Screens

From Materiality to Spectatorship – A Historical and Theoretical Reassessment

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Intersections between Showing and Concealment in the History of the Concept of Screen

Giorgio Avezzù

The genealogical reconstructions of the word and concept of screen in media archaeology have often stressed that "surface for presenting images" is a relatively late meaning that came into use in the first half of the 19th century, associated with the spread of pre-cinema devices such as the phantasmagoria and magic lantern. The original meaning instead referred primarily to concepts of concealment and protection.[1] I believe, however, that another, broader – and hence inevitably unsystematic, incomplete, and simplifying – exploration of the concept of screen is required, to establish that it embodies two coexisting meanings: an instrument of "protection" or "concealment," on the one hand, and of "showing" or "monstration," on the other.[2] Some episodes in the history of this concept, which we shall discuss, show how we should not be too hasty in jumping to the conclusion that the 19th century was a crucial time of discontinuity, of breaking with the past, a "point of diffraction" between two incompatible meanings (to use Foucault's terminology).[3] The aim is not merely to court controversy but to make a profitable contribution to an archaeology of the screen that demonstrates the intimate relationship between the two orders of meaning. This relationship may even seem obvious sometimes but problematic and theoretically fertile at others. Perhaps it lays the foundations for the concept itself: the screen probably needs to be considered *not as an object but as a function*, or rather as a *combination* of functions.

As If on a Screen, the Usual Illusion: Montale

A well-known poem by one of Italy's greatest 20th-century poets can provide a starting point. "Maybe One Morning, Walking in Dry, Glassy Air," from 1923, appears in Eugenio Montale's first collection, *Cuttlefish Bones* (*Ossi di seppia*).

Forse un mattino andando in un'aria di vetro, arida, rivolgendomi, vedrò compirsi il miracolo: il nulla alle mie spalle, il vuoto dietro di me, con un terrore di ubriaco.	Maybe one morning, walking in dry, glassy air, I'll turn, and see the miracle occur: nothing at my back, the void behind me, with a drunkard's terror.
Poi come s'uno schermo, s'accamperanno di gitto alberi case colli per l'inganno consueto. Ma sarà troppo tardi; ed io me n'andrò zitto tra gli uomini che non si voltano, col mio segreto.	Then, as if on a screen, trees houses hills will suddenly collect for the usual illusion. But it will be too late: and I'll walk on silent among the men who don't look back, with my secret.[4]

Italo Calvino noted how this poem "clearly belongs to the cinema age": the word "screen" (*schermo*) is used metaphorically, with a meaning that originates in cinema. This meaning, Calvino continues, differs from the Italian poetic tradition we are accustomed to; it has always used the word "in the sense of 'a shelter which obscures vision' or 'diaphragm.'" Indeed, he ventures, with an observation that seems to be echoed in those of Huhtamo, Elsaesser, and Hagener on how the term's meaning has evolved, probably "this is the first time that an Italian poet uses *schermo* in the sense of 'surface on which images are projected.'"[5]

Before reflecting on the poetic tradition to which Calvino refers, it may be useful to consider whether something of the original meaning of concealment persists even in this seemingly different usage. Things will assemble "as if on a screen," but effectively to create the "usual illusion": to conceal the "nothing" behind us, whose revelation – despite the screen, before its interposition – represents a "miracle." Interestingly, the Italian term *accampare* – to stand out against a background, as the figures are placed in a field of vision – probably derives from heraldry: the *campo* (field) is the background of the shield;[6] we shall talk of shields later. The miracle (the word's etymology is naturally linked to the sense of sight), the revealing of what lies beyond the screen (beyond the shield), is a central theme in Montale's poetry. It is "the prodigy that reveals divine Indifference," frequently invoked in *Cuttlefish Bones*, a book in which walls often recur. It is, in other words, what allows things to "betray their final secret," which precisely concerns an imperfection, a crack, a break, a split in a *dispositif* placed to separate and divide – the "flaw in the net," the "half-shut gate."[7]

Another poem, "The Hope of Even Seeing You Again" (1937), a motet in Montale's subsequent collection (*The Occasions*/*Le occasioni*), where the term "screen" appears again, may help to clarify the poet's use of the word:

La speranza di pure rivederti m'abbandonava;	The hope of even seeing you again was leaving me;
e mi chiesi se questo che mi chiude ogni senso di te, schermo d'immagini, ha i segni della morte o dal passato è in esso, ma distorto e fatto labile, un *tuo* barbaglio [...].	and I asked myself if this which closes off all sense of you from me, this screen of images, is marked by death, or if, out of the past, but deformed and diminished, it entails some flash *of yours* [...].[8]

Here, too, not only is the screen a *screen of images*, but it actually has the effect of preventing awareness or at least of conveying a distorted, distant sense.[9] We should not really be surprised if Montale's use of the word "screen," read in a cinematic sense, has a "negative" connotation and thus remains tied to an older usage tradition. Indeed, it depends on the particular consideration that the poet had for the cinema. Although he contributed to the issue of *Solaria* dedicated to cinema (1927), in which various Italian intellectuals pronounced their faith in and openness to the "new" medium, Montale used it as an early opportunity to distance himself from the impassioned "effusions" voiced by many French commentators.[10] Later, his view would become radical: "I would abolish cinema";[11] "cinema is an inevitable source of prostitution and delinquency."[12] He considered it devoid of artistic foundations, an art of imitation and mimicry that effects an "actual substitution of objects [and] effectively mutilates our way of seeing."[13] Moreover, it is "art for the masses," and as such it could not meet the approval of a poet of intimately elitist character: "True art today [...] is more than ever the art of the few for the few."[14] Unsurprisingly, Montale proved a less than felicitous choice as president of the jury at the 1953 Venice Film Festival: that year, for the first time, no Golden Lion was awarded, despite entries from Mizoguchi and Fellini, among others.

When Montale mentions screens of images, things that organize and array themselves "as if on a screen," I do not take that as a completely revolutionary departure from the term's meaning in the Italian poetic tradition. The screen certainly serves to represent and show – thus, it evokes the cinema epoch, as Calvino noticed – but also to hide