. Therefore, in this model, player B can feel responsible for A 's disappointment only after the terminal history (I, T) . In this case $m_A(I, T) = 0$, and player A 's disappointment is

$$D_A(\mathbf{s}, \boldsymbol{\alpha}_A) = [\mathbb{E}_{\boldsymbol{\alpha}_A}[\tilde{m}_A] - 0]^+ = (1 - \alpha_A^I) \cdot 1 + \alpha_A^I \cdot 2\alpha_A^S.$$

Moreover, given that player B could grant player A her maximum payoff by choosing to *Share*, $\min_{s'_B} D_A(s_A, s'_B, \boldsymbol{\alpha}_A) = 0$. Thus, the psychological utility of (I, T) for player B (expressed as a function of player A 's first-order belief) is

$$u_B(I, T, \boldsymbol{\alpha}_A; \theta) = 4 - \theta (1 - \alpha_A^I + 2\alpha_A^S \alpha_A^I).$$

Figure 2 represents the Trust Game with our specification of psychological utilities.

Note that player B does not know A 's first-order belief $\boldsymbol{\alpha}_A$, and therefore he chooses his strategy based on his second-order belief $\boldsymbol{\beta}_B$.




Figure 2: Trust Game with psychological utilities

2.2 Social Dynamics

We now introduce the cultural composition of the society and discuss the social dynamics implied by the outcome of strategic interactions in the adult age game.

Each agent belongs to one of two homogeneous cultural groups, where $C := \{L, H\}$ is the set of groups. Each agent has guilt sensitivity in $\Theta := \{\theta^L, \theta^H\} \in \mathbb{R}_+^2$, where Θ is common knowledge. Without loss of generality, we assume $\theta^L \leq \theta^H$, so that L is the low guilt group and H the high guilt one. At any given $t \in \mathbb{N}_0$, let q_t^i be the measure of group $i \in C$ in the society.

As discussed above, agents play infinitely many times the trust game described in Section 2.1. Each time the game is played, agents are matched with a partner randomly drawn from the whole population and they play in both roles (A, B) with the same probability.

At the end of the strategic interactions, agents observe the frequency of actions played in the society by agents of each group and, thus, assuming common knowledge of the game form, they can compute the average payoffs.

With a little abuse of notation, we let $i \in C$ denote both the group and the representative agent belonging to that group. Each parent $i \in C$ chooses a socialization effort $\tau_t^i \in [0, 1]$ to transmit own trait to their own child.⁸ In order to choose an effort each parent must have an expectation of the utility they derives from having a child with their own guilt sensitivity as opposed to a child with a different one. At each time t , each parent $i \in C$ has a conjecture about the future population shares at $t + 1$. We assume *adaptive expectations* along the paper, so that parents form conjectures about population shares at $t + 1$ using the observed population shares at t . This implies that all agents share the same conjecture. Formally, for each $i \in C$, $\mathbb{E}_{\delta_{q_t^i}}[q_{t+1}^i] = q_t^i$, where the common conjecture $\delta_{q_t^i}$ is the Dirac measure at q_t^i .⁹ This means that parents do not internalize changes in the population shares due to the cultural dynamics we describe below. For each $i \in C$ and

⁸We refer to agents as parents when we discuss their socialization efforts, i.e., when they take actions related to their role as parents. Moreover, we refer to both parents and children with the singular *they*.

⁹Note that this assumption implies that at steady states conjectures about population shares are always correct. We refer to Della Lena and Panebianco (2021) to understand the effect of wrong conjectures about population shares in a cultural transmission framework.

$j \neq i$, let V_t^{ii} and V_t^{ij} be the utility each parent i at time t expects from having a child in group i or j , respectively. In Section 2.3, we discuss how these utilities are formed, allowing both for the case in which parents just care about own child's material payoffs, and for the case in which they also care about psychological utilities.

We now describe the transition probabilities which characterize the cultural transmission process (Bisin and Verdier, 2001). In detail, each parent directly socializes the child to own trait with a probability equal to their own socialization effort τ_t^i – *vertical socialization*. If this socialization fails, the child randomly takes a trait from the population – *oblique socialization*. Therefore, the probability that, at time t , a child of parent i acquires trait i is given by

$$p_t^{ii} := p(\tau_t^i; q_t^i) = \tau_t^i + (1 - \tau_t^i)q_t^i, \quad (3)$$

Analogously, $p_t^{ij} = (1 - \tau_t^i)(1 - q_t^i)$.

Each parent $i \in C$, given q_t^i , chooses the effort τ_t^i that maximizes their subjective expected utility

$$\mathbb{E}_{p_t^{ii}}(u_t^i) = p_t^{ii}V_t^{ii} + (1 - p_t^{ii})V_t^{ij} - \frac{1}{2}(\tau_t^i)^2, \quad (4)$$

where $\frac{1}{2}(\tau_t^i)^2$ is the cost of socialization. Indeed, with probability p_t^{ii} they get a child with their own trait and gain V_t^{ii} , while with probability p_t^{ij} they get a child with a different trait and gain V_t^{ij} . Let $\Delta V_t^i := V_t^{ii} - V_t^{ij}$, and similarly $\Delta V_t^j := V_t^{jj} - V_t^{ji}$. These are referred to in the literature as *cultural intolerance* of group i and j , respectively. Solving the parental optimization problem we get, for each $i \in C$,

$$\tau_t^i := \tau(q_t^i, \Delta V_t^i) = [(1 - q_t^i)\Delta V_t^i]^+. \quad (5)$$

Note first that, if parents of group i expect to receive a higher utility from having a child with a different trait than a child with their own trait, they do not exert any effort. The higher the cultural intolerance ΔV_t^i the higher the effort, given that parents think that being of their own trait is the more profitable for their children the higher ΔV_t^i . Moreover, it is trivial to see that, when ΔV_t^i is independent of q_t^i , parents of group i increase their socialization effort when their population share decreases. This property is known in literature as *cultural substitution*. In Section 3 we study what happens, instead, when cultural intolerance is endogenously determined by population shares, and this endogeneity is of paramount importance for our analysis.

The population dynamics is given by

$$q_{t+1}^i = q_t^i \cdot p_t^{ii} + (1 - q_t^i) \cdot p_t^{ji}.$$

Using the continuous-time approximation we get

$$\dot{q}_t^i = q_t^i(1 - q_t^i)(\tau_t^i - \tau_t^j), \quad (6)$$

which, when both efforts are positive, reads

$$\dot{q}_t^i = q_t^i(1 - q_t^i) \left((1 - q_t^i) \Delta V_t^i - q_t^i \Delta V_t^j \right). \quad (7)$$

Lastly, when one effort is zero, the dynamics is trivial.

2.3 Parenting Styles

Parents may care about different aspects of their children's life while forming subjective expected utility from having children with different traits. Depending on the cultural features of the society parents live in, some of these aspects may be prevalent. For our purposes, we consider both parents who care only about material payoffs and parents who care also about children's psychological utilities.

Let $\mathbf{s}_t := (s_t^i)_{i \in C}$ be the equilibrium strategy profile of the adult age game at time t .¹⁰ For each $i \in C$ and $t \in \mathbb{N}_0$, define \bar{m}_t^i as the average material payoff of agent $i \in C$ in the stage game. Given our assumptions about the matching, this is equal to the average lifetime material payoff agent $i \in C$ experiences. Namely,

$$\bar{m}_t^i := \bar{m}^i(\mathbf{s}_t) = \frac{1}{2} m_A^i(\mathbf{s}_t) + \frac{1}{2} m_B^i(\mathbf{s}_t),$$

where, $m_A^i(\mathbf{s}_t)$ is the lifetime payoff gained by agents when playing in role A , and $m_B^i(\mathbf{s}_t)$ is the one gained when playing in role B . Similarly, we define the average psychological utility of agent $i \in C$ in the adult age game as

$$\bar{u}_t^i := \bar{u}^i(\mathbf{s}_t; \theta^i) = \frac{1}{2} u_A^i(\mathbf{s}_t; \theta^i) + \frac{1}{2} u_B^i(\mathbf{s}_t; \theta^i),$$

where $u_A^i(\mathbf{s}_t; \theta^i)$ is the lifetime utility experienced by agents when playing in role A , whereas $u_B^i(\mathbf{s}_t; \theta^i)$ is the one experienced playing in role B . We distinguish between materialistic parents and those who care also about children's psychological utilities. The latter can be further classified as perfectly and imperfectly empathic parents. Specifically,

(M) **Materialistic parents.** These parents care only about their own children's material payoffs, so that $V_t^{ii} = \bar{m}_t^i$ and $V_t^{ij} = \bar{m}_t^j$. Given that $\mathbb{E}_{\delta_{q_t^i}}[q_{t+1}^i] = q_t^i$, parents expect the average material payoff of each group at $t + 1$ to be the same as the average material payoff of that group at time t , that is, for all $i, j \in C$, $\mathbb{E}_{\delta_{q_t^i}}[\bar{m}_{t+1}^i] = \bar{m}_t^i$, $\mathbb{E}_{\delta_{q_t^i}}[\bar{m}_{t+1}^j] = \bar{m}_t^j$. Thus, $\Delta V_t^i = \bar{m}_t^i - \bar{m}_t^j = -\Delta V_t^j$, which implies that only one of

¹⁰We focus here on the case in which the adult age game has a unique equilibrium strategy profile. In the characterization of the equilibria we will also provide selection criteria such that a unique equilibrium is selected at any parameterization.

the two efforts is positive and, thus, the social dynamics, for each is given by

$$\begin{cases} \dot{q}_t^i = q_t^i(1 - q_t^i)^2 (\bar{m}_t^i - \bar{m}_t^j) & \text{if } \bar{m}_t^i > \bar{m}_t^j \\ \dot{q}_t^i = (q_t^i)^2(1 - q_t^i) (\bar{m}_t^i - \bar{m}_t^j) & \text{if } \bar{m}_t^i < \bar{m}_t^j \end{cases}, \quad (8)$$

i.e., \dot{q}_t^i is positive when $\bar{m}_t^i > \bar{m}_t^j$ and negative when the opposite relation holds.

(PE) **Perfectly empathic parents.** These parents care about their own children's psychological utility. When parents evaluate the expected utility of their own children being of a given cultural group, they are able to perfectly identify themselves with agents of that group. Therefore, they use the correct guilt sensitivity to compute the psychological utility experienced by agents of that group. Given that $\mathbb{E}_{\delta_{q_t^i}}[q_{t+1}^i] = q_t^i$, it follows that, for all $i, j \in C$, $\mathbb{E}_{\delta_{q_t^i}}^j[\bar{u}_{t+1}^i] = \mathbb{E}_{\delta_{q_t^i}}^i[\bar{u}_{t+1}^i] = \bar{u}_t^i$. Thus we have that $\Delta V_t^i = \bar{u}_t^i - \bar{u}_t^j = -\Delta V_t^j$, which implies that only one of the two efforts is positive and, thus, the dynamics is given by

$$\begin{cases} \dot{q}_t^i = q_t^i(1 - q_t^i)^2 (\bar{u}_t^i - \bar{u}_t^j) & \text{if } \bar{u}_t^i > \bar{u}_t^j \\ \dot{q}_t^i = (q_t^i)^2(1 - q_t^i) (\bar{u}_t^i - \bar{u}_t^j) & \text{if } \bar{u}_t^i < \bar{u}_t^j \end{cases}, \quad (9)$$

i.e., \dot{q}_t^i is positive when $\bar{u}_t^i > \bar{u}_t^j$ and negative when the opposite relation holds.

(IE) **Imperfectly empathic parents.** These parents care about their own children's psychological utilities but, when they evaluate the expected utility of a child of any cultural group, they use their own guilt sensitivity to compute the offspring's psychological utility. In detail, $\mathbb{E}_{\delta_{q_t^i}}^i[\bar{u}_{t+1}^i] = \frac{1}{2}u_A^i(\mathbf{s}_t; \theta^i) + \frac{1}{2}u_B^i(\mathbf{s}_t; \theta^i) = \bar{u}_t^i$ as before. When $j \neq i$, instead,

$$\hat{u}_t^j := \mathbb{E}_{\delta_{q_t^i}}^j[\bar{u}_{t+1}^j] = \frac{1}{2}u_A^j(\mathbf{s}_t; \theta^i) + \frac{1}{2}u_B^j(\mathbf{s}_t; \theta^i).$$

Then $\Delta V_t^i = \bar{u}_t^i - \hat{u}_t^j \neq -\Delta V_t^j$. As a consequence, both parental efforts may be positive, in which case the dynamics is given by (7), and it becomes

$$\dot{q}_t^i = q_t^i(1 - q_t^i) \left((1 - q_t^i)(\bar{u}_t^i - \hat{u}_t^j) - q_t^i(\bar{u}_t^j - \hat{u}_t^i) \right). \quad (10)$$

3 Cultural Substitution and Complementarity

We have discussed in Section 4.1 that, when the cultural intolerance of agents of group i , ΔV_t^i , is not affected by population shares, the optimal socialization effort of agents of group i always displays cultural substitution. However, as discussed in the previous session, ΔV_t^i is endogenous and depends on the lifetime payoffs (either material or psy-

chological) gained by agents and, thus, it can depend on the distribution of the population in the society.

Formally, we say that a socialization effort τ_t^i displays *cultural substitution* if $\frac{\partial \tau_t^i}{\partial q_t^i} < 0$, whereas it displays *cultural complementarity* if $\frac{\partial \tau_t^i}{\partial q_t^i} > 0$. We also define the elasticity of the cultural intolerance of group i with respect to the share of group j in population as $\varepsilon_{ij} := \frac{\partial \Delta V_t^i}{\partial q_t^j} \frac{q_t^j}{\Delta V_t^i}$. Recall that ΔV_t^i represents parent i 's expectation (that depends on the parenting styles) of the relative material or psychological advantage of having a child belonging to own group. Then $\frac{\partial \Delta V_t^i}{\partial q_t^j}$ is a measure of the effect of a change of the population share of group j on the effort of parents i , passing through cultural intolerance. Therefore, the elasticity provides a measure of the responsiveness of the cultural intolerance to a change in the size of the opposite group. Proposition 1 provides a generic characterization of the conditions under which the optimal socialization effort of a generic group $i \in C$ displays cultural substitution or complementarity.

Proposition 1 *Consider the optimal socialization effort in equation (5). Then, for each $i \in C$ and $j \neq i, t$*

- *if $\frac{\partial \Delta V_t^i}{\partial q_t^j} \geq 0$, τ_t^i displays cultural substitution;*
- *if $\frac{\partial \Delta V_t^i}{\partial q_t^j} < 0$, τ_t^i displays cultural substitution if and only if $\varepsilon_{ij} > -1$.*

Recall from equation (5) that the optimal socialization effort is $\tau_t^i = [(1 - q_t^i)\Delta V_t^i]^+$. Then, we see that, besides the effect of q_t on the cultural intolerance ΔV_t^i , there is always a baseline level of cultural substitution.

Proposition 1 shows that, when the cultural intolerance increases in the share of agents belonging to the other group — so that $\varepsilon_{ij} > 0$ —, an additional motive of substitution, stemming from the change in the payoffs of the adult age game, comes into play and, thus, the socialization effort necessarily displays cultural substitution.

If, instead, the cultural intolerance decreases in the number of agents belonging to the other group — so that, $\varepsilon_{ij} < 0$ — a complementarity between own group size and socialization effort arises. This happens whenever the payoff of agents in group i are higher when interacting with agents of group j than with agents of the same group. The magnitude of this overall effect depends on how responsive cultural intolerance is to population shares. Thus, if the cultural intolerance of i is (negatively) elastic with respect to j 's group size (i.e., $|\varepsilon_{ij}| > 1$), the complementarity effect dominates and, thus, socialization efforts display cultural complementarity. Conversely if the cultural intolerance is rigid with respect to the other group's size (i.e., $|\varepsilon_{ij}| < 1$), cultural substitution is displayed.

