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PUTTING THE DELEUZIAN MACHINE TO WORK IN PSYCHOLOGY
Putting the Deleuzian Machine to Work in Psychology
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SECTION 3
ARTISTIC PROVOCATIONS
PERCEPTS, AFFECTS AND DESIRE

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Abstract

In this essay I explore some thoughts concerning stability (percepts and affects) and modification (desire). The two works written by Deleuze and Guattari that I consider in this exploration are What is Philosophy? and the two volumes of Capitalism and Schizophrenia – Anti-Oedipus and A Thousand Plateaus. I make reference to Joyce’s literature, despite Joyce being rarely mentioned by Deleuze and Guattari. The reason for using Joyce is that the Irish writer seems to have more than one affinity with the texts produced in the intersecting lives (Dosse, 2011) of the two French writers.

At the same time, Spinoza, among the philosophers who influenced Deleuze, is the benchmark of my essay for understanding the distinction between stability, concerning the work of art, and the work of the unconscious. The distinction between the philosophical mainstream (particularly Aquinas) in regard to “desire” and the importance of body in Spinoza’s philosophy is the path I follow for demonstrating that Schizoanalysis is a breaking point for philosophy, for psychology and for psychoanalysis.

In continuing the line traced out by Spinoza, and followed by Nietzsche and Bergson among others, Deleuze and Guattari break with the psychoanalytical vision of desire as a negative instance (the missing of something, a lack to be endlessly fulfilled) and foster the positive instance of desire as a production of the unconscious. Finally, I note that the distinction between the stability of the work of art and the modification of desire – in connection with the distinction made by Spinoza – permits Deleuze to entirely regain the issue concerning: “what a body can do”.

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An imaginary parallel: Deleuze/Joyce

Deleuze and Guattari differentiate two terms in *What is Philosophy?* (1996) “percepts” and “affects.” In explaining these concepts, they state that “[p]ercepts are no longer perceptions; they are independent of a state of those who experience them” (p. 164) and: “[a]ffects are no longer feelings or affections; they go beyond the strength of those who undergo them” (ibid). Percepts and affects are independent of the person who created the work of art and independent of its observer (or admirer). Percepts and affects must have a strength that preserves the work of art in itself, as a harmony that goes beyond humanity. The compound of percept and affect is a “bloc of sensations”.

Harmonies are affects. Consonance and dissonance, harmonies of tone or color, are affects of music or painting. Rameau emphasized the identity of harmony and affect. The artist creates blocs of percepts and affects, but the only law of creation is that the compound must stand up on its own. The artist’s greatest difficulty is to make it *stand up on its own*. Sometimes this requires what is, from the viewpoint of an implicit model, from the viewpoint of lived perceptions and affections, great geometrical improbability, physical imperfection, and organic abnormality (ibid)

What Deleuze and Guattari mean here is that, for any work of art to be such, it must have *stability* and *harmony* (Deleuze, 1992a). Note that this claim by them does not require perfection and normality. Having *stability* means that the work of art is resistant to the gaze of the observer, and even resistant to the career of its creator. Having harmony means that an accord is established between consonances and dissonances (Deleuze, 1992b), as in the Baroque. The created is a “being whose validity lies” far beyond “any lived” and is preserved in itself.

Standing up alone does not mean having a top and a bottom or being upright (for even houses are drunk and askew); it is only the act by which the compound of created sensations is preserved in itself - a monument, but one that maybe contained in a few marks or a few lines, like a poem by Emily Dickinson. (Deleuze & Guattari, 1996, p. 164-165)

Understanding this stability that ‘stands on its own’ brings us close to the connection between Deleuze, Guattari and Joyce. Although references to James Joyce rarely appear on Deleuze’s pages (Deleuze, 1972, 1977, Restuccia, 1984, Murphy, 1999, Davies, 2005, Beaulieu, 2016), the French philosopher and Guattari used the word “chaosmos” (a neologism invented by Joyce) several times in many of their essays. As Beaulieu states,

The notion of chaosmos, borrowed from James Joyce, points to another aspect of Deleuze’s cosmological sensitivity. Joyce’s neologism “chaosmos” expresses the fact that chaos and cosmos
(disorder and order) are not opposite, but part of a larger continuum... (2016, p. 201)

For Joyce and Deleuze, chaosmos is the disjunctive synthesis between chaos and cosmos, and cosmos, from the Greek tradition, means, first of all, “the order of the universe”.