In the next sections, together with the analysis of the equilibria and of the population dynamics, we also describe how cultural intolerance depends on the specific parenting style and on the level of guilt sensitivity, so as to analyze more in detail the cultural substitution/complementarity properties (see Corollary 1 and 2).

4 Complete Information about the Matching

We first study, as a benchmark, the case in which there is complete information about the matching, i.e., both matched agents know which group their co-player belongs to and this is common knowledge. Since there are only two cultural groups in the society, from this section on we will refer to the population share of low guilt agents, q_t^L , as q_t and to the one of high guilt agents, $q_t^H = 1 - q_t^L$, as $1 - q_t$.

Complete information about the matching means complete information over the partner's guilt sensitivity θ .¹¹ We follow Battigalli et al. (2019a) which characterizes the Bayesian Sequential Equilibria (BSE) in pure strategies of the Trust Game with role-dependent guilt aversion.¹²

Note that we have four possible types of match, and, in principle, four possible equilibria to be defined, indexed by the specific match ji —player A of group j , player B of group i —, with strategies $\mathbf{s}^{ji} := \{s_A^{ji}, s_B^{ji}\}$, and second-order beliefs $\beta^{ji} := \{\beta_A^{ji}, \beta_B^{ji}\}$. Formulated in our setting, results in Battigalli et al. (2019a) show that, with role dependent guilt aversion, only group i of player B matters, as it determines his guilt sensitivity θ^i . Hence, equilibrium strategies are just indexed by the group of player B , and for every $j, i \in C$, $\mathbf{s}^i := \mathbf{s}^{ii} = \mathbf{s}^{ji}$. Therefore, a BSE (in pure strategies), given a match in which the B player belongs to group i , is given by a (pure) strategy profile $\mathbf{s}^i = (s_A^i, s_B^i)$, and a corresponding profile of second-order beliefs $\beta^i = (\beta_A^i, \beta_B^i)$, where second-order beliefs β^i are correct.¹³

We refer to Battigalli et al. (2019a) for the full characterization of the equilibria, and we simply report the (pure) strategy profiles that are compatible with equilibrium. These equilibrium strategy profiles, depending on the guilt parameter of the player B 's θ^i , are:

- $\mathbf{s}^i \in \{(O, T)\}$, if $\theta^i < 1$;
- $\mathbf{s}^i \in \{(O, T), (I, S)\}$, if $\theta^i \in [1, 2]$;
- $\mathbf{s}^i \in \{(I, S)\}$, if $\theta^i > 2$.

This equilibrium characterization tells that if guilt aversion is low, the equilibrium path of play is the same as in the Nash equilibrium of the game without belief dependent preferences, and agents always choose to stay *Out*. On the contrary, as guilt aversion

¹¹We assume that player B 's utility depends on player A 's expectation given the matching. Player A could also form her expectation on her per-period payoff before the match is known. More than that, player B could feel guilt for letting player A down from her *initial* expectations, instead than letting her down from her expectations given the match. The analysis of the case in which there is complete information on the matching, but player B cares about player A 's ex-ante disappointment is available from the authors upon request.

¹²We use Bayesian Sequential Equilibrium as it is the extension for psychological games of Sequential Equilibrium (Kreps and Wilson, 1982), which is a widely used refinement. We focus on BSE due to the need of selecting a unique equilibrium of the stage game for every parametric specification. See Battigalli et al. (2019a) for the definition of BSE and for an extensive discussion of solution concepts for psychological games and their properties.

¹³In order to analyze the cultural transmission process we focus on pure strategy equilibria only.

increases, also (I, S) becomes an equilibrium strategy profile. If guilt aversion is very high, then only (I, S) can be sustained in a BSE.

Note that, as just mentioned, for values of guilt aversion $\theta^i \in [1, 2]$ there is a multiplicity of strategy profiles which can be sustained in equilibrium. We assume that, whenever multiple equilibria exist, the Pareto dominant one is selected, as also done in [Tabellini \(2008b\)](#).¹⁴ In this case, the assumption about the selection criterion implies that in the region where $\theta^i \in [1, 2]$ the selected equilibrium strategy is (I, S) . Therefore, the selected profiles of equilibrium strategies are:

- $\mathbf{s}^i = (O, T)$, if $\theta^i \leq 1$;
- $\mathbf{s}^i = (I, S)$, if $\theta^i > 1$.

Figure 3 summarizes the behavior of individuals depending on the group of player B , and on the guilt sensitivity of the two populations.




Figure 3: Equilibrium behavior for agents of the two groups in the case of common knowledge of the matching.

Given that $\theta^L \leq \theta^H$, we have three relevant parametric regions for the analysis. For each of them, we characterize the equilibrium outcomes of the stage game given the match, at every time $t \in \mathbb{N}$.

Region 1: $\theta^L \leq \theta^H < 1$. In this region, for every type of match, there is only one sequential equilibrium outcome, that is, for each $i \in C$, $\mathbf{s}^i = (O, T)$. At any interaction each individual plays in role A with probability $\frac{1}{2}$, in which case she meets a co-player

¹⁴See Appendix C for a discussion of the refinement criterion, and for the derivation of the result.

of group L with probability q_t . However, regardless of the role and the group of the co-player, each player gains a material payoff of 1 in every interaction. Therefore, the average material payoffs at each time t are $\bar{m}_t^L = \bar{m}_t^H = 1$. In such a case, material payoffs and psychological utilities coincide.

Region 2: $\theta^L < 1 \leq \theta^H$. In this region the equilibrium strategies depend on the specific match. If the individual plays in role A (which happens with probability $\frac{1}{2}$) her payoff depends on the guilt sensitivity of the matched partner (and therefore on the composition of the population q_t). If he instead plays in role B, the equilibrium strategy and his payoff depend only on his guilt sensitivity. The average material payoffs are therefore

$$\begin{aligned}\bar{m}_t^L &= \frac{1}{2}(q_t \cdot 1 + (1 - q_t) \cdot 2) + \frac{1}{2} \cdot 1 = \frac{3 - q_t}{2}, \\ \bar{m}_t^H &= \frac{1}{2}(q_t \cdot 1 + (1 - q_t) \cdot 2) + \frac{1}{2} \cdot 2 = \frac{4 - q_t}{2},\end{aligned}$$

and they coincide with the average psychological utilities \bar{u}_t^L, \bar{u}_t^H .

Region 3: $1 \leq \theta^L \leq \theta^H$. In this region, for every type of match, there is only one sequential equilibrium outcome, that is, for each $i \in C$, $\mathbf{s}^i = (I, S)$. At any interaction each individual plays in role A with probability $\frac{1}{2}$, in which case she meets a co-player of group L with probability q_t . However, regardless of the role and the guilt sensitivity of the co-player, each player gains a material payoff of 2 in every interaction. Therefore, the average material payoffs at each time t are $\bar{m}_t^L = \bar{m}_t^H = 2$. In such a case, material payoffs and psychological utilities coincide.

Note that, in all the three regions discussed above, as the path (I, T) never occurs, the average material payoffs coincides with the average psychological utilities (with both perfect and imperfect empathy) in each group, that is for each $i \in C$, $\bar{m}_t^i = \bar{u}_t^i = \hat{u}_t^i$, given that guilt is never experienced in equilibrium. Therefore, focusing on parenting styles, given that for each $i \in C$ $\mathbb{E}_{\delta_{qt}}^i[q_{t+1}] = q_t$, we also have that $V_t^{ii} = V_t^{ji} = \bar{m}_t^i = \bar{u}_t^i = \hat{u}_t^i$. This means that the utility each parent expects to derive from a child of group i is independent of both her parenting style and her group. Table 1 summarizes these results.

<i>Bounds of the region</i>	<i>Average material payoff/psychological utility</i>	<i>Equilibrium Strategies</i>
$\theta^L \leq \theta^H < 1$	$\bar{m}_t^L = \bar{m}_t^H = 1 = \bar{u}_t^L = \bar{u}_t^H$	$\mathbf{s}^H = \mathbf{s}^L = (O, T)$
$\theta^L < 1 \leq \theta^H$	$\bar{m}_t^L = \frac{3 - q_t}{2} = \bar{u}_t^L, \bar{m}_t^H = \frac{4 - q_t}{2} = \bar{u}_t^H$	$\mathbf{s}^L = (O, T), \mathbf{s}^H = (I, S)$
$1 \leq \theta^L \leq \theta^H$	$\bar{m}_t^L = \bar{m}_t^H = 2 = \bar{u}_t^L = \bar{u}_t^H$	$\mathbf{s}^H = \mathbf{s}^L = (I, S)$

Table 1: Average material payoffs and psychological utilities, given the levels of guilt aversion and the group, when the matching is known.

Let us now analyze how the results of Proposition 1 on cultural complementarity and substitution, hold when agents have complete information about the partner's group.

Corollary 1 *Under complete information about the matching, independently of the parenting style, the socialization efforts in equation (5) for both groups L and H always display cultural substitution.*

The result trivially follows from the functional form of the optimal socialization effort, $\tau_t^i = [(1 - q_t^i)\Delta V_t^i]^+$. Indeed, as we can see from Table 1, for each $i \in C$, ΔV_t^i is independent of population shares, so that only the cultural substitution passing through $(1 - q_t^i)$ is present.

4.1 Social Dynamics

We now analyze the social dynamics. Let $q_\theta^* \in Q_\theta^* := \{q_t(\theta) \in [0, 1] : \dot{q}_t(\theta) = 0\}$ denote a generic steady state of equation (6) at a given $\theta := (\theta^L, \theta^H)$, and \mathbf{s}_θ^{i*} the corresponding steady-state equilibrium strategy for a generic $i \in C$. Note that we introduce a notation that highlights how the social dynamics may depend on the vector of guilt sensitivities θ .

Proposition 2 *Given the dynamics in equation (6) and complete information about the matching, independently of the parenting style,*

- (i) *If $\theta^L \leq \theta^H < 1$, then $q_\theta^* = q_0$ and, for each $i \in C$, $\mathbf{s}_\theta^{i*} = (O, T)$;*
- (ii) *If $1 \leq \theta^L \leq \theta^H$, then $q_\theta^* = q_0$ and, for each $i \in C$, $\mathbf{s}_\theta^{i*} = (I, S)$;*
- (iii) *If $\theta^L < 1 \leq \theta^H$, then $Q_\theta^* = \{0, 1\}$ and $q_\theta^* = 0$ is globally stable, and, for each $i \in C$, $\mathbf{s}_\theta^{i*} = (I, S)$.*

Figure 4 represents graphically the population dynamics and the steady-state equilibrium strategies observed described in Proposition 2.

Points (i) and (ii) of Proposition 2 state that, if the guilt sensitivities of the two groups are both high ($1 \leq \theta^L \leq \theta^H$) or both low ($\theta^L \leq \theta^H < 1$), any vector of population shares is a steady state as it delivers the same material payoffs and psychological utilities for agents of both groups. If $\theta^L \leq \theta^H < 1$ (Region 1), we always observe *Out* as equilibrium path, independently of q_t . Indeed, each agent, when playing in role *A*, is aware of the fact that the partner, independently of his group, has such a low guilt sensitivity that he is not willing to *Share*, thus any player *A* chooses *Out*. Conversely, if $1 \leq \theta^L \leq \theta^H$ (Region 3), we always observe (I, S) as equilibrium path, independently of q_t . Indeed, the guilt sensitivity of both groups is so high that any player *B* always chooses *Share* and this induces players *A* to go *In*. In both cases, cultural heterogeneity persists in the long run.

Note however that, this cultural heterogeneity is coupled with substantive homogeneity in behavior.

Point (iii) of Proposition 2 states that, when $\theta^L < 1 \leq \theta^H$ (Region 2), only agents of group H survive in the steady state and the observed equilibrium path is always (I, S) . Given that player A has complete information about the guilt sensitivity of player B , she will go In when matched with agents of group H , and Out when matched with agents of group L . In the former case they both gain 1, whereas in the latter they gain 2. Therefore, the average payoff of agents who belong to group H is higher than the average payoff of agents who belong to group L . In this case, cultural heterogeneity is not sustained in the long run and agents of group H invade the society. It is interesting to notice that in this region the social dynamics leads to a homogeneous population in the long run, despite the presence of cultural substitution.¹⁵

Proposition 2 states that results are independent of parenting styles. Notably, even if parents are materialistic, guilt sensitivity plays a role for the evolution of the population dynamics. For example, consider a materialistic and selfish society where agents have no guilt aversion ($\theta^L = 0$) — i.e., the y -axis of Figure 4. Suppose that a new small group of agents with positive guilt aversion ($\theta^H > 0$) enters in the society at time t so that $q_t = 1 - \varepsilon$, with an arbitrary $\varepsilon > 0$. If the guilt sensitivity of this minority group is small, $\theta^H < 1$, the trait is preserved in the long-run but has no effect on the outcome of the society. If, instead, the guilt sensitivity of the minority is large enough, $\theta^H > 1$, then, not only the trait is preserved but it also dominates in the long-run and leads the whole society to play (I, S) . The result holds irrespectively of the size ε and of the parenting style.

Overall, if at least one group has a high enough guilt sensitivity (i.e., $\theta^H \geq 1$) and agents are able to observe the guilt sensitivity of their partner, in the long run the level of trust of the society (namely the share of agents playing In) reaches its maximum. The following remark presents the implications of the results above on the level of trust(worthiness).

Remark 1 *With complete information about the matching, independently on the parenting style, the levels of trust and trustworthiness in the society weakly increase over time.*

5 Incomplete Information about the Matching

The assumption of observability of the guilt aversion trait may hold in small communities, but is less realistic in large anonymous societies. Depending on the way agents interact

¹⁵In this case, despite the fact that τ_t^L displays cultural substitution, the long-run homogeneity is reached because τ_t^H is always zero.




Figure 4: Population dynamics and selected equilibrium strategies in the case of common knowledge of the matching.

in the society they live in, they may observe (or infer) the guilt aversion traits of their partners or not. As a matter of example, in large cities, in which interactions are much more sparse and happen daily also among agents who do not know each others, it is very likely that the trait of the matched partner is not observed. Therefore, in this section, we study the long-run dynamics of guilt when agents in their adult age interact in a strategic environment where, for each interaction, there is incomplete information about the matching, i.e., player A does not know whether player B belongs to group H or L . As a consequence, player A forms beliefs on her expected payoff by combining her beliefs on the probability that players B from group $i \in C$ Share, with the information on the population shares, q_t . Note that the population shares, and in turn the strategies, now depend on t . However, for simplicity of notation, we drop the subscript t as long as we analyze the equilibrium of the trust game. We restore the dependence on t explicitly in Section 5.1 when we analyze the social dynamics. The disappointment of player A now on A 's beliefs on both low guilt and high guilt B players, and on the population share of the low guilt group, q as follows:

$$D_A(\mathbf{s}, \boldsymbol{\alpha}_A) = (1 - \alpha_A^I) \cdot 1 + \alpha_A^I \cdot 2(q\alpha_A^{L,S} + (1 - q)\alpha_A^{H,S}).$$

Note that the main difference between complete and incomplete information is that in the latter the agents' expected payoffs and, their strategies, depend on the population share q . In detail, the expected payoffs of players in role A depend on their beliefs about how many agents plan to play *Share* when in role B . This, in turn, affects the second-order beliefs of agents in role B , and their possible psychological loss.

A BSE in pure strategies is now constituted by a profile of strategies $\mathbf{s} = (s_A, s_B^L, s_B^H)$, together with a profile of (correct) second-order beliefs $\boldsymbol{\beta} = (\beta_A, \beta_B^L, \beta_B^H)$ — where the first element of the vector refers to player A , the second to player B if belongs to group L , and the third to player B if belongs to group H . Note that, as far as player A is concerned, the equilibrium describes her behavior and her beliefs regardless of her group, as we assume that each player A holds the same (homogeneous) beliefs. Player B 's behavior, instead, depends on whether he belongs to group L or H . Note that, the composition of the population q_t affects both player A 's beliefs and her disappointment, and therefore it affects the equilibrium which is played.

Appendix B reports the formal definition of the equilibrium concept we adopt and the characterization of the (pure strategy) BSEs of this game. Some of the regions suffer of the same problem of multiplicity of equilibrium strategy profiles, as for the case with complete information. As before, we select equilibria according to the Pareto dominance criterion.¹⁶

Let us define $\bar{\theta}(q) := \frac{1}{1-q}$. Figure 6 summarizes the selected equilibrium strategies in different regions of the parameter space. To understand how incomplete information about the matching shapes behavior with respect to the complete information case, in Figure 6 we highlight the areas in which the equilibrium outcomes are the same as in the complete information setting.




Figure 5: Selected equilibrium behavior in the case of unknown matching. The red-shadowed area represents the regions in which the selected equilibrium outcome is the same as in the complete information case.

Let us now discuss the results keeping the same classification of regions as in Section

¹⁶Details of the equilibrium selection procedure can be found in Appendix C.

4 for ease of comparison.

Region 1 ($\theta^L \leq \theta^H < 1$): Agents always choose *Out* when in role *A* and *Take* when in role *B*, regardless of their group, as in the complete information case.

Region 2 ($\theta^L < 1 \leq \theta^H$): Let us first consider players in role *A*. Note that *L* agents have such a low guilt sensitivity that, when in role *B*, they always *Take*, independently of the population shares. Therefore, if $q > \frac{1}{2}$ (Figure 6b), independently of what agents *H* choose, an agent in role *A* always prefers to go *Out*. Conversely, if $q < \frac{1}{2}$ (Figure 6a), the optimal choice depends on what agents *H* do when playing in role *B*: if they *Share*, the optimal choice for players in role *A* is to go *In*, so that the equilibrium strategy is (I, T, S) ; if they *Take*, the optimal choice is to go *Out* and the equilibrium strategy is (O, T, T) .

Consider now agents in role *B*. As we discussed above, agents *L* always *Take*. Instead, the optimal choices of agents *H* when in role *B* depend on both q and their own guilt sensitivity. The threshold $\bar{\theta}(q)$ is the guilt sensitivity for which, given q , agents *H* are indifferent between *Sharing* and *Taking*. For higher levels of guilt sensitivity ($\theta^H > \bar{\theta}(q)$), agents *H* always *Share*, and for lower levels ($\theta^H < \bar{\theta}(q)$) agents *H* always *Take*.

Note that, if q increases, the area in which the equilibrium strategy profile is (O, T, T) grows larger, given that $\bar{\theta}(q) = \frac{1}{1-q}$ is increasing in q . As a matter of fact, when q_t is large, the expected payoff of player *A* from going *In* is low and so is her disappointment.

Region 3 ($1 \leq \theta^L \leq \theta^H$): In this region, the equilibrium strategy profile that survives the Pareto dominance selection is (I, S, S) . Thus, the equilibrium outcome is the same as with complete information for every possible matching.

Table 2 reports the equilibrium average material payoffs and psychological utilities in the different parametric regions. Note that, psychological utilities differ from material payoffs only when the selected equilibrium prescribes (I, T, S) .

As we did in the previous section, we now analyze the results about cultural complementarity and substitution of Proposition 1 when agents have incomplete information about the partner's group.

Corollary 2 *Under incomplete information about the matching,*

- τ_t^H displays cultural complementarity if and only if parents are imperfectly empathic and $\theta^L < 1$ and $\theta^H \geq \bar{\theta}(q_t)$;
- τ_t^L displays cultural complementarity if and only if parents are (perfectly or imperfectly) empathic and $\frac{1}{2(1-q_t)} < \theta^L < 1$ and $\theta^H \geq \bar{\theta}(q_t)$.

<i>Pop. share</i>	<i>Bounds of the region</i>	<i>Average material payoff</i>	<i>Average psychological utility</i>
$q_t \leq \frac{1}{2}$	$\theta^L < 1$ and $\theta^H < \bar{\theta}(q_t)$	$\bar{m}^L = \bar{m}^H = 1$	$\bar{u}^L = \bar{u}^H = 1$
	$\theta^L < 1$ and $\theta^H \geq \bar{\theta}(q_t)$	$\bar{m}_t^L = 3 - q_t,$ $\bar{m}_t^H = 2 - q_t$	$\bar{u}_t^L = 3 - q_t - \theta^L(1 - q_t),$ $\bar{u}_t^H = 2 - q_t$
	$\theta^L \geq 1$ and $\theta^H > 1$	$\bar{m}^L = \bar{m}^H = 2$	$\bar{u}^L = \bar{u}^H = 2$
$q_t > \frac{1}{2}$	$\theta^L < 1$	$\bar{m}^L = \bar{m}^H = 1$	$\bar{u}^L = \bar{u}^H = 1$
	$1 \leq \theta^L \leq \theta^H$	$\bar{m}^L = \bar{m}^H = 2$	$\bar{u}^L = \bar{u}^H = 2$

Table 2: Average material payoffs and psychological utilities, given the levels of guilt aversion, the group, and the population share, when the matching is unknown.

From Corollary 2 we see that socialization efforts may display cultural complementarity only when the equilibrium strategy profile is (I, T, S) — i.e., in the area $\theta^L < 1$ and $\theta^H \geq \bar{\theta}(q_t)$ — and only if parents take into account children’s psychological utility when choosing the optimal socialization effort. Indeed, from Table 2 it is straightforward to see that only in this parameter space the cultural intolerance may depend on q_t .

In this area, when parents are imperfectly emphatic the optimal socialization of parents of group H always displays cultural complementarity because the higher their share, the higher the share of matches in which the cooperative path (I, S) is played and the higher the payoffs.¹⁷

Consider low guilt agents. As shown Table 2, L agents always have a material advantage over H agents, but the $\bar{m}_t^L - \bar{m}_t^H$ is independent of q_t . Thus, if parents were just materialistic, only cultural substitution would have been displayed. If parents have positive guilt sensitivity and are empathic, their guilt towards H agents would counter-balance this effect. However, for low guilt sensitivity levels (i.e., $\theta^L < \frac{1}{2(1-q_t)}$) this effect is not strong enough and we always see substitution. On the contrary, if guilt sensitivity is higher (i.e., $\theta^L > \frac{1}{2(1-q_t)}$) complementarity arises.

5.1 Social Dynamics

We now consider the population dynamics induced by the equilibrium strategies. Given that material and psychological payoffs differ for some parameter space (as shown in Table 2), we have that the dynamics may differ depending on the parenting styles. Indeed, by looking at equation (6), it is clear that the dynamics is characterized by the difference in the socialization efforts, which in turn depends on the way parents evaluate children’s expected payoffs, i.e., on their parenting styles, as discussed in Section 2.3.

In what follows, we present the full characterization of the population dynamics and the steady-state strategies for the whole parameter space θ and for any possible q_0 (see

¹⁷Notably, if they were perfectly empathic and, thus, evaluated the future psychological payoffs of low guilt children with the correct psychological parameter, they would have never socialized them because $\Delta^H < 0$.

Figures 6 and 7 and Table 2).

We begin by characterizing the dynamics in the regions where they are independent from parenting styles (Proposition 3). We then focus on the most interesting case, where different parenting styles generate different dynamics (Propositions 4 and 5).

Proposition 3 *Consider the dynamics in equation (6) with incomplete information about the matching, and fix (θ, q_0) . If either (i) $q_0 > \frac{1}{2}$, or (ii) $q_0 \leq \frac{1}{2}$, $\theta^L < 1$, and $\theta^H \leq \bar{\theta}(q_0)$, or (iii) $q_0 \leq \frac{1}{2}$ and $1 \leq \theta^L < \theta^H$, then, **independently of parenting style**, $\dot{q}_t(\theta) = 0$, so that $q_\theta^* = q_0$.*

The proposition characterizes the dynamics in those regions in which the average psychological utility is the same across groups and it coincides with the average material payoff, as there is no psychological loss from guilt (see Table 2). This happens in regions in which players in role *A* go *Out* and in those where all agents behave alike regardless of their group —as both guilt sensitivities are very high or very low. In all these cases, independently of the parenting styles, $\dot{q}_t(\theta) = 0$ and the steady-state population share coincides with q_0 .

Let us now focus on those cases in which the parenting style plays a role, namely when $q_0 \leq \frac{1}{2}$, $\theta^L < 1$, and $\theta^H \geq \bar{\theta}(q_0)$. Note that the threshold $\bar{\theta}(q_t)$ evolves together with the population share, and this must be taken into account for the characterization of the steady state q_θ^* .

Materialism and perfectly empathy. If parents are materialistic, only material payoffs play a role in determining the optimal socialization efforts. In such a case, the material advantage in favor of group *L*, induced by the equilibrium strategy (I, T, S) , makes $\tau^L > \tau^H = 0$, so that the share of agents of group *L* increases. The same holds in the presence of perfect empathy, as the material advantage that agents of group *L* have from *Taking* in role *B* is larger than their psychological loss from guilt. As a matter of fact, agents belonging to group *L* could ensure themselves the same utility as agents of group *H* by *Sharing* in role *B*, but they have a higher psychological utility from *Taking*. Proposition 4 characterizes the dynamics and the steady state for this case. Let $\bar{q}_{\theta^H} := \{q : \theta^H = \bar{\theta}(q)\}$.

Proposition 4 *Consider the dynamics in equation (6) with (M) or (PE), incomplete information about the matching, and fix (θ, q_0) , with $q_0 < \frac{1}{2}$. If $\theta^L < 1$ and $\theta^H \geq \bar{\theta}(q_0)$, then $\dot{q}_t(\theta) \geq 0$, $q_\theta^* = \min\{\bar{q}_{\theta^H}, \frac{1}{2}\}$, and $\mathbf{s}_\theta^* = (I, T, S)$.*

From Proposition 4, we can see that, if parents are materialistic or perfectly empathic, in the considered region the share of group *L* in the society, q_t , increases. When this happens, $\bar{\theta}(q_t)$ increases as well up to the point where either $\bar{\theta}(q_t) = \theta^H$ or $q_t = \frac{1}{2}$.

The Figure 6 summarizes the social dynamics in the presence of materialistic and perfectly empathic parents, merging the results of Proposition 3 and 4. Specifically, in Figure 6b we see that whenever $q_t > \frac{1}{2}$ there is no dynamics, whereas Figure 6a shows that when $q_t \leq \frac{1}{2}$ there is a region in which the share of agents of group L in society increases.




Figure 6: Population dynamics and selected equilibrium strategies in the case unknown matching and materialistic or perfectly empathic parents. The red-shadowed area represents the regions in which the selected equilibrium outcome is the same as in the complete information case.

Let us now compare the social dynamics with incomplete information with the one with complete information (i.e., Figure 4). We find a difference in Region 2 ($\theta^L < 1 \leq \theta^H$). In particular, if $q_t > \frac{1}{2}$ (Figure 6b), there is no dynamics and the population shares remain fixed independently on the initial conditions. On the other hand, if $q_t \leq \frac{1}{2}$, when $\theta^H \in [1, \bar{\theta}(q))$ all the agents gain the same utility and population shares are fixed over time, given that player A always goes *Out*; whereas, if $\theta^H \geq \bar{\theta}(q)$ the share of agents of group L increases. Therefore, we can conclude that if parents are either materialistic or perfectly empathic, incomplete information favours agents with low guilt sensitivity, L , and always guarantees cultural heterogeneity in the long-run.

The implication of the dynamics on the level of trust and trustworthiness are contained in the following remark.

Remark 2 *With incomplete information about the matching, if parents are materialistic or perfectly empathic the level of trustworthiness in the society weakly decreases over time.*

Imperfectly empathy. Let us now consider parents who evaluate the psychological utilities of children using their own guilt sensitivity. Let us recall that, in the region where $\theta^L < 1$, $\theta^H \geq \bar{\theta}(q_0)$, and $q_0 \leq \frac{1}{2}$, the psychological utility of low guilt agents is $\bar{u}_t^L = 3 - q_t - \theta^L(1 - q_t)$, whereas high guilt agents do not face any psychological loss and, thus, $\bar{u}^H = \bar{m}^H = 2 - q_t$ (see Table 2). Under imperfect empathy high guilt parents evaluate the psychological utility of agents belonging to group L as $\hat{u}_t^L = 3 - q_t - \theta^H(1 - q_t)$. Therefore, given $\theta^H > \theta^L$, high guilt parents overestimate the eventual psychological loss of a child of group L and, thus, they exert a higher socialization effort with respect to perfectly empathic parents. Low guilt parents, on the contrary, exert the same socialization effort τ^L as perfectly empathic parents, because on the one hand they evaluate their children's psychological utility with the correct θ^L , and, on the other hand, their evaluation of group H utility is not affected by any assumption about parents' empathy because they do not experience any guilt. Let us define the following values: $\bar{\theta}'(q_t) := \frac{1 - (1 - q_t)^2 \theta^L}{q_t(1 - q_t)}$, $\hat{\theta}(q_t) := \frac{1 - 2q_t}{(1 - q_t)^2}$, $\bar{q}_{\theta^H} := \{q : \theta^H = \bar{\theta}'(q_0)\}$, and $\hat{q}_{\theta^L} := \{q : \theta^L = \hat{\theta}(q_0)\}$.¹⁸

Proposition 5 *Consider the dynamics in equation (6) with (IE) and incomplete information about the matching. Fix (θ, q_0) with $q_0 < \frac{1}{2}$. If $\theta^L < 1$ and $\theta^H \geq \bar{\theta}(q_0)$, then,*

- *if $\theta^H < \bar{\theta}'(q_0)$, then $\dot{q}_t \geq 0$. Moreover, if $\theta^L < \hat{\theta}(q_0)$ then $q_{\theta}^* = \min\{\bar{q}_{\theta^H}, \bar{q}'_{\theta^H}, \hat{q}_{\theta^L}\}$, whereas, if $\theta^L \geq \hat{\theta}(q_0)$ then $q_{\theta}^* = \min\{\frac{1}{2}, \bar{q}_{\theta^H}\}$;*
- *If $\theta^H \geq \bar{\theta}'(q_0)$, then $\dot{q}_t \leq 0$. Moreover, if $\theta^L \leq \hat{\theta}(q_0)$ then $q_{\theta}^* = \hat{q}_{\theta^L}$, whereas, if $\theta^L > \hat{\theta}(q_0)$ then $q_{\theta}^* = \bar{q}_{\theta^H}$.*

Proposition 5 shows that imperfect empathy mitigates the positive effect of incomplete information on q_t , allowing the share of L agents to decrease in the society and, thus, allowing the overall level of guilt sensitivity to increase. Notably, this happens only if group H agents have a high enough guilt sensitivity. In this case, H agents, when evaluating the psychological loss of a child of group L , use their high guilt sensitivity parameter and overestimate the eventual psychological loss of a child of group L . For this reason, parents of group H have a high incentive to directly socialize children to own trait, so that their share in the society increases, i.e., q_t decreases. We can see in Figure 7 that, under imperfect empathy, if $q_0 \leq \frac{1}{2}$ there is the area $\theta^H \geq \bar{\theta}'(q_0)$ in which $\dot{q}_t < 0$. The case in which $q_0 > \frac{1}{2}$ is described by Figure 6b as the parenting style does not matter when $q_0 > \frac{1}{2}$.