“Chaosmos” is in Deleuze’s project since its very beginning, and it is particularly important in regard to psychology. On the essay concerning Hume, written in 1953 (now in Deleuze, 1991), Deleuze considers the 18th Century Scottish philosopher as the founder of a new type of psychology. Instead of a “psychology of mind”, Hume proposes a “psychology of mind affections. “The two ways for the mind to be affected are passions and the social”. How minds connect passions to the social world? In a way that Guattari calls Chaosmosic (Guattari, 1995), which is “an ethico-aesthetic paradigm”, something dealing with the immanent singularity of the event (chaos) that takes stability in life (cosmos). Even though chaos and cosmos are not two different instances that join, they are a single instance, as in the portmanteau words.

Through the 20th Century however, the clinical stories became more and more constrained and, in turn, concepts became academic power/knowledge tools in the hands of the “expert psychologist”, constituting an authoritarian attitude that increasingly framed reality within the boundaries of ‘right-thinking’ individuals and families. In this sense, the example of the Oedipus, made by Deleuze and Guattari, is the most paradigmatic one. The complex and nuanced tragedy, by Sophocles, was transformed, by psychoanalysis, in the triangle “mom-dad-son” and, through this transformation, the role of “Destiny” was completely neglected. The unconscious, instead of being immanent to life (the Greek Moirae) as in the way Sophocles shapes the tragedy of Oedipus, became the desire of the missing mother due to the interdiction of the father. Such a transformation has lead psychology to the wrong idea of considering passions as private issues that are to be put under the control of the “Self”. Within such a frame, therapy in all its guises – including counselling and psychological “rehabilitation” – has the task to make people aware, thus moving the focus to the dominion of “conscious purpose” and cutting the social and historical issues, as if, to give just one example, the alcoholic is a person who is not aware of the limits of drinking instead of the obscene parody of the “Self”-made man (Bateson, 1971, Deleuze, & Parnet, 2011). This all is going to be removed by the contemporary “official” psychology, hegemonized by the “philosophy of mind”, with the program of transforming people as “trivial machines” (Foerster, 1984), machines completely “aware” of everything.

Critical psychology, in re-evaluating Deleuze and other thinkers (e.g. Spinoza whom I am speaking further later, Whitehead, Simondon and Artaud), invests efforts to come back to affects, as an alternative to the theory of mind and the concept of “emotion” (Brown, & Stenner, 2001) as a neuro-physiological issue – central to present dominant Cartesian
psychology. The alternative is a reorientation into the dynamic of affects-affections, the “corporeal turn” and the encounter between bodies. From the critical point of view, arts – more than medicine – are the main point of inspiration. Instead of “the medical body”, psychology deals with music, theatre and poetry on the one hand and, on the other, aging, political asylum, schizophrenia, torture and war as social issues.

Definition of art

The definition of art, given by Deleuze and Guattari, appears to be similar to the one given by Joyce in the novel Portrait of The Artist as a Young Man. Joyce writes with his Hero’s (Stephen) “voice”:

You see I use the word arrest. I mean that the tragic emotion is static. Or rather the dramatic emotion is. The feelings excited by improper art are kinetic, desire or loathing. Desire urges us to possess, to go to something; loathing urges us to abandon, to go from something. These are kinetic emotions. The arts, which excite them, pornographical or didactic, are therefore improper arts. The esthetic emotion (I used the general term) is therefore static (2016, p. 254).

There is something, in art, that is static, that has stability – as far as the meanings of “static” (Joyce) and “having stability” (Deleuze and Guattari) are similar. This is what characterizes the aesthetic gaze as a stare, rather than as a glance. Nevertheless, there is a significant difference between Joyce and the two authors of What is Philosophy? Such a difference seems to concern the use of the term “desire”. In Joyce’s aesthetic theory, “desire” is excited by improper art, as for the example of pornography. Proper art affects are static; in Joyce’s view they are pity and terror. Instead desire is a “kinetic” feeling. Having been satisfied, desire temporarily disappears. Desire goes back and forth, has a connection with lust, or concupiscence. For Deleuze and Guattari in contrast, desire is a positive reality that belongs to life it is a plateau of immanence. As we’ll see in the next paragraph, desire is not something, which has to do with a lapse.

What is Philosophy? and Capitalism and Schizophrenia: a contradiction?

Coming back to Deleuze and Guattari’s “block of sensations”, I will confront What is Philosophy? to the two volumes of Capitalism and Schizophrenia (1983, 1987). What do the two authors have in mind when they are in the process of writing Anti-Oedipus and,
later on, *A Thousand Plateaus*? And what is the difference, if any, with *What is Philosophy*?

*Prima facie* we are dealing with two contradictory arguments. Is the world something that has a continuous movement – like a “desiring machine” – or does the world have stability, in terms of “percepts”, and “affects”? We have to decide whether such a question concerns a contradiction in the two philosophers or a distinction within the complexity of Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy.

At a first glance, one can observe that stability (of the work of art) and continuous movement (of the unconscious at work) are exactly the opposite. In such a case, the contradiction to be resolved, or demonstrated, is the one between the idea of “Work of Art” in *What is Philosophy*? – in a way similar to that expressed by Joyce, concerning “stability” in *Portrait* – and the notion of “desiring machines” as expressed in *Capitalism and Schizophrenia*. This approach could easily lead to declaring *Capitalism and Schizophrenia* to be a mistake within the works of Deleuze and Guattari.

This apparent contradiction has to deal with the complex interweaving between affects and affections, as well as the interweaving between percepts and perceptions. Affections and perceptions depend on the “state of those who experience them” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1996, p. 164). Perceptions and affections have a psychological side, they transform the subject; they touch “It” (Groddeck, 1961), producing the overlapping mind/body confusion addressed by Spinoza as I will discuss next. On the other hand, affects and percepts belong to the ontological side of our living experience. They are events, independent from us, belonging to life. Art is the way affects and percepts touch the subject with stability. Spinoza’s distinction, between substance and affections, seems to clarify the apparent contradiction in Deleuze’s and Guattari’s thought.

**Affects are no longer feelings or affections, a confrontation with Spinoza’s difference between substance and modification**

Baruch Spinoza – together with Leibniz, Nietzsche and Bergson – is one of the most important philosophers to influence Deleuze (1988, 1992, 2010). In turn, Deleuze is considered one of the most important Spinoza’s scholars. He wrote and gave lessons on the Dutch heretic philosopher, particularly concerning his “affects theory”.

There are three statements in Spinoza’s *Ethics* that I find particularly relevant. Firstly, Spinoza writes “[b]y eternity, I mean existence itself, in so far as it is conceived necessarily to follow solely from the definition that which is eternal” (Part I, Definition VIII). Then, in Proposition I of Part I, he states that “[s]ubstance is by nature prior to
modification”. Finally he also writes: “[b]y mode I mean the modifications [in Latin, *Affectiones*] of substance or that which exist in, and is conceived through, something other than itself” (Part I, Definition V).

With these statements Spinoza makes a clear distinction between eternity and modification, a distinction between what remains intact – that is *substantia* – and what changes – *affectiones*. For him, these are two different dominions: substance, which is self-caused, and existence, which is conceived by something else. Substance is something that has no need to be conceived by something else (for it is “conceived through itself”) and has infinite attributes. As humans, we have access to just two of the infinite attributes of substance: thought and extension, which can be declined in soul (or mind) and body. These two attributes are independent of each other, while at the same time they are mixed and confused in different ways. In Part I, Proposition VIII, Note II, Spinoza clarifies such a distinction:

> No doubt it will be difficult for those who think about things loosely, and have not been accustomed to know them by their primary causes, to comprehend the demonstration of Proposition VII\(^\text{52}\): for such persons make no distinction between the modifications of substances and substances themselves, and are ignorant of the manner in which things are produced; hence they may attribute to substances the beginning of which they observe in natural objects. Those who are ignorant of the true causes make complete confusion-think... So also those who confuse the two natures, divine and human, readily attribute human passions to the deity, especially so long as they do not know how passions originate in the mind... modifications exist in something external to themselves.

Spinoza’s “Theory of affects” concerns modification, and introduces the body as an attribute of essence, which belongs to the extended thing. Body acts within the dynamics of the encounter: “For instance, if the motion which object we see communicate to our nerves be conductive to health, the objects causing it are styled beautiful; if a contrary motion be excited, they are styled ugly.” (Appendix to Proposition XXXVI in Part I).