The implication of the dynamics on the evolution of trust and trustworthiness in the presence of imperfect empathy are summarized by the following remark

Remark 3 *With incomplete information about the matching, if parents are imperfectly empathic the level of trustworthiness in the society weakly decrease over time if $\theta^H < \bar{\theta}'(q_0)$ and weakly increases if $\theta^H \geq \bar{\theta}'(q_0)$.*

¹⁸Note that both $\bar{\theta}'(q_t)$ and $\hat{\theta}(q_t)$ are larger than $\bar{\theta}(q_t)$.




Figure 7: Population dynamics and selected equilibrium strategies in the case of unknown matching, imperfectly emphatic parents and $q_0 \leq \frac{1}{2}$. The red-shadowed area represents the regions in which the selected equilibrium outcome is the same as in the complete information case.

6 An Example with Homophily

So far we have assumed that the matching of agents in the society was random. However, in reality this seldom happens. Indeed, it is a well-known fact in the literature that agents are more prone to interact with people with similar traits (Currarini et al., 2009). This phenomenon is known as *homophily*.

Let $a \in [0, 1]$ be the *inbreeding* homophily rate which biases the random matching.¹⁹ Let us also define ρ_t^i as the probability, at time t , of an agent of group $i \in C$ to meet an agent of the same group. Note that, generically, $\rho^i \neq 1 - \rho^j$. Specifically,

$$\begin{cases} \rho_t^L = a + (1 - a)q_t \\ \rho_t^H = a + (1 - a)(1 - q_t). \end{cases}$$

When we introduce homophily, also the strategy of player A might depend on the group she belongs to, as her expectation on B 's strategy (correctly) depend on her group. Consider for example an equilibrium in which B players from group L Take, and B players from group H Share. In the presence of homophily, A players from group H have a higher probability of being matched (and therefore a higher α_A^S) than A players from group L . As a consequence, a strategy profile has now length 4.

Specifically, player A 's probability of being matched with a player B from group L

¹⁹We call the homophily rate a , as homophily induces assortative matching between agents.

now depends on the group of player A . We denote these probabilities with \hat{q}_t^k , where $k = H, L$ denotes the group player A belongs to. These probabilities are:

$$\begin{aligned}\hat{q}_t^L &= \rho^L = a + (1 - a)q_t, \\ \hat{q}_t^H &= 1 - \rho^H = (1 - a)q_t.\end{aligned}$$

As a consequence, A 's disappointment depends on A 's group as follows:

$$D_A(\mathbf{s}, \boldsymbol{\alpha}_A) = (1 - \alpha_A^{i,I}) \cdot 1 + \alpha_A^{i,I} \cdot 2(\hat{q}_t^i \alpha_A^{L,S} + (1 - \hat{q}_t^i) \alpha_A^{H,S}).$$

Also player B 's belief on A 's belief on being matched with a B player from group L now depends on his group. Let us call $\mathbb{E}^k(\hat{q}_t)$ the correct belief of a player B of group k on the expectation of his matched A 's on his own group. This belief depends on B 's group, as his group affects the probability of being matched with a player A from a specific group, together with the fact that player A 's expectations (correctly) depend on her group. The two beliefs are:

$$\begin{aligned}\mathbb{E}^H(q_t) &= \rho^H \hat{q}_t^H + (1 - \rho^H) \hat{q}_t^L = (1 - a^2)q_t, \\ \mathbb{E}^L(q_t) &= \rho^L \hat{q}_t^L + (1 - \rho^L) \hat{q}_t^H = a^2 + (1 - a^2)q_t.\end{aligned}$$

Note that homophily makes it more likely for a B player from group L to be matched with a player A (from group L) who expects to be matched with a player B from group L with a higher probability. Let us define, the thresholds $\bar{\theta}_a(q_t) := \frac{1}{1 - (1-a)q_t}$ and $\bar{\theta}_{a^2}(q_t) := \frac{1}{1 - (1-a^2)q_t}$, which coincide with $\bar{\theta}_a(q_t)$ when there is no homophily (i.e., $a = 0$).

Figure 8 shows the selected equilibrium strategy profiles in the case of homophily. The characterization of the equilibria and the selection procedure are contained in Appendix D.

We can see in the figure below the two thresholds on q_t that delimits the three panels (i.e., $\frac{1}{2(1-a)}$ and $\frac{1-2a}{2(1-a)}$) are decreasing and increasing in a , respectively. This, implies that as the level of assortativity increases, the space of q_t for which the equilibrium strategies are described by Panel b increases.

Lastly note that, since we are considering just materialistic parents, and the cultural intolerance with materialistic parents is always independent on q_t , the socialization efforts always displays cultural substitution.

Social dynamics In what follows we analyze the impact of homophily on the population dynamics, in the presence of materialistic parents.

Let us start noticing that, whenever the equilibrium strategies are (O, O, T, T) , (O, O, T, S) , or (I, I, S, S) , the payoffs are the same for both groups so that the population shares show no dynamics. Therefore, by looking at Figure 8, if $q_0 > \frac{1}{2(1-a)}$ or if $\theta^L > 1$ or $\theta^H < \bar{\theta}_a(q_0)$,




Figure 8: Selected equilibrium strategies with unknown matching and homophily. The red-shadowed area represents the regions in which the selected equilibrium outcome is the same as in the complete information and incomplete information without homophily cases. The blue-dotted-shadowed area represents the regions in which the selected equilibrium outcome is the same as in the incomplete information case without homophily (but different from the complete information case).

then $\dot{q} = 0$.²⁰

Proposition 6 provides the main insights from the dynamics for the areas in which population shares do change. Note that a full characterization of steady states can be found in the proof of the proposition in Appendix A.


Proposition 6 *Consider the dynamics (6) with (M) and homophily, at $\theta^L < 1$, $\theta^H \geq \bar{\theta}_a(q_0)$, $q_0 \leq \frac{1}{2(1-a)}$. Then,*

- If $a \leq 1/3$, then $\dot{q}_t \geq 0$ and the steady state is weakly increasing in θ^H ;
- If $a > 1/3$, then:
 - if $q_0 > \frac{1-2a}{2(1-a)}$, then $\dot{q}_t < 0$;
 - if $q_0 \leq \frac{1-2a}{2(1-a)}$, then $\dot{q}_t > 0$ if $\theta^H \geq \bar{\theta}_{a^2} \left(\frac{1-2a}{2(1-a)} \right)$, whereas $\dot{q}_t = 0$ otherwise.

From Proposition 6, we can see that, if homophily is low (i.e., $a < \frac{1}{3}$), then agents of group L , interacting often enough with agents of group H , can exploit them and, thus, get advantage of partners' high guilt, so that $\dot{q}_t > 0$. Note that, unsurprisingly, this result is in line with what happens for the case without homophily. Moreover, the higher θ^H , the more L agents are better-off and, thus, their share in the society at the steady state is larger.

As homophily increases, low guilt agents have a lower possibility to exploit high guilt agents, as they are less often matched with them.

²⁰Note that $\dot{q}_t = 0$ even when $q_t \leq \frac{1-2a}{2(1-a)}$, $\theta^L < 1$, and $\bar{\theta}_{a^2}(q_t) \leq \theta^H < \bar{\theta}_a(q_t)$. This case is internalized in Proposition 6.



(a) for $\theta^L < 1$, $\theta^H \geq \bar{\theta}_a(q_0)$, when $\theta^H \geq \bar{\theta}_{a^2} \left(\frac{1-2a}{2(1-a)} \right)$.



(b) for $\theta^L < 1$, $\theta^H \geq \bar{\theta}_a(q_0)$, when $\theta^H < \bar{\theta}_{a^2} \left(\frac{1-2a}{2(1-a)} \right)$.

Figure 9: Social Dynamics with homophily, when $a > \frac{1}{3}$

If homophily is high enough (i.e., $a > \frac{1}{3}$) agents of both groups interact among themselves with a large enough frequency, so that their payoffs is mostly affected by the equilibrium strategies played by the agents belonging to their own group. In particular, when the share of agents of group L is sufficiently high in the society (i.e., $q_0 > \frac{1-2a}{2(1-a)}$), low guilt agents interact mainly among themselves and their low guilt make them worse-off with respect to H agents. On the contrary, if the share of L agents is low (i.e., $q_0 \leq \frac{1-2a}{2(1-a)}$), then, even for relatively high levels of homophily, they interact with many H agents. Therefore, if the guilt parameter of H agents, θ^H , is above a certain threshold, L agents can exploit it and gain higher payoffs, hence $\dot{q}_t > 0$. If instead the guilt parameter of H agents is below the threshold, agents of both groups choose *Out* since the level of trustworthiness is so low that no one trust any other agent (and thus $\dot{q}_t = 0$).

The implication of the population dynamics on the level of trust and trustworthiness are summarized in the following remark.

Remark 4 *Consider the case of incomplete information about the matching, homophily, and materialistic parents.*

- *If homophily is low ($a \leq 1/3$), the levels of trust and trustworthiness in the society weakly decrease over time.*
- *If homophily is high ($a > 1/3$), the levels of trust and trustworthiness increase for high population shares whereas for low population shares the levels of trust and trustworthiness weakly decrease.*

7 Conclusion

This paper is the first analysis of the evolution of psychological preferences, in particular guilt sensitivity, due to cultural transmission, and of the consequences that this transmission has on the evolution of cooperation, trust, and trustworthiness.

Agents in this model are the more cooperative the higher their guilt sensitivity, as the desire of avoid guilt feelings (guilt aversion) induces them to share in the trust game. We find that, when agents can observe whether their partner belongs to a high or low guilt population, socialization efforts always display cultural substitution and the share of agents with low guilt weakly decreases over time, so that, trust and trustworthiness increase.

When agents do not know to which group their partner belongs, the advantage of high guilt agents disappears and the socialization efforts may display cultural complementarity depending on the parenting styles and the level of guilt sensitivity. Moreover, in most cases, and for most parenting styles, the share of the low guilt population weakly increases, as low guilt agents ensure themselves a higher material payoff by betraying the trust of their partners who cannot recognize them as low guilt. However, when parents are imperfectly empathic, the share of high guilt is weakly increasing when their guilt sensitivity is sufficiently high. This is because parents fail to evaluate what will be the true psychological utility in case their children adopted a different mindset. In a way, imperfect empathy makes the evolution of trust possible because it misrepresents the effects of betrayal in the eyes of cooperative parents.

The concept of imperfect empathy may at first seem farfetched. However, when one thinks at the systems of beliefs that sustained cooperation in large anonymous societies—the most important examples being large monotheist religions—the assumption of imperfect empathy is realistic. When parents believe that a supernatural entity may punish them or their children for misconduct, or lack of cooperation, they will evaluate children’s utility according to their belief, i.e., with imperfect empathy. As in some religions guilt is a relevant trait (Walinga et al., 2005; Sheldon, 2006; Oviedo, 2016), our model also speaks to the literature that investigate the link between the evolution of religious beliefs and the evolution of trust (Norenzayan, 2013). The relation between cultural transmission of psychological traits and the evolution of institutions is a topic that deserves to be investigated further.

A Proofs of Propositions

Proof of Proposition 1

Let us consider two generic group i and j . The socialization effort of i , τ^i , display cultural substitution if and only if :

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial \tau_t^i}{\partial q_t^i} &= -\Delta V_t^i + (1 - q_t^i) \frac{\partial \Delta V_t^i}{\partial q_t^i} < 0 \\ &\frac{\partial \Delta V_t^i}{\partial q_t^i} < \frac{\Delta V_t^i}{(1 - q_t^i)} \\ &\frac{\partial \Delta V_t^i}{\partial q_t^i} \frac{(1 - q_t^i)}{\Delta V_t^i} < 1 \\ &-\frac{\partial \Delta V_t^i}{\partial q_t^j} \underbrace{\frac{q_t^j}{\Delta V_t^i}}_{\geq 0} < 1 \end{aligned}$$

The result follows from the last inequality. ■

Proof of Proposition 2

In Regions 1 and 3, for every $i, j \in C$, $V_t^{ij} = V_t^{ii}$ so that $\Delta V_t^i = \Delta V_t^j = 0$. Then, given equation (5), independently of q_t , $\tau_t^{i*} = \tau_t^{j*} = 0$, so that any q_t is a steady state.

Consider now Region 2. By construction of (6), $q_t = 0$ and $q_t = 1$ are always steady states. Moreover, $\bar{m}_t^L = \frac{3-q_t}{2} < 2 - \frac{q_t}{2} = \bar{m}_t^H$, and consequently $0 > \Delta V_t^L = -\Delta V_t^H$. Then, for every q_t , $\tau_t^{H*} > \tau_t^{L*} = 0$ and $\dot{q}_t < 0$ for every $q_t \in (0, 1)$. Consequently $q_t = 0$ is globally stable. Equilibrium actions follows. ■

Proof of Corollary 2

We can see from Table 2 that, for materialistic parents and all the parameter spaces different from $\theta^L < 1$ and $\theta^H \geq \bar{\theta}(q_t)$, cultural intolerances ΔV^L and ΔV^H do not depend on the population shares. Therefore, using the result of Proposition 1, socialization effort always displays cultural substitution. Let us now focus on empathic parents and $\theta^L < 1$ and $\theta^H \geq \bar{\theta}(q_t)$. For low guilt parents, substituting the value of ΔV_t^L as in Table 2, there

is cultural complementarity if and only if :

$$\begin{aligned}\frac{\partial \tau_t^L}{\partial q_t} &= -\Delta V_t^L + (1 - q_t) \frac{\partial \Delta V_t^L}{\partial q_t} > 0 \\ -1 + \theta^L(1 - q_t) + (1 - q_t)\theta^L &> 0 \\ \theta^L &> \frac{1}{2(1 - q_t)}\end{aligned}$$

Let us consider high guilt imperfectly empathic parents, substituting the value of ΔV_t^H as in Table 2, there is cultural complementarity if and only if:

$$\begin{aligned}\frac{\partial \tau_t^H}{\partial(1 - q_t)} &= -\Delta V_t^H + q_t \frac{\partial \Delta V_t^H}{\partial(1 - q_t)} > 0 \\ -1 + \theta^H(1 - q_t) + q_t\theta^H &> 0 \\ -1 + \theta^H - \theta^H q_t + q_t\theta^H &> 0 \\ \theta^H &> 1 \quad \text{always.}\end{aligned}$$

If instead high guilt parent are perfectly emphatic $\Delta V_t^H = 1 - \theta^L(1 - q_t)$, which with $\theta^L < 1$ is always negative, thus, $\tau_t^H = 0$. ■

Proof of Proposition 3

Consider the payoffs agents get when $\theta^L < \bar{\theta}(q_t)$, and $\theta^H \geq \bar{\theta}(q_t)$ provided in Table 2 and in Appendix B. In all these regions $m^H = m^L = u^H = u^L$. Then, independently of the parenting style $\dot{q} = 0$. ■

Proof Proposition 4

Materialistic Parents In this region, the equilibrium is (I,T,S). Recall also that $\theta^H \geq \bar{\theta}(q_t)$ implies $q_t \leq \frac{\theta^H - 1}{\theta^H}$, and that $\theta^L < \bar{\theta}(q_t)$ implies $q_t > \frac{\theta^L - 1}{\theta^L}$. As shown in Table 2 and in Appendix B, $m^L = 3 - q_t$ and $m^H = 2 - q_t$. Then, for each $q_t \in (\frac{\theta^L - 1}{\theta^L}, \frac{\theta^H - 1}{\theta^H}]$, $m^L > m^H$. Because parents are materialistic, $\tau^{L*} > \tau^{H*}$. Thus $\dot{q}_t > 0$ and $q_\theta^* = \min\{\frac{\theta^H - 1}{\theta^H}, \frac{1}{2}\}$.