The sense of smell perceives fragrance, or fetidity; the same could happen concerning taste, touch, hearing, gaze, proprioception, movement, etc. Any one of these affections makes a difference. The nerves are affected by these differences and transmit such differences to the mind. It seems an anticipation of Gregory Bateson’s (1979) concept of “difference, which makes a difference”. Spinoza stresses the importance of the intimate relationship between mind and body. As Descartes (2000) is the philosopher of the

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\(^{52}\) Prop. VII. Existence belongs to the nature of substances. Proof. – Substance cannot be produced by anything external (Corollary, Prop vi.), it must, therefore, be its own cause – that is, its essence necessarily involves existence, or existence belongs to its nature.
separation between res cogitans and res extensa, Spinoza is that of the reunification of mind and body. Nevertheless the mainstream of philosophy remained, in its dominant conception, Cartesian. Phenomenological philosophy itself was entangled within this distinction. Edmund Husserl, the founder of phenomenology, in trying to overpass Descartes, remained caught within the pre-category and pre-reflective position of the “I” as the ontological premise that grounds the ontic horizon of the sciences. Eventually Husserl, and then Merleau-Ponty, located the pre-categorial in the body, as corporeal schema. Even the attempts of this later Husserl and Merleau-Ponty to rescue the body from philosophy remained incomplete (Foucault, 1996). The only two modern philosophers who inspired Deleuze in the enterprise of “saving the body” are Nietzsche and Bergson. Nietzsche with the two apparently contradictory concepts of Wille zur Macht and Ewige Wiederkunft des Gleichen (Will to Power and Eternal return), and Bergson’s rejection of “the conventional division between a material and an intelligible world.” (Nichterlein and Morss, 2017, p. 14)

In Spinoza, the first step in such a direction is the dynamics between affects (affectio) and feelings (affectus), which is the primary dynamics of the encounter. For Spinoza, affectio is about an encounter of an “external body”; affectus is the way in which the encounter gives rise to a variation, or “disturbance of the soul”. In Descartes, the mind has a primacy over the body; the mind moves the body to act. Contrary to this, Spinoza gives three examples in which the body produces gestures and acts by itself: children, the inebriate and the somnambulist. These examples show there is no primacy of the mind over body and that body acts independently of mindfulness. There is no way of being completely aware of myself. In the example of the somnambulist, during sleep the somnambulist does things that she/he would not do in waking life. In dissidence to the mainstream philosophy of his times, Spinoza criticizes the idea that the mind can fill the body gap through conscious purpose. Deleuze gives a synthesis of this critique in one of his lectures:

The point of view of an ethics is: of what are you capable, what can you do? Hence a return to this sort of cry of Spinoza’s: what can a body do? We never know in advance what a body can do. We never know how we’re organized and how the modes of existence are enveloped in somebody. (Deleuze 2010)

The Spinoza of Deleuze claims that desire is a positive movement in a plane of immanence, a concept that Deleuze borrowed from Henri Bergson and, later on, from Gregory Bateson. It is what Deleuze and Guattari call the work of the unconscious or the “unconscious at work”. Desire is neither a temptation of the flesh, nor a subject lapse consequent to primary repression. Desire is ethically connected to “what can a body do”.

A literary example of Capitalism and Schizophrenia

No doubt that, in *Capitalism and Schizophrenia* (Deleuze & Guattari 1983, 1987), “desire” is a key word. What Deleuze and Guattari mean by “desire” is explained in the expression “desiring machines”. “Desiring machines” are the vehicles – to use a kinetic expression – for describing the unconscious “at work”. The unconscious at work is a desiring machine. Deleuze’s definition of desire stands opposite to what Aquinas means by “desire” and also stands opposite to what the psychoanalytical mainstream means by it. In Scholastic philosophy, as well as in Scholastic psychoanalysis, “desire” is in relation to something missing: the expulsion from Eden (due to original sin) as well as primary repression (due to the entrance of the Father into the dyadic relationship).

By contrast, “desire” in Deleuze and Guattari has nothing of transcendence, nothing external to itself that constitutes it as lacking. It is not a lapse located between Ego and reality. “Desire” is something working within a plateau of immanence; “desire” is nomadic, is a positive and productive instance. Furthermore, “desire” is always in horizontal de-territorialized movement. “Desire”, in more than one sense, is kinetic and it is rhizomatic in that it moves in a horizontal way. Hence, if we make a parallel between Chapter 7 of *What is Philosophy?* and the whole work on *Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, there is already enough material that requires clarification.