Perfectly Empathic Parents In this region, the equilibrium is (I,T,S), therefore

$$\begin{aligned}\bar{u}^L &= \frac{1}{2} \cdot [(1 - q_t) \cdot 2 + q_t \cdot 0] + \frac{1}{2} \cdot [4 - \theta^L \cdot 2(1 - q_t)] = 3 - q_t - \theta^L(1 - q_t) \\ \bar{u}^H &= \frac{1}{2} \cdot [(1 - q_t) \cdot 2 + q_t \cdot 0] + \frac{1}{2} \cdot 2 = 2 - q_t.\end{aligned}$$

Note that $\bar{u}^L > \bar{u}^H$ and, thus, $\tau^L > \tau^H$ if and only if

$$\begin{aligned} 4 - 2\theta^L(1 - q_t) &> 2 \\ 2 - \theta^L(1 - q_t) &> 1 \\ 1 - \theta^L(1 - q_t) &> 0, \end{aligned}$$

hence, when

$$\theta^L < \frac{1}{1 - q_t}.$$

which always holds in this region. Thus, we have that $\tau^L > \tau^H$ always and thus $\dot{q}_t > 0$ and $q_\theta^* = \min\{\frac{\theta^H - 1}{\theta^H}, \frac{1}{2}\}$. ■

Proof Proposition 5

Recall that the equilibrium in this region is (I,T,S). Then, the psychological utilities are

$$\begin{aligned} \bar{u}^L &= \frac{1}{2} \cdot [(1 - q_t) \cdot 2 + q_t \cdot 0] + \frac{1}{2} \cdot [4 - \theta^L \cdot 2(1 - q_t)] = 3 - q_t - \theta^L(1 - q_t), \\ \hat{u}^L &= \frac{1}{2} \cdot [(1 - q_t) \cdot 2 + q_t \cdot 0] + \frac{1}{2} \cdot [4 - \theta^H \cdot 2(1 - q_t)] = 3 - q_t - \theta^H(1 - q_t), \\ \bar{u}^H = \hat{u}^H &= \frac{1}{2} \cdot [(1 - q_t) \cdot 2 + q_t \cdot 0] + \frac{1}{2} \cdot 2 = 2 - q_t. \end{aligned}$$

Consider first low guilt agents. Note that $\bar{u}^L > \hat{u}^H$ if and only if $4 - 2\theta^L(1 - q_t) > 2$, that is, $\theta^L < \frac{1}{1 - q_t} = \bar{\theta}(q_t)$. Thus, since $\theta^L < 1$, we always have that $\tau^{L*} > 0$.

Consider now high guilt agents. Note that $\bar{u}^H > \hat{u}^L$ if and only if $4 - 2\theta^H(1 - q_t) < 2$, that is, $\theta^H > \frac{1}{1 - q_t}$. This is always the case because, in this area, $\theta^H \geq \bar{\theta}(q_t)$. Then, $\tau^{H*} > 0$ always.

Consider first τ^{L*} .

$$\begin{aligned} \tau^{L*} &= \frac{1}{2}(1 - q_t) [4 - 2\theta^L(1 - q_t) - 2] \\ &= (1 - q_t) (1 - (1 - q_t)\theta^L). \end{aligned}$$

Consider now τ^{H*}

$$\begin{aligned} \tau^{H*} &= \frac{1}{2}q_t [2 - (4 - 2\theta^H(1 - q_t))] \\ &= q_t (-1 + (1 - q_t)\theta^H). \end{aligned}$$

The social dynamics is determined by the difference in parental efforts, which is given by

the following:

$$\tau^{L*} - \tau^{H*} = (1 - q_t) \left(1 - (1 - q_t)\theta^L \right) - q_t \left(-1 + (1 - q_t)\theta^H \right).$$

Therefore,

$$\tau^{L*} - \tau^{H*} > 0 \quad \text{if and only if} \quad \theta^H < \frac{1 - (1 - q_t)^2 \theta^L}{q_t(1 - q_t)} =: \bar{\theta}'(q_t).$$

Notice that $\bar{\theta}'(q_t) > \bar{\theta}(q_t)$ always. Therefore, in the Region 2, $[0, 1] \times [\bar{\theta}(q_t), +\infty]$, where the PBE is (I, T, S) , the dynamics is such that if $\theta \in [0, 1] \times [\bar{\theta}(q_t), \bar{\theta}'(q_t))$, then $\dot{q}_t > 0$; whereas, if $\theta \in [0, 1] \times [\bar{\theta}'(q_t), \infty]$, then $\dot{q}_t < 0$. This is reported in the following Figure 10.




Figure 10: Population dynamics in the case of role-dependent guilt, unknown matching, and imperfectly emphatic parents, in the space $\theta \in [0, 1] \times [\bar{\theta}(q_t), \infty]$.

To study the dynamics given a pair (θ^L, θ^H) we first need to analyze how $\bar{\theta}'(q_t)$ changes with q_t .

$$\frac{\partial \bar{\theta}'(q_t)}{\partial q_t} = \frac{\theta^L + \theta^L q_t^2 - 2\theta^L q_t + 2q_t - 1}{(1 - q_t)^2 q_t^2} = \frac{\theta^L(1 - q_t)^2 + 2q_t - 1}{(1 - q_t)^2 q_t^2}.$$

Then, we have that

$$\frac{\partial \bar{\theta}'(q_t)}{\partial q_t} > 0 \quad \text{if and only if} \quad \theta^L > \frac{1 - 2q_t}{(1 - q_t)^2} =: \hat{\theta}(q_t).$$

Moreover $\frac{\partial \hat{\theta}(q_t)}{\partial q_t} < 0$ always. Note finally that whenever $\theta^H = \bar{\theta}'(q_t)$, $\theta^H = \bar{\theta}(q_t)$, or $\theta^L = \hat{\theta}(q_t)$, then $\dot{q}_t = 0$.

Therefore, considering the space in Region 2, Figure 11 represents the four areas derived by the thresholds $\hat{\theta}(q_t)$ and $\bar{\theta}'(q_t)$.

To analyze the dynamics and characterize the steady state, let us define the following:

$$\tilde{q}^* := \{q : \theta^H = \bar{\theta}'(q), 0 < q < \min\{\frac{1}{2}, \frac{\theta^H - 1}{\theta^H}\}, 0 < \theta^L < 1\} = \frac{\theta^H - 2\theta^L + \sqrt{(\theta^H)^2 + 4\theta^L - 4\theta^H}}{2(\theta^H - \theta^L)} > 0$$




Figure 11: Population dynamics and comparative statics of $\bar{\theta}'(q_t)$ in the case of role-dependent guilt, unknown matching, and imperfectly emphatic parents, in the space $\theta \in [0, 1] \times [\bar{\theta}(q_t), \infty]$.

$$\hat{q}^* := \{q : \theta^L = \hat{\theta}(q), 0 < q < \min\{\frac{1}{2}, \frac{\theta^H - 1}{\theta^H}\}, \theta^L < 1\} = 1 - \frac{1 - \sqrt{1 - \theta^L}}{\theta^L} \in \left[0, \frac{1}{2}\right].$$

Let us consider in turn the areas of the Figure 11.

- If $\theta^H \geq \bar{\theta}'(q_t)$ and $\theta^L \leq \hat{\theta}(q_t)$ (i.e., $q_t \leq \hat{q}_\theta^* \leq \bar{q}'_{\theta^H \theta}$), then $\dot{q}_t \leq 0$. Thus, as q_t decreases, $\bar{\theta}'(q_t)$ increases, $\hat{\theta}(q_t)$ increases, and $\bar{\theta}(q_t)$ decreases. Given a point (θ^L, θ^H) in this area, and given how $\bar{\theta}(q_t)$, $\bar{\theta}'(q_t)$, $\hat{\theta}(q_t)$ move with q_t , then the dynamics stops when $\theta^H = \bar{\theta}'(q_t)$, so that $q_\theta^* = \bar{q}'_{\theta^H}$.
- if $\theta^H \geq \bar{\theta}'(q_t)$ and $\theta^L > \hat{\theta}(q_t)$ (i.e., $q_t \geq \bar{q}'_{\theta^H \theta}$ and $q_t \geq \hat{q}_\theta^*$), $\dot{q}_t \leq 0$. Thus, as q_t decreases, $\bar{\theta}'(q_t)$ decreases, $\hat{\theta}(q_t)$ increases, and $\bar{\theta}(q_t)$ decreases. Given a point (θ^L, θ^H) in this area, and given how $\bar{\theta}(q_t)$, $\bar{\theta}'(q_t)$, $\hat{\theta}(q_t)$ move with q_t , then the dynamics stops when $\theta^L = \hat{\theta}(q_t)$, so that $q_\theta^* = \hat{q}^*$.
- if $\theta^H < \bar{\theta}'(q_t)$ and $\theta^L \geq \hat{\theta}(q_t)$ (i.e., $\hat{q}_\theta^* \leq q_t \leq \bar{q}'_{\theta^H \theta}$), $\dot{q}_t \geq 0$. Thus, as q_t increases, $\bar{\theta}'(q_t)$ increases, $\hat{\theta}(q_t)$ decreases, and $\bar{\theta}(q_t)$ increases. Given a point (θ^L, θ^H) in this area, and given how $\bar{\theta}(q_t)$, $\bar{\theta}'(q_t)$, $\hat{\theta}(q_t)$ move with q_t , then the dynamics stops when $\theta^H = \bar{\theta}(q_t)$ or if q_t reaches $\frac{1}{2}$, so that $q_\theta^* = \begin{cases} \frac{\theta^H - 1}{\theta^H} & \text{if } \theta^H < 2 \\ \frac{1}{2} & \text{if } 2 < \theta^H < 4 - \theta^L \end{cases}$, so that $q_\theta^* = \min\{\frac{1}{2}, \frac{\theta^H - 1}{\theta^H}\}$.
- if $\theta^H < \bar{\theta}'(q_t)$ and $\theta^L < \hat{\theta}(q_t)$ (i.e., $q_t \leq \bar{q}'_{\theta^H \theta}$ and $q_t \leq \hat{q}_\theta^*$), $\dot{q}_t \geq 0$. Thus, as q_t increases, $\bar{\theta}'(q_t)$ decreases, $\hat{\theta}(q_t)$ decreases, and $\bar{\theta}(q_t)$ increases. Given a point (θ^L, θ^H) in this area, and given how $\bar{\theta}(q_t)$, $\bar{\theta}'(q_t)$, $\hat{\theta}(q_t)$ move with q_t , then all the threshold may be binding, thus, the dynamics stops when $q_\theta^* = \min\{\frac{\theta^H - 1}{\theta^H}, \tilde{q}^*, \hat{q}^*\}$.

■

Proof Proposition 6

To prove results in Proposition 6, we present and prove two auxiliary propositions that delivers a complete characterization of the dynamics and steady states. Proposition 6 presents the main insights from these two auxiliary propositions.

Proposition 7 Consider the dynamics in (6) with homophily, at $\theta^L < 1$, $\theta^H > \bar{\theta}_a(q_0)$, $q_0 \leq \frac{1}{2(1-a)}$, and $a \leq \frac{1}{3}$. Then $\dot{q} \geq 0$. Moreover,

- If $q_0 \leq \frac{1-2a}{2(1-a)}$ and
 - $\theta^H \in [\bar{\theta}_a(q_0), \bar{\theta}_{a^2}(q_0)]$, then $q^* = q_0$;
 - $\theta^H \in [\bar{\theta}_{a^2}(q_0), \bar{\theta}_{a^2}(\frac{1-2a}{2(1-a)})]$, then $q^* = \frac{\theta^H - 1}{\theta^H(1-a^2)}$;
 - $\theta^H \in [\bar{\theta}_{a^2}(\frac{1-2a}{2(1-a)}), 2)$, then $q^* = \frac{\theta^H - 1}{\theta^H(1-a)}$;
 - $\theta^H \geq 2$, then $q^* = \frac{1}{2(1-a)}$;
- If $q_0 \in (\frac{1-2a}{2(1-a)}, \frac{1}{2(1-a)}]$ and
 - $\theta^H \in (\bar{\theta}_a(q_0), 2)$, then $q^* = \frac{\theta^H - 1}{\theta^H(1-a)}$;
 - $\theta^H > 2$, then $q^* = \frac{1}{2(1-a)}$.

Proposition 8 Consider the dynamics (6) with homophily, at $\theta^L < 1$, $\theta^H \geq \bar{\theta}_a(q_0)$, when $q_0 \leq \frac{1}{2(1-a)}$ and $a > \frac{1}{3}$. Then,

- if $\theta^H \geq \bar{\theta}_{a^2}(\frac{1-2a}{2(1-a)})$, then $q^* = \frac{1-2a}{2(1-a)}$ is the globally stable steady state;
- if $\theta^H \in [\bar{\theta}_a(q_0), \bar{\theta}_{a^2}(\frac{1-2a}{2(1-a)})]$ then $q^* = \begin{cases} q_0 & \text{if } q_0 \leq \frac{1-2a}{2(1-a)}; \\ \frac{1-2a}{2(1-a)} & \text{if } q_0 > \frac{1-2a}{2(1-a)}. \end{cases}$

Proof of Proposition 7 and 8 Before proceeding with the proofs let us notice that:

$$\begin{cases} \bar{\theta}_a\left(\frac{1}{2(1-a)}\right) = \frac{1}{1-(1-a)\frac{1}{2(1-a)}} = 2; \\ \bar{\theta}_{a^2}\left(\frac{1-2a}{2(1-a)}\right) = \frac{2}{2-(1+a)(1-2a)}. \end{cases}$$

Let us consider the spaces where the equilibria are either (O, I, T, S) —i.e., $\frac{1-2a}{2(1-a)} < q_0 \leq \frac{1}{2(1-a)}$, $\theta^L < 1$, $\theta^H \geq \bar{\theta}_a(q_0)$ — or (I, I, T, S) —i.e., $q_0 \leq \frac{1-2a}{2(1-a)}$, $\theta^L < 1$, $\theta^H \geq \bar{\theta}_{a^2}(q_0)$.

– (O, I, T, S) In such a case the **material payoffs** are:

$$\begin{aligned} \bar{m}^L &= \frac{1}{2} \cdot 1 + \frac{1}{2}(\rho^L \cdot 1 + (1 - \rho^L) \cdot 4) = \frac{5}{2} - \frac{3}{2}\rho^L; \\ \bar{m}^H &= \frac{1}{2} \cdot (\rho^H \cdot 2 + (1 - \rho^H) \cdot 0) + \frac{1}{2}(\rho^H \cdot 2 + (1 - \rho^H) \cdot 1) = \frac{1}{2} + \frac{3}{2}\rho^H. \end{aligned}$$

Let us compute the difference

$$\bar{m}^L - \bar{m}^H = 2 - \frac{3}{2}(\rho^L + \rho^H) = 2 - \frac{3}{2}(1 + a) = \frac{1}{2}(1 - 3a),$$

so that $\bar{m}^L > \bar{m}^H$ if and only if $a < \frac{1}{3}$.

– (I, I, T, S) In such a case the **material payoffs** are:

$$\begin{aligned}\bar{m}^L &= \frac{1}{2} \cdot (\rho^H \cdot 2 + (1 - \rho^H) \cdot 0) + \frac{1}{2} \cdot 4 = \rho^H + 2; \\ \bar{m}^H &= \frac{1}{2} \cdot (\rho^H \cdot 2 + (1 - \rho^H) \cdot 0) + \frac{1}{2} \cdot 2 = \rho^H + 1.\end{aligned}$$

Thus, $\bar{m}^L > \bar{m}^H$ and $\dot{q}_t > 0$ always .

If $a = \frac{1}{3}$ In this case, if $q_0 \in \left(\frac{1-2a}{2(1-a)}, \frac{1}{2(1-a)}\right]$ where (O, I, T, S) are the equilibrium strategies, then $\bar{m}^L = \bar{m}^H$ and, thus, $\dot{q}_t = 0$. If instead $q_0 \leq \frac{1-2a}{2(1-a)}$ where (I, I, T, S) are the equilibrium strategies and, thus, $\dot{q}_t \geq 0$.

If $a < \frac{1}{3}$

- Let us consider the case of $q_0 \in \left(\frac{1-2a}{2(1-a)}, \frac{1}{2(1-a)}\right]$, where (O, I, T, S) are the equilibrium strategies (see Figure 8b). In such cases, $\dot{q}_t > 0$. Note that $\frac{\partial \bar{\theta}_a(q_t)}{\partial q_t} > 0$. Starting from any point in the space (θ, q_0) where (O, I, T, S) are the equilibrium strategies, either q_t increases (and thus $\bar{\theta}_a(q_t)$ does so) up to the point that $\theta^H = \bar{\theta}_a(q_t)$, or $\bar{\theta}_a(q_t)$ never reaches θ^H so that q_t keeps increasing until $q_t = \frac{1}{2(1-a)}$, where either (O, O, T, T) or (O, O, T, S) are the equilibrium strategies, and the dynamics stops. Therefore, the steady state is either $q^* = \{q : \theta^H = \bar{\theta}_a(q)\} = \frac{\theta^H - 1}{\theta^H(1-a)}$, or $q^* = \frac{1}{2(1-a)}$. The steady state is $q^* = \min\left\{\frac{\theta^H - 1}{\theta^H(1-a)}, \frac{1}{2(1-a)}\right\}$. Note also that $\frac{\theta^H - 1}{\theta^H(1-a)} \geq \frac{1}{2(1-a)}$ if and only if $\theta^H \geq 2$ and that $\bar{\theta}_a(q_t = \frac{1}{2(1-a)}) = 2$. Thus, $q^* = \begin{cases} \frac{\theta^H - 1}{\theta^H(1-a)} & \text{if } \theta^H \leq 2 \\ \frac{1}{2(1-a)} & \text{if } \theta^H > 2 \end{cases}$.

- Let us consider the case of $q_0 \in \left[0, \frac{1-2a}{2(1-a)}\right]$ (see Figure 8a). It is trivial to see that if $\theta^H \in (\bar{\theta}_a(q_0), \bar{\theta}_{a^2}(q_0))$ then (O, O, T, T) are the equilibrium strategies and, thus, $\dot{q} = 0$ so that $q^* = q_0$. Let us now consider $\theta^H \geq \bar{\theta}_{a^2}(q_0)$ where (I, I, T, S) are the equilibrium strategies and note that $\frac{\partial \bar{\theta}_{a^2}(q_t)}{\partial q_t} > 0$. In such a case $\dot{q}_t > 0$ and either q_t increases until $q_t = \frac{1-2a}{2(1-a)}$ and (O, I, T, S) are the equilibrium strategies and the analysis in the previous bullet point holds, or $\bar{\theta}_{a^2}(q_t)$ increases until it reaches θ^H and (O, O, T, T) are the equilibrium strategies and the steady state is $q^* = \{q : \theta^H = \bar{\theta}_{a^2}(q)\} = \frac{\theta^H - 1}{\theta^H(1-a^2)}$. Therefore, if θ^H is higher than $\bar{\theta}_{a^2}(q_0)$ but lower than the upper-bound of the threshold — i.e., $\bar{\theta}_{a^2}\left(\frac{1-2a}{2(1-a)}\right)$ — the dynamics stops when $\bar{\theta}_{a^2}(q_t) = \theta^H$, so that $q^* = \frac{\theta^H - 1}{\theta^H(1-a^2)}$. If instead θ^H is higher than $\bar{\theta}_{a^2}\left(\frac{1-2a}{2(1-a)}\right)$, q_t increases and, at a some t , it overcomes $\frac{\theta^H - 1}{\theta^H(1-a^2)}$ where the equilibrium strategies

become (O, I, T, S) and the analysis of the previous bullet point holds. Thus, if $\theta^H \geq 2$ then $q^* = \frac{1}{2(1-a)}$, whereas if $\theta^H \in [\bar{\theta}_{a^2}(\frac{1-2a}{2(1-a)}), 2)$, then $q^* = \frac{\theta^H - 1}{\theta^H(1-a)}$.

If $a > \frac{1}{3}$

- Let us consider the regions where (O, I, T, S) (i.e., $\frac{1-2a}{2(1-a)} < q_0 \leq \frac{1}{2(1-a)}$) are the equilibrium strategies. In such cases $\dot{q}_t < 0$ and q_t decreases over time. Thus,
 - If $\theta^H \geq 2$, then as soon as $q_t = \frac{1-2a}{2(1-a)}$, then (I, I, T, S) are the equilibrium strategies and, as previously argued, q_t should be increasing. Thus, $q^* = \frac{1-2a}{2(1-a)}$ is the steady state.
 - If $2 > \theta^H \geq \bar{\theta}_{a^2}(q_t = \frac{1-2a}{2(1-a)})$ then, again, as soon as $q_t = \frac{1-2a}{2(1-a)}$, then (I, I, T, S) are the equilibrium strategies and, as previously argued, q_t should be increasing. Thus, $q^* = \frac{1-2a}{2(1-a)}$ is the steady state.
 - If $\theta^H < \bar{\theta}_{a^2}(q_t = \frac{1-2a}{2(1-a)})$, then as $q_t = \frac{1-2a}{2(1-a)}$ the dynamics stops.
- Let us consider the regions where (I, I, T, S) (i.e., $q_0 \leq \frac{1-2a}{2(1-a)}$) are the equilibrium strategies. In this case $\dot{q}_t > 0$ and q_t increases over time. Thus,
 - If $\theta^H \geq 2$, then as soon as $q_t = \frac{1-2a}{2(1-a)}$, then (O, I, T, S) should be played and, as previously argued, q_t should start to decrease. Thus, $q^* = \frac{1-2a}{2(1-a)}$ is the steady state.
 - If $2 > \theta^H \geq \bar{\theta}_{a^2}(q_t = \frac{1-2a}{2(1-a)})$ then, again, as soon as $q_t = \frac{1-2a}{2(1-a)}$, then (O, I, T, S) are the equilibrium strategies and, as previously argued, q_t should start to decrease. Thus, $q^* = \frac{1-2a}{2(1-a)}$ is the steady state.
 - If $\theta^H < \bar{\theta}_{a^2}(q_t = \frac{1-2a}{2(1-a)})$, then as $q_t = \frac{1-2a}{2(1-a)}$, then q_t keeps increasing up to the point that $q^* = \frac{\theta^H - 1}{\theta^H(1-a^2)}$, where $\theta^H = \bar{\theta}_{a^2}(q_t)$ and (O, O, T, T) are the equilibrium strategies.

■

Proposition 6 trivially follows from Proposition 7 and 8.

B Characterization of the equilibria with incomplete information of the matching

This Appendix proposes the full characterization of equilibria in pure strategies of the case of incomplete information over the match. Equilibria are analyzed separately for the case where $q < \frac{1}{2}$ and the case where $q > \frac{1}{2}$.

We first define formally the BSE for our case, adapting the general definition of Battigalli et al. (2019a). Note that our game is *naïve*, in the definition of Battigalli et al.

(2019a), in that there is only one epistemic type for each player, i.e., \mathcal{E}_i is a singleton. This is the reason for which we did not introduce formally epistemic types in the main text of the paper.

Definition A profile of (pure) strategies (s_A, s_B^H, s_B^L) together with a profile of second-order beliefs $(\beta_A, \beta_B^H, \beta_B^L)$ is a (pure strategy) BSE of the stage game with guilt if

1. *Rational planning:* For each player and for each type of player,

$$\begin{aligned} \forall h \in H, \quad & s_A(\cdot|h) \subseteq r_{i,h}(\beta_A); \\ \forall h \in H, \forall i \in \{L, H\}, \quad & s_B(\cdot|h, \theta^i) \subseteq r_{i,h}(\theta^i, \beta_B^i). \end{aligned}$$

2. *K&W-consistency:* There exist a sequence $(\sigma_n)_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$ of profiles of strictly positive behavior strategy maps converging to \mathbf{s} and such that

$$\begin{aligned} \forall h \in H, \quad & \beta_A(\sigma_n) \rightarrow \beta_A; \\ \forall h \in H, \forall i \in \{L, H\}, \quad & \beta_B^i(\sigma_n) \rightarrow \beta_B^i. \end{aligned}$$

B.1 Case I: $q < \frac{1}{2}$

The left panel of Figure 12 highlights the regions that we consider.




Figure 12: Regions of analysis, unknown matching.

Region I: $\theta^L < 1$ and $\theta^H < \bar{\theta}(q)$

In this case the best response of the B player is to *Take* if he has low guilt θ^L , independently of his second-order belief, independently of β_B^L . Therefore, A 's first-order belief $\alpha_A^S \leq 1 - q$, and so is $\beta_B^i(S)$, $i \in \{L, H\}$. If player A chose to enter $\alpha_A^S \geq \frac{1}{2}$, therefore her disappointment after (I, T) , $D_A(I, T, \alpha_A) = 1 - \alpha_A^I + 2\alpha_A^S \alpha_A^I$ is increasing both in α_A^S and in α_A^I . The maximum disappointment (and the maximum guilt for player B) is reached when $\alpha_A^I = 1$ and $\alpha_A^S = 1 - q$, i.e., player A expects player B to *Share* if his guilt sensitivity is high. If $\theta^H < \bar{\theta}(q) = \frac{1}{1-q}$, player B 's utility from *Taking* is higher than player B 's utility from *Sharing* even when his guilt is high:

$$4 - \theta^H(1 - \alpha_A^I + 2\alpha_A^S \alpha_A^I) > 4 - \frac{1}{1-q}(2(1 - q)) \geq 2.$$

Therefore the pure equilibrium strategies are (O, T, T) , and the second-order beliefs are the degenerate ones that obtain from the equilibrium strategies.

Region II: $\theta^L < 1$ and $\bar{\theta}(q) \leq \theta^H < 2$

Also in this case the best response of the B player is to *Take* if he has low guilt sensitivity θ^L , independently of his second-order belief, independently of β_B^L . As in Region 1, A 's first-order belief $\alpha_A^S \leq 1 - q$, and so is $\beta_B^i(S)$, $i \in \{L, H\}$. Differently from above, now two equilibria may arise, depending on the second-order beliefs of the high guilt player B , as his guilt sensitivity is sufficiently high to sustain an equilibrium in which he *Shares*:

- (i) (O, T, T) with $\alpha_A^I = 0$, $\alpha_A^S = 0$, and, by correct conjectures, $\mathbb{E}[D_A, \beta_B | I] = 1 < \frac{2}{\theta^H}$ given $\theta^H < 2$.
- (ii) (I, T, S) with $\alpha_A^I = 1$, $\alpha_A^S = 1 - q$, and $\mathbb{E}[D_A, \beta_B | I] = 2(1 - q) \geq \frac{2}{\theta^H}$, given $\theta^H \geq \frac{1}{1-q}$.
In this equilibrium player A finds it optimal to go *In* even when only high guilt B players *Share* because $q < \frac{1}{2}$.

Region III: $\theta^L < 1$ and $\theta^H \geq 2$

Also in this case the best response of the B player is to *Take* if he has low guilt sensitivity θ^L , independently of his second-order belief, independently of β_B^L . In this region, however, the best response of the B player is to *Share* if he has high guilt sensitivity. Given that the fraction of low guilt B players is $q < \frac{1}{2}$ player A finds it optimal to go *In* even when only high guilt B players *Share*. Therefore the pure equilibrium strategies are (I, T, S) , and the second-order beliefs are the degenerate ones that obtain from the equilibrium strategies.

Region IV: $1 \leq \theta^L < \bar{\theta}(q)$ and $\theta^H < \bar{\theta}(q)$

In this case both the low and the high guilt B players may find it optimal to *Share* or *Take*, depending on player A 's beliefs. We focus on pure strategy equilibria, therefore the possibilities are that players of both guilt levels *Share*, that they both *Take*, or that the high guilt B *Shares* (*Takes*) and the low guilt B *Takes* (*Shares*) respectively. Player A 's best response is to go *In* if at least the high guilt B *Shares*, and to stay *Out* if at most the low guilt B does it. Two of these strategy profiles are equilibria:

- (i) (O, T, T) with $\alpha_A^I = 0$, $\alpha_A^S = 0$, and, by correct conjectures, $\mathbb{E}[D_A, \beta_B | I] = 1 < \frac{2}{\theta^i}$, for $i \in C$, given $\theta^L < 2$ and $\theta^H < 2$.
- (ii) (I, S, S) with $\alpha_A^I = 1$, $\alpha_A^S = 1$ and by correct conjectures, $\mathbb{E}[D_A, \beta_B | I] = 2 > \frac{2}{\theta^i}$, for $i \in C$, given $\theta^L > 1$ and $\theta^H > \frac{1}{1-q}$.

The other two strategy profiles are not equilibria: (I, T, S) induces $\mathbb{E}[D_A, \beta_B | I] = 2(1-q) < \frac{2}{\theta^H}$, given $\theta^H < \frac{1}{1-q}$; (O, S, T) induces $\mathbb{E}[D_A, \beta_B | I] = 2q < \frac{2}{\theta^L}$, given $\theta^L > 1$ and $q < \frac{1}{2}$.

Region V: $1 \leq \theta^L < \bar{\theta}(q)$ and $\bar{\theta}(q) \leq \theta^H < 2$

In this case both the low and the high guilt B player may find it optimal to *Share* or *Take*, depending on player A 's beliefs. We focus on pure strategy equilibria, therefore the possibilities are that both high and low guilt players *Share*, that they both *Take*, or that the high guilt B *Shares* (*Takes*) and the low guilt B *Takes* (*Shares*) respectively. Player A 's best response is to go *In* if at least the high guilt B *Shares*, and to stay *Out* if at most the low guilt B does it. Three of these strategy profiles are equilibria:

- (i) (O, T, T) with $\alpha_A^I = 0$, $\alpha_A^S = 0$, and, by correct conjectures, $\mathbb{E}[D_A, \beta_B | I] = 1 < \frac{2}{\theta}$ given $\theta^L < 2$ and $\theta^H < 2$.
- (ii) (I, T, S) with $\alpha_A^I = 1$, $\alpha_A^S = 1 - q$, and $\mathbb{E}[D_A, \beta_B | I] = 2(1-q) > \frac{2}{\theta^H}$, given $\theta^H > \frac{1}{1-q}$. Note that $\mathbb{E}[D_A, \beta_B | I] = 2(1-q) < \frac{2}{\theta^L}$.
- (iii) (I, S, S) with $\alpha_A^I = 1$, $\alpha_A^S = 1$ and by correct conjectures, $\mathbb{E}[D_A, \beta_B | I] = 2 > \frac{2}{\theta}$ given $\theta^L > 1$ and $\theta^H > \frac{1}{1-q}$.