Two roads diverge

There are different possible ways of clarifying the issue concerning the use of the word “desire”. In Aquinas’ (1970) conception, “desire” is the lapse of man [sic] in facing up to “temptations”; for Scholastic Philosophy, desire is moved by concupiscientia carnis (desire of flesh). Aquinas considers “desire” as opposite to the concept that Spinoza and Deleuze have in common.

I should also mention an affinity between the notion of “desire” in Aquinas and the notion of the same term within psychoanalysis. In psychoanalysis, primary repression is the consequence of the infant’s encounter with Father/Language. In Lacan’s terms, at the very moment of the encounter with Symbolic Order, the subject starts to exist, and he – this is valid ‘only’ for men, because *la femme n’existe pas tout*, by definition\(^{53}\) –

\(^{53}\) This is a confronting point in psychoanalytical theory that requires careful consideration. In Lacanian theory, there is an expression: *la femme n’existe pas tout*. This expression means that the woman, in order to encounter the Father (which is not the dad, but a significant inside the symbolic order), has to make a second turn. In other words, such an encounter is not direct, as in the male. The advantage of this position is that *la femme*, in difference form the male, is not entirely trapped into the categorial symbolic order. She lives in the singularity and does not exist as a whole, but always into the contingency. In this sense Lacan’s position concerning the feminine world is similar to Spinoza’s (and
exists as barred Subject ($). The symbolic order places the subject under the Law and divides him [sic]. The action of language, as a razor, places the subject under a transcendental order of Language. In more traditional psychoanalysis, this is the entrance of the Father into the Oedipal triangle, what Freud called the “castration complex”. As in Aquinas, under different forms, “desire” has a negative connotation as something that is missing.

What psychoanalysis considers a universal destiny of the (neurotic) subject, for schizoanalysis is the consequence of sub-jection into the oedipal-capitalist society. The universal condition of humanity is transformed, by schizoanalysis, into a particular gesture of sub-mission (instead of sub-stance) within capitalist society, a historical form of submission, equivalent to that of Aquinas in medieval times. This road will consider Thomist philosophy and the mainstream of psychoanalysis as two historical ways of sub-mission, that is, as two forms of constitution of the sub-ject.

Desire theory and desire production

At the beginning of this essay, I mentioned Joyce’s idea of “desire” and the affinities between him and What is Philosophy? in the aesthetic approach. Joyce’s idea of desire depends on a double influence: the philosophy of Aquinas and psychoanalysis. We should consider the notes written by Joyce on art and aesthetics in the Portrait as a critique of the idea of “desire” as concupiscencia carnis (Aquinas, 1970) as well as the idea of manque à être; a critique to the main conception of desire at that time, of desire as a sin or a lapse.

Let us go back to the Portrait for a while. In the main philosophical tradition, “desire” is something to be fulfilled. This is the meaning that Joyce also gives to “desire”. Joyce quotes Thomas of Aquinas in italic letters:


Joyce disagrees with Saint Thomas (Aquinas), however over the meaning of claritas as the “divine purpose in anything” or a force that renders the aesthetic image universal. On the contrary, in Joyce, “radiance” means quidditas (whatness). This is Joyce’s sacrilege. As Stephen Dedalus states:

The instant wherein that supreme quality of beauty, the clear radiance of the esthetic image, is apprehended luminously by the

Deleuze's) position concerning the world as “life”.
mind which has been arrested by its wholeness and fascinated by its harmony is the luminous silent stasis of esthetic pleasure... (ibid)

Joyce twists the theological position of “divine purpose” into the aesthetic gaze. Here, Joyce is close to Deleuze and Guattari’s idea of desire, which is different to the mainstream of Aquinas: the wholeness of aesthetic pleasure is far from being something pornographic.

In order to see that basket, said Stephen, your mind first of all separates the basket from the rest of the visible universe, which is not the basket. The first phase of apprehension is a bounding line drawn about the object to be apprehended. An aesthetic image is presented to us either in space or in time. What is audible is presented in time, what is visible is presented in space. But, temporal or spatial, the aesthetic image is first luminously apprehended as self-bounded and self-contained upon the immeasurable background of space or time, which is not it. You apprehend it as one thing. You see it as one whole. You apprehend its wholeness. (p. 264)

I think that this is the same compound mentioned in What is Philosophy? Wholeness seems to be something that goes far beyond the subject as observer or creator of this specific Work of Art. The Work of Art surpasses the subjectivity of the person. Between the oedipalized sub-ject – the conscious purpose – and the work of art there is an unbridgeable gap, because the work of art is a production of the unconscious.