The other strategy profiles is not an equilibrium one: (O, S, T) induces $\mathbb{E}[D_A, \beta_B | I] = 2q < \frac{2}{\theta^L}$, given $\theta^L > 1$ and $q < \frac{1}{2}$.

Region VI: $1 \leq \theta^L < \bar{\theta}(q)$ and $\theta^H \geq 2$

The best response of the B player is to *Share* if he has high guilt sensitivity. Given this, player A always chooses I , regardless of the choice of low guilt B players, because their fraction is $q < \frac{1}{2}$. Depending on the second-order beliefs of the low guilt player B , as his guilt sensitivity is such that he can optimally either *Share* or *Take*:

- (i) (I, T, S) with $\alpha_A^I = 1$, $\alpha_A^S = 1-q$, and, by correct conjectures, $\mathbb{E}[D_A, \beta_B|I] = 2(1-q) < \frac{2}{\theta^L}$ given $\theta^L < \bar{\theta}(q)$.
- (ii) (I, S, S) with $\alpha_A^I = 1$, $\alpha_A^S = 1$, and $\mathbb{E}[D_A, \beta_B|I] = 2 > \frac{2}{\theta^L}$, given $\theta^L > 1$.

Region VII: $\bar{\theta}(q) \leq \theta^L < 2$ and $\bar{\theta}(q) \leq \theta^H < 2$

In this case both the low and the high guilt B players may find it optimal to *Share* or *Take*, depending on player A 's beliefs. We focus on pure strategy equilibria, therefore the possibilities are that both high and low guilt players *Share*, that they both *Take*, or that the high guilt B *Shares* (*Takes*) and the low guilt B *Takes* (*Shares*) respectively. Player A 's best response is to go *In* if at least the high guilt B *Shares*, and to stay *Out* if at most the low guilt B does it. Two of these strategy profiles are equilibria:

- (i) (O, T, T) with $\alpha_A^I = 0$, $\alpha_A^S = 0$, and, by correct conjectures, $\mathbb{E}[D_A, \beta_B|I] = 1 < \frac{2}{\theta}$ given $\theta^L < 2$ and $\theta^H < 2$.
- (ii) (I, S, S) with $\alpha_A^I = 1$, $\alpha_A^S = 1$ and by correct conjectures, $\mathbb{E}[D_A, \beta_B|I] = 2 > \frac{2}{\theta}$ given θ^L and $\theta^H > \frac{1}{1-q}$.

Region VIII: $\theta^L \geq \bar{\theta}(q)$ and $\theta^H \geq 2$

In this region the best response of player B is to *Share* if he has high guilt sensitivity, because the minimum disappointment of player A is 1 (when $\alpha_A^I = 0$). As a matter of fact, player A has the opportunity of securing at least 1 by choosing *Out*, therefore in equilibrium she must expect to gain at least 1. Therefore the minimum level of guilt that player B experiences by *Taking* after I is $\theta * 1$ which is enough to induce him to *Share* in this parametric region. As a consequence, also the low guilt player B finds it optimal to *Share*, as the minimum disappointment is $2(1-q) > \frac{2}{\theta^L}$. Hence, player A chooses I in equilibrium. Therefore the pure equilibrium strategies are (I, S, S) , and the second-order beliefs are the degenerate ones that obtain from the equilibrium strategies.

B.2 Case II: $q > \frac{1}{2}$

The right panel of Figure 12 highlights the regions that we consider. Note that when $q < \frac{1}{2}$, $\bar{\theta}(q) > 2$, so that we have a smaller number of regions in this case.

Region I: $\theta^L < 1$ and $\theta^H < 2$

The equilibrium behavior in this region is the same as in Region 1 of the case with $q > \frac{1}{2}$. Therefore the pure equilibrium strategies are (O, T, T) , and the second-order beliefs are the degenerate ones that obtain from the equilibrium strategies.

Region II: $\theta^L < 1$ and $\theta^H > 2$

Also in this case the best response of the B player is to *Take* if he has low guilt sensitivity θ^L , independently of his second-order belief, independently of β_B^I . In this region, however, the best response of the B player is to *Share* if he has high guilt sensitivity. Given that the fraction of low guilt B players is $q > \frac{1}{2}$ player A finds it optimal to go *Out* even when if high guilt B players *Share*. Therefore the pure equilibrium strategies are (O, T, S) , and the second-order beliefs are the degenerate ones that obtain from the equilibrium strategies.

Region III: $1 < \theta^L < 2$ and $1 < \theta^H < 2$

In this case both the low and the high guilt B player may find it optimal to *Share* or *Take*, depending on player A 's beliefs. We focus on pure strategy equilibria, therefore the possibilities are that both high and low guilt players *Share*, that they both *Take*, or that the high guilt B *Shares* (*Takes*) and the low guilt B *Takes* (*Shares*) respectively. Player A 's best response is to go *In* if at least the low guilt B *Shares*, and to stay *Out* if at most the high guilt B does it. Two of these strategy profiles are equilibria:

- (i) (O, T, T) with $\alpha_A^I = 0$, $\alpha_A^S = 0$, and, by correct conjectures, $\mathbb{E}[D_A, \beta_B|I] = 1 < \frac{2}{\theta}$ given $\theta^L < 2$ and $\theta^H < 2$.
- (ii) (I, S, S) with $\alpha_A^I = 1$, $\alpha_A^S = 1$ and by correct conjectures, $\mathbb{E}[D_A, \beta_B|I] = 2 > \frac{2}{\theta}$ given $\theta^L > 1$ and $\theta^H > 1$.

Region IV: $1 < \theta^L < 2$ and $\theta^H > 2$

In this case high guilt B player *Shares*, while the low guilt may find it optimal to *Share* or *Take*, depending on player A 's beliefs. Player A 's best response is to go *In* if both high and low guilt players *Share*, and to stay *Out* if only the high guilt B does it. The equilibrium strategy profiles are:

- (i) (O, T, S) with $\alpha_A^I = 0$, $\alpha_A^S = 1 - q$, and, by correct conjectures, $\mathbb{E}[D_A, \beta_B|I] = 1 > \frac{2}{\theta^H}$ given $\theta^H > 2$.
- (ii) (I, S, S) with $\alpha_A^I = 1$, $\alpha_A^S = 1$ and by correct conjectures, $\mathbb{E}[D_A, \beta_B|I] = 2 > \frac{2}{\theta}$ given $\theta^L > 1$ and $\theta^H > 2$.

Region V: $\theta^L > 2$ and $\theta^H > 2$

In this region the best response of both high and low guilt B players is to *Share*. Hence, player A chooses I in equilibrium. Therefore the pure equilibrium strategies are (I, S, S) , and the second-order beliefs are the degenerate ones that obtain from the equilibrium strategies.

C Equilibrium selection

In this appendix we discuss the equilibrium selection of Sections 3 and 4. We select equilibria based on Pareto-dominance. Formally, when we compare equilibrium X to equilibrium Y , we say that X Pareto-dominates Y if $u_i(X) \geq u_i(Y)$ for each player, and there exist a player j such that $u_j(X) > u_j(Y)$. In this case we assume that X is the selected equilibrium.

This standard notion of Pareto-dominance solves all but one problems of multiplicity present in our model. In the incomplete information case, the traditional concept of Pareto-dominance does not allow us to resolve the multiplicity when both (I, T, S) and (I, S, S) are possible. In this case we consider a weaker notion of Pareto-dominance which considers the average population payoffs. If the average utility of individuals from both populations is weakly higher in equilibrium X than in equilibrium Y , and it is strictly higher at least for individuals of one population, we say that X Pareto-dominates Y at the population level, and we select X .

Of course, it is trivial to show that if X Pareto-dominates Y in the standard way, it also Pareto-dominates Y at the population level. In what follows, we will highlight where we need to introduce the concept of Pareto-dominance at the population level.

Complete information

Recall that, as shown in Battigalli et al. (2019a), the (pure) strategy profiles that are compatible with equilibrium in the complete information case are, depending on the guilt parameter of the player B 's θ^i :

- $\mathbf{s}^i \in \{(O, T)\}$, if $\theta^i < 1$;
- $\mathbf{s}^i \in \{(O, T), (I, S)\}$, if $\theta^i \in [1, 2]$;
- $\mathbf{s}^i \in \{(I, S)\}$, if $\theta^i > 2$.

Hence, the only pure strategy profiles compatible with equilibrium in the complete information case are (O, T) and (I, S) . We note that the utility of each player in (I, S) is $2 > 1$ which is the utility of each player in (O, T) . We can conclude that (I, S) Pareto-dominates (O, T) and it is the selected equilibrium strategy profile in the region where equilibria that sustain both strategy profiles exist. As a consequence, the (pure) strategy profiles compatible with equilibrium that survive Pareto-dominance equilibrium selection are:

- $\mathbf{s}^i \in \{(O, T)\}$, if $\theta^i < 1$;
- $\mathbf{s}^i \in \{(I, S)\}$, if $\theta^i \geq 1$.

Incomplete information

Let us now consider equilibrium selection in the case in which there is incomplete information. In Appendix B we fully characterized the pure equilibrium strategy profiles. The region in which multiple strategy profiles are sustainable as an equilibrium are:

1. $q \geq \frac{1}{2}$:
 - Region 2: $(O, T, T), (I, T, S)$;
 - Region 4: $(O, T, T), (I, S, S)$;
 - Region 5: $(O, T, T), (I, T, S), (I, S, S)$;
 - Region 6: $(I, T, S), (I, S, S)$;
 - Region 7: $(O, T, T), (I, S, S)$;
2. $q > \frac{1}{2}$
 - Region 3: $(O, T, T), (I, S, S)$;
 - Region 4: $(O, T, S), (I, S, S)$;

We begin our analysis of Pareto-dominance by noting that, as for the complete information case, (I, S, S) , which gives utility 2 to each player, Pareto-dominates any equilibrium in which player A goes out, as this gives utility 1 to each player. Selecting (I, S, S) over (O, T, T) and (O, T, S) leaves us with the following multiplicity problems:

1. $q \geq \frac{1}{2}$:
 - Region 2: $(O, T, T), (I, T, S)$;
 - Region 5: $(I, T, S), (I, S, S)$;
 - Region 6: $(I, T, S), (I, S, S)$;

We now show that (I, T, S) dominates (O, T, T) . First, player A must have a higher payoff from (I, T, S) than from (O, T, T) , as she can ensure the same utility as in (O, T, T) by going *Out* and she instead chooses to go *In*. Second, a player B from group H has a utility equal to 2 in (I, T, S) and a utility of 1 in (O, T, T) . Finally, a player B from group H has a utility higher than 2, as he could ensure himself a utility equal to 2 by *Sharing*, and he instead find it optimal to *Take*.

We are left with the analysis of the case where (I, T, S) and (I, S, S) are both sustainable as pure equilibrium strategy profiles. We first note that (i) (I, T, S) does not Pareto-dominate (I, S, S) because player A has an higher utility in (I, S, S) than in (I, T, S) ; (ii) (I, S, S) does not Pareto-dominate (I, T, S) because a player B from group L has a higher utility under (I, T, S) than under (I, S, S) . We therefore need to consider Pareto-dominance at the population level. For players of group H (I, S, S) is a better equilibrium at the individual level (both when playin in role A and when playing in role B), and therefore it is also a better equilibrium at the population level. We therefore consider only the average utility for individuals from group L . The average utility when (I, T, S) is played is

$\frac{1}{2}(2(1-q)) + \frac{1}{2}(4 - \theta^H(2(1-q))) < 2$ which is the average utility from (I, S, S) whenever $\theta^L > 1$, that is, in the region of interest.

D Equilibrium characterization and equilibrium selection with homophily

When we introduce homophily, also the group of player A becomes relevant. Therefore the profile of equilibrium strategies has now length four.

Let us now gather/derive the elements that we need to compute the equilibria.

1. *Matching probabilities.* The probability that a player from group L is matched with a player from the same group at time t is $\rho_t^L = a + (1-a)q_t$. The probability that a player from group H is matched with a player from the same group at time t is $\rho_t^H = a + (1-a)(1-q_t)$.
2. *A's expectation on matched B.* Player A 's probability of being matched with a player B from group L now depends on the group of player A . We denote these probabilities with \hat{q}_t^k , where $k = H, L$ denotes the group player A belongs to. These probabilities are:

$$\begin{aligned}\hat{q}_t^L &= \rho^L = a + (1-a)q_t \\ \hat{q}_t^H &= 1 - \rho^H = (1-a)q_t.\end{aligned}$$

3. *B's belief on A's belief on being matched with a B player from group L.* Let us call $\mathbb{E}^k(\hat{q}_t)$ the correct belief of a player B of group k on the expectation of his matched A 's on his own group. This belief depends on B 's group, as his group affects the probability of being matched with a player A from a specific group, together with the fact that player A 's expectations (correctly) depend on her group. Let us compute these two beliefs.

$$\begin{aligned}\mathbb{E}^H(q_t) &= \rho^H \hat{q}_t^H + (1 - \rho^H) \hat{q}_t^L \\ &= \rho^H(1 - \rho^H) + (1 - \rho^H)\rho^L \\ &= \rho^H - \rho^{H2} + \rho^L - \rho^H \rho^L \\ &= (1 - a^2)q_t\end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
\mathbb{E}^L(q_t) &= \rho^L \hat{q}_t^L + (1 - \rho^L) \hat{q}_t^H \\
&= \rho^{L2} + (1 - \rho^L)(1 - \rho^H) \\
&= \rho^{L2} + 1 - \rho^L - \rho^H + \rho^L \rho^H \\
&= a^2 + (1 - a^2)q_t
\end{aligned}$$




Figure 13: Role-dependent guilt, unknown matching, homophily, regions of analysis.

Region I: $\theta^L < 1$, $\theta^H < \frac{1}{1-(1-a)q}$.

In this region B players from group L Take, regardless of their beliefs, as $\theta^L < 1$. Player A from group i chooses to enter if $\hat{q}^i \alpha_A^{L,S} + (1 - \hat{q}^i) \alpha_A^{H,S} \geq \frac{1}{2}$. In this region this is equivalent to $(1 - \hat{q}^i) \alpha_A^{H,S} \geq \frac{1}{2}$, as $\alpha_A^{L,S} = 0$. Player A 's disappointment therefore is

$$D_A^i(I, T, \alpha_A) = 1 - \alpha_A^{i,I} + 2(1 - \hat{q}^i) \alpha_A^{H,S} \alpha_A^{i,I},$$

which is increasing in α_A^I , $\alpha_A^{H,S}$ and decreasing in \hat{q}^i . Note that, in this region $D_A^H(I, T, \alpha_A) > D_A^L(I, T, \alpha_A)$, as A players from group H correctly expect to be matched with a B player from group H more often, and only B players from group H may choose Share with positive probability. Player B 's expectation of player A 's disappointment, when player B belongs to group i , is

$$\mathbb{E}^i[D_A] = \hat{q}^i D_A^L + (1 - \hat{q}^i) D_A^H,$$

when A players of both groups choose In, $D_A^H(I, T, \alpha_A)$ when only A players from group H choose In, and $D_A^L(I, T, \alpha_A)$ when only A players from group L choose In. The expected disappointment is maximum for B players of group H when: (i) only A players from group H choose In, that is when $\alpha_A^{H,I} = 1$ and $\alpha_A^{L,I} = 0$; and (ii) player A believes that all B players of group H Share, that is $\alpha_A^{H,S} = 1$. In this case, the expected disappointment

for a B player of group H became

$$\mathbb{E}^H[D_A(I, T, \alpha_A)] = 2(1 - (1 - a)q).$$

Even in this case a B player from group H Takes, as $\theta^H < \bar{\theta}_a(q) := \frac{1}{1 - (1 - a)q}$. Given that every player B Takes, every player A stays Out, and the equilibrium behavior is (O, O, T, T) .