It is interesting that the future author of the most anti-oedipal work of art in the history of literature (Finnegans Wake), during his youth, was already close to establishing another approach to conceiving “desire”, and at the same time remained entangled with the idea of desire as something missing that, to be excited, needs pornography. It is a matter of fact that, during the years of his youth, Joyce was fascinated by Freudian psychoanalysis.

It is not by chance that I started my essay using Joyce as a comparison point with Deleuze and Guattari. Something like Finnegans Wake could be considered the most illuminating example of the unconscious at work in the entire history of literature. Among other definitions of this massive work, Finnegans Wake can be defined as a family delusional...
incestuous disorder, a never-ending babelish and chaomsotic family dream. *Finnegans Wake* is the absolute paramount of the work of the unconscious. It is composed by a multiplicity of languages, including port-manteau words, apparently non-sens; non-sense that, in time, scholar have discovered as having hidden meanings with multiple references to different Authors, historical episodes and philosophical theories.

**Psychoanalysis and schizoanalysis: theory and production**

In one of Lacan’s last seminars, Joyce appears as the *Sinthome*, an old French word that, in a pun, means, at the same time, “symptom”, and “saint man”. Joyce is considered the subject who has been able to become his own father, avoiding schizophrenia, putting schizophrenia on the written pages, particularly throughout his own writings – *Ulysses* and *Finnegans Wake*.

Following the mainstream of philosophy, psychoanalysis argues that the existence of “desire” is constitutive of the impossibility to get complete pleasure in human life. The Western subject is a divided Self, always missing the fullness of pleasure, always submitted to the *principle* of pleasure. The “principle” submits “pleasure” to the Law (of capitalistic society).

In Deleuze and Guattari’s perspective, this conceptualization is a big mistake.

First of all, there are two different ways of missing as human being: the anthropological and the psychoanalytical. In the anthropological, and biological sense, humans are neotenic animals. They are animals that live within a long period of infancy and childhood. In contrast to this evidence, the *manqué à être* of psychoanalysis refers to the impossibility of fulfilling the wholeness of pleasure. The possible overlapping of these two different gaps is probably at the base of the mistake concerning “desire”. Is “desire” immanent to human animals, as in the anthropological and ontological sense? Or is “desire” the consequence of the primary repression, as is proposed in psychoanalysis?

First position: The nomadic *animal* – the ontological condition as “missing animal” (mängelwesen) – is what the empirical observation concerning human life shows, from 450,000 years ago until now. If incompleteness is constitutive of life, the “missing animal”, in anthropological sense, is the one who is involved into a second fold: neoteny and nomadism are two faces of the process of becoming other. They probably are the most important examples of how the unconscious works, producing without product.

Second position: The psychoanalytical idea of having a *lapse* – a gap that moves desire towards pleasure – is far from being evident from an ontological perspective that considers humankind beyond the Victorian era of capitalism or, to the same effect, of
other Western historical practices of creating docile bodies (Foucault, 1976), of constituting the sub-ject. Sub-ject originally means servant, or slave, and in English language, the word maintains the same nuance (in Latin sub-jectum = lie down).

From Aquinas’ *Seven Capital Sins*, to the mainstream of psychoanalysis, perversion and madness have been considered the benchmark limits for desire. From temptation, to castration, passing through Puritan society, the body has been considered no more than a locus of lust, sexuality and excess. In Christianity, the withdrawal of Self – where the Self was the main source of sin – was the only possible way for acquiring grace (Bercovich, 1975, Foucault, 2005). Within modernity, sexuality is the possible explosion of transgression and madness. Sexuality, one of the sources of “perversion”, needs to be repressed in order to reproduce capitalistic society. In terms of modern psychiatric discourse, from infantile masturbation to homosexuality, the image of the debauched man, and the one of the prostitute, all are dangerous for the reproduction of the everyday manual work in factories.

The so-called “pan-sexuality” of psychoanalysis, seems to join the Puritan idea of the body as a taboo and sex under a prohibition that, paradoxically, generates pornographic desire. Following Foucault (1976), psychoanalysis seems to be the path for transforming incestuous desire into discursive practice. This is the reason why psychoanalysis ends up considering the body as an obstacle. “Body is the main obstacle to love”, declared Jacques Lacan in a conversation in Milan with the Ferenczian psychoanalyst Elvio Fachinelli (Fachineilli, 1989, p. 201, Barbetta, in press).