Region II: $\theta^L < 1$, $\frac{1}{1 - (1 - a)q} < \theta^H < 2$, $q > \frac{1}{2(1 - a)}$.

In this region, as in Region I, B players from group L Take. Given the computations derived in Region I, B players of group H Share if only A players of group H go In. However, A players from group H stay out even if all B players of group H Share, because the probability of being matched with a B player of group H is $\rho^H = 1 - (1 - a)q < \frac{1}{2}$. This holds a fortiori for A players from group L . Therefore the only equilibrium strategy profile in this region is (O, O, T, T) .

Region III: $\theta^L < 1$, $\frac{1}{1 - (1 - a)q} < \theta^H < 2$, $\frac{1 - 2a}{2 - 2a} < q < \frac{1}{2(1 - a)}$.

In this region, as in Region I, B players from group L Take. Given the computations derived in Region I, B players of group H Share if only A players of group H go In. A players from group H go In if all B players of group H Share, because the probability of being matched with a B player of group H is $\rho^H = 1 - (1 - a)q > \frac{1}{2}$. A players of group L , instead, stay Out, because their probability of being matched to a B player from group H is $(1 - a - (1 - a)q) < \frac{1}{2}$. Also (O, O, T, T) is sustainable as equilibrium strategy profile in this region, however it is Pareto-dominated by (O, I, T, S) . This can be shown by noting that: (i) a player A from group L has the same utility under both strategy profiles; (ii) a player A from group H has a higher utility under (O, I, T, S) , as she can ensure herself the same utility as in (O, O, T, T) by going Out and she chooses not to do so; (iii) a player B from group L has a higher expected utility under (O, I, T, S) , as if he is matched to a player A from group H he Takes and experiences a utility higher than 2 (otherwise he would have Shared) instead of the utility of 1 that he receives from player A going Out, which is the only possible outcome under (O, O, T, T) ; (iv) a player B from group H has a higher expected utility under (O, I, T, S) , as if he is matched to a player A from group H he Shares and experiences a utility equal to 2 instead of the utility of 1 that he receives from player A going Out, which is the only possible outcome under (O, O, T, T) .

Region IV: $\theta^L < 1$, $\frac{1}{1-(1-a)q} < \theta^H < \frac{1}{1-(1-a^2)q}$, $q < \frac{1-2a}{2-2a}$.

In this region, as in Region I, B players from group L Take. Given the computations derived in Region I, B players of group H Share if only A players of group H go In. A players from group H go In if all B players of group H Share, because the probability of being matched with a B player of group H is $\rho^H = 1 - (1-a)q > \frac{1}{2}$. A players of group L , find it optimal to go In because their probability of being matched to a B player from group H is $1 - \rho^L = (1-a - (1-a)q) > \frac{1}{2}$. However, in this region, B players of group H find it optimal to share if A players of group H only go In, but they do not find it optimal to go In if A players of group L go In as well, as they have lower expectations. In particular, the expected disappointment for a B player of group H if A players of both groups go In is

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbb{E}^H[D_A(I, T, \alpha_A)] &= \hat{q}^H D_A^L(I, T, \alpha_A) + (1 - \hat{q}^H) D_A^H(I, T, \alpha_A) \\ &= (1-a)q D_A^L(I, T, \alpha_A) + (1 - (1-a)q) D_A^H(I, T, \alpha_A) \\ &= (1-a)q 2(1 - \hat{q}^L) + (1 - (1-a)q) 2(1 - \hat{q}^H) \\ &= (1-a)q 2(1-a - (1-a)q) + (1 - (1-a)q) 2(a + (1-a)(1-q)) = 2(1 - (1-a^2)q). \end{aligned}$$

As a consequence, B players from group H do not find it optimal to Share when B players of group L Take. A -players of both groups go In as long as $\theta^H < \bar{\theta}_{a^2}(q) := \frac{1}{1-(1-a^2)q}$. The only profile of strategies that is sustainable in equilibrium is therefore (O, O, T, T) .

Region V: $\theta^L < 1$, $\frac{1}{1-(1-a^2)q} < \theta^H < 2$, $q < \frac{1-2a}{2-2a}$.

In this region, as in Region I, B players from group L Take. Given the computations derived in Region I, B players of group H Share if only A players of group H go In. A players from group H go In if all B players of group H Share, because the probability of being matched with a B player of group H is $\rho^H = 1 - (1-a)q > \frac{1}{2}$. A players of group L , find it optimal to go In because their probability of being matched to a B player from group H is $1 - \rho^L = (1-a - (1-a)q) > \frac{1}{2}$. In this region, B players of group H find it optimal to Share even if A players of both groups go In, despite the lower expected disappointment associated with this strategy profile. In particular, the expected

disappointment for a B player of group H if A players of both groups go In is

$$\begin{aligned}
\mathbb{E}^H[D_A(I, T, \alpha_A)] &= \hat{q}^H D_A^L(I, T, \alpha_A) + (1 - \hat{q}^H) D_A^H(I, T, \alpha_A) \\
&= (1 - a)q D_A^L(I, T, \alpha_A) + (1 - (1 - a)q) D_A^H(I, T, \alpha_A) \\
&= (1 - a)q 2(1 - \hat{q}^L) + (1 - (1 - a)q) 2(1 - \hat{q}^H) \\
&= (1 - a)q 2(1 - a - (1 - a)q) + (1 - (1 - a)q) 2(a + (1 - a)(1 - q)) = 2(1 - (1 - a^2)q).
\end{aligned}$$

As a consequence, B players from group H find it optimal to *Share* when B players of group L *Take* and A players of both groups go In given that $\theta > \bar{\theta}_{a^2}(q) = \frac{1}{1 - (1 - a^2)q}$. Hence, in this region (I, I, T, S) is sustainable as an equilibrium. Note that also (O, O, T, T) is sustainable as equilibrium strategy profile in this region, however it is Pareto-dominated by (I, I, T, S) . This can be shown by noting that: (i) a player A (from either group) has a higher utility under (I, I, T, S) , as she can ensure herself the same utility as in (O, O, T, T) by going *Out* and she chooses not to do so; (ii) a player B from group L has a higher expected utility under (I, I, T, S) , as player A goes In he *Takes* and experiences a utility higher than 2 (otherwise he would have *Shared*) instead of the utility of 1 that he receives from player A going *Out*, which is the only possible outcome under (O, O, T, T) ; (iv) a player B from group H has a higher expected utility under (I, I, T, S) , as player A goes In and he *Shares* and experiences a utility equal to 2 instead of the utility of 1 that he receives from player A going *Out*, which is the only possible outcome under (O, O, T, T) .

Region VI: $\theta^L < 1$, $\theta^H > 2$, $q < \frac{1-2a}{2-2a}$.

In this region, B players from group L *Take* and B players of group H *Share*. A players from group H go In if all B players of group H *Share*, because the probability of being matched with a B player of group H is $1 - (1 - a)q > \frac{1}{2}$. A players of group L , find it optimal to go In because their probability of being matched to a B player from group H is $(1 - a - (1 - a)q) > \frac{1}{2}$. As a consequence, the only equilibrium strategy profile sustainable as an equilibrium is (I, I, T, S) .

Region VII: $\theta^L < 1$, $\theta^H > 2$, $\frac{1-2a}{2-2a} < q < \frac{1}{2-2a}$.

In this region, B players from group L *Take* and B players of group H *Share*. A players from group H go In if all B players of group H *Share*, because the probability of being matched with a B player of group H is $1 - (1 - a)q > \frac{1}{2}$. A players of group L , instead, find it optimal to stay *Out* because their probability of being matched to a B player from group H is $(1 - a - (1 - a)q) < \frac{1}{2}$. As a consequence, the only equilibrium strategy profile can be sustained in equilibrium is (O, I, T, S) .

Region VIII: $\theta^L < 1$, $\theta^H > 2$, $q > \frac{1}{2-2a}$.

In this region, B players from group L *Take* and B players of group H *Share*. A players from group H go *Out* if all B players of group H *Share*, because the probability of being matched with a B player of group H is $1 - (1 - a)q < \frac{1}{2}$. A players of group L , find it optimal to stay *Out* because their probability of being matched to a B player from group H is $(1 - a - (1 - a)q) < \frac{1}{2}$. As a consequence, the only equilibrium strategy profile which can be sustained in equilibrium is (O, O, T, S) .

Region IX: $\theta^H \geq \theta^L > 1$

In this region (I, I, S, S) is an sequential equilibrium, given that in both groups B players find it optimal to *Share* whenever every A player expects them to do so. If B players of both groups find it optimal to *Share*, A players from both groups find it optimal to go *In*. In this region, (I, I, S, S) is also the only equilibrium strategy profile that survives our Pareto-dominance criterion of equilibrium selection. We prove this by showing that, in the region where they exist, (I, I, S, S) Pareto-dominates all other possible equilibrium strategy profiles, by listing all alternative equilibrium strategy profiles one by one.

1. (O, O, T, T) : this strategy profile can be sustained as an equilibrium as long as $\theta^L \leq \theta^H < 2$. However (O, O, T, T) is Pareto-dominated by (I, I, S, S) , as the utility of each player is 2 under (I, I, S, S) instead of 1 under (O, O, T, T) .
2. (O, O, T, S) this strategy profile can be sustained as an equilibrium as long as $q > \frac{1}{2-2a}$, $\theta^L < \bar{\theta}_a(q)$ and $\theta^H > 2$. However (O, O, T, S) is Pareto-dominated by (I, I, S, S) , as the utility of each player is 2 under (I, I, S, S) instead of 1 under (O, O, T, S) .
3. (O, I, T, S) : this strategy profile can be sustained as an equilibrium if $q \in \left(\frac{1-2a}{2-2a}, \frac{1}{2-2a}\right)$ and $\theta^L < \bar{\theta}_a(q)$. The first condition ensures that A players from group L find it optimal to stay *Out*, and that A players from group H find it optimal to go *In*; the second condition implies that B players from group L *Take*. (O, I, T, S) is Pareto-dominated by (I, I, S, S) . Player A of both groups have a utility of 2 under (I, I, S, S) , instead of a utility of 1 and $2(1 - \hat{q}^H)$ respectively under (O, I, T, S) ; B players of group H have a utility of 2 under (I, I, S, S) instead of a utility of $\hat{q}^H + 2(1 - \hat{q}^H) = 2 - \hat{q}^H < 2$

under (O, I, T, S) . B players from group L have an expected utility of

$$\begin{aligned}
& \hat{q}^L + (1 - \hat{q}^L)(4 - \theta^L D_A^H(I, T, \alpha_A)) \\
&= a + (1 - a)q + (1 - a - (1 - a)q)(4 - \theta^L(2(1 - \hat{q}^H))) \\
&= a + (1 - a)q + (1 - a - (1 - a)q)(4 - \theta^L(2(1 - (1 - a)q))) \\
&= 4 - 3(a + (1 - a)q) - 2\theta^L(1 - (1 - a)q)(1 - a - (1 - a)q) < 2
\end{aligned}$$

for every $\theta^L \geq 1$.

4. (I, O, S, T) : this strategy profile can be sustained as an equilibrium if $q \in \left(\frac{1-2a}{2-2a}, \frac{1}{2-2a}\right)$, $\theta^L > \frac{1}{a^2+(1-a^2)q}$ and $\theta^H < \frac{1}{(1-a^2)q}$. The first condition ensures that A players from group H find it optimal to stay *Out*, and that A players from group L find it optimal to go *In*; the second condition implies that B players from group L *Share*; the third condition implies that B players from group H *Take*. Note that it is possible that B players from group L *Share* and B players from group H *Take* even though $\theta^L < \theta^H$ because in this equilibrium A players from group H have lower expectations on the probability of *Sharing* from their matched B players, and as a consequence $\mathbb{E}^H[D_A] < \mathbb{E}^L[D_A]$. (I, O, S, T) is however Pareto-dominated by (I, I, S, S) . Player A of both groups have a utility of 2 under (I, I, S, S) , instead of a utility of $2\hat{q}^L$ and 1 respectively under (I, O, S, T) ; B players of group L have a utility of 2 under (I, I, S, S) instead of a utility of $(1 - \hat{q}^L) + 2\hat{q}^L = 1 + \hat{q}^L < 2$ under (I, O, S, T) . B players from group H have an expected utility of

$$\begin{aligned}
& \hat{q}^H(4 - \theta^L D_A^L(I, T, \alpha_A)) + (1 - \hat{q}^H) \\
&= (1 - a)q(4 - \theta^H(2(\hat{q}^L))) + (1 - (1 - a)q) \\
&= (1 - a)q(4 - \theta^H(2a + 2(1 - a)q)) + (1 - (1 - a)q).
\end{aligned}$$

The above expected utility is smaller than 2 for each $\theta^H > \frac{3(1-a)q-1}{2a+2(1-a)q}$; as $\frac{3(1-a)q-1}{2a+2(1-a)q} < 1$ this is true for every $\theta^H \geq 1$.

5. (I, I, T, S) this strategy profile can be sustained as an equilibrium if $q \leq \frac{1-2a}{2-2a}$ and $\theta^L < \bar{\theta}_a(q)$. The first condition ensures that A players from both groups find it optimal to go *In*; the second condition implies that B players from group L *Take*. (I, I, T, S) is Pareto-dominated at the population level by (I, I, S, S) . A players of both groups have a utility of 2 under (I, I, S, S) , instead of a utility of $2(1 - \hat{q}^L)$ and $2(1 - \hat{q}^H)$ respectively under (I, I, T, S) ; B players of group H have a utility of 2 under (I, I, S, S) instead of a utility of $\hat{q}^H + 2(1 - \hat{q}^H) = 2 - \hat{q}^H < 2$ under

(I, I, T, S) . B players from group L have a higher expected utility under (I, I, T, S) than under (I, I, S, S) . However the average payoff of a player from group L under (I, I, T, S) is

$$\begin{aligned}
& \frac{1}{2} (2(1 - \hat{q}^L)) + \frac{1}{2} \left(4 - \theta^L \left(2 \left(\hat{q}^L (1 - \hat{q}^L) + (1 - \hat{q}^L) (1 - \hat{q}^H) \right) \right) \right) \\
= & \frac{1}{2} (2 - 2\hat{q}^L + 4 - 2\theta^L \hat{q}^L + 2\theta^L (\hat{q}^L)^2 - 2\theta^L + 2\theta^L \hat{q}^L + 2\theta^L \hat{q}^H - 2\theta^L \hat{q}^L \hat{q}^H) \\
< & 2 - (\hat{q}^L + \theta^L (\hat{q}^L)^2 + \theta^L \hat{q}^H - \theta^L \hat{q}^L \hat{q}^H) \\
= & 2 - (a - a^2 - a(1 - a)q) = 2 - a(1 - a - (1 - a)q) < 2
\end{aligned}$$

Note that (I, O, T, S) and (O, I, S, T) can never be sustained in equilibrium, as the A players who choose to go *In* are the ones that are more frequently matched with a player B who *Share*.

Moreover, (I, I, S, T) can never be an equilibrium, given that $\theta^L \leq \theta^H$, and therefore, whenever both A players from group H and A players from group L choose the same action, if a player B from group L finds it optimal to *Share* also a player B from group H finds it optimal to *Share*.

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