Deleuze and Guattari’s position switches the mainstream of psychoanalysis from “desire” as something transcendent or missing, into “desire” as immanent and positive. Some psychoanalysts (David-Menard, 2005) have taken a fresh view of schizophrenia and perversion through this reversal. The concept of “desiring machine” is at the core of the distance that Deleuze and Guattari took from mainstream psychoanalytical discourse during the 70s and the 80s.

The *Anti-Oedipus* that Deleuze and Guattari propose consists in the subtraction of the authoritarian principle of oedipalization from the analysis, proposing instead a kind of anti-subjection. Schizophrenia does not take name, religion, nation, race, language or gender. In schizophrenia the possibility of being Napoleon, Jesus or Mohammed is always open. Schizophrenia seems to be the line of flight from being a subject: no race, no gender, no name, no religion or belonging to someone. The *Anti-Oedipus* is not simplistically claiming that schizophrenia is something like a *joie de vivre*. In the *Anti-Oedipus*, the argument is against the disrespectful way in which psychoanalysis, on the basis of the psychiatric mainstream, uses the diagnosis of “schizophrenia” both, as an incurable disease and as a radical impossibility to be admitted within the “human society”. In this sense, for the two authors, the distress of schizophrenia is more
connected with the way schizophrenia is treated by psychiatry and abandoned by the mainstream of psychoanalysis.

The *Anti-Oedipus* can be also view as a practical application - the field of Schizoanalysis - of what Deleuze considered more theoretically in *Difference and Repetition* (Deleuze, 1994, p. 67): the stability of the equivocity of Being. The affinity with Gregory Bateson is astonishing when one considers schizophrenia as a process of creation due to a trans-contextual exit from the double bind, as in Bateson (Bateson M.C., 2005).

In Deleuze, the work of art, percepts and affects are the ontological conditions of possibility for any affections and feelings, and affections and feelings are two of the vehicles of desiring machines, precisely the ones coming from art.

**Conclusion**

This work should have continued with other references to Nietzsche’s “eternal return” and Bergson’s “movement and duration”. These authors helped Deleuze in his work into philosophical concepts on movement and time, particularly important for his two volumes on cinema. Given space constraints, I am not able to establish these connections. Neither will I be able to touch on the influences of the artists that inspired him: Francis Bacon, Antonin Artaud, Pasolini, Antonioni, Godard as well as Anglo-American Literature and Japan, amongst other.

Aware of these limitations, I chose to include a comparison with James Joyce’s literary production for various reasons, including: the affinity of Joyce’s *Portrait* and Deleuze/Guattari’s *What is Philosophy?* concerning the stability of work of art; the affinity between *Finnegans Wake* and Schizoanalysis; and the difference between Joyce and Deleuze/Guattari in reference to “desire”, a distinction that introduces the difference between desire as a lapse of psychoanalytical primary repression – the *manque à être* – and desire as the unconscious at work. The principal reason for the unusual parallel between Joyce and Deleuze is however that they both use the portmanteau word chaosmos, a word that, in joyful synthesis, contains the stability of the Work of Art and the chaotic world of schizophrenia, and, at the same time, recognizes that schizophrenia, like a Work of Art, can become “a joy forever” – as in John Keats’s Poem *Endymion* – when it is able to connect in a singular and affirmative chaosmos.

Returning to Joyce, the meaning of “desire” is connected to the mainstream of western philosophy (as Joyce himself recognizes by quoting Plato, Aristotle and Aquinas). It is the negative connotation of desire as a lapse – a lapse in obtaining full pleasure – that continues in different forms, under the guise of pornography, during the era of capitalism. At the same time through all of Joyce’s literature, the “epiphanies” are
nothing else but the full joy of this same lapse: “what a body can do”. In a kind of reversal of the psychoanalytical mainstream, Joyce’s epiphanies are the joyful connections with something distant, or in some way, unreachable: the life of the positive desire at work. A kind subjectivisation, were the (im)possible relation with the other emerges. That is the work of art, a different way for considering therapy as the art of connection.

References


Deleuze, G. (1977), 'I have nothing to admit', trans. by Janis Forman, Semiotext(e) 2,3.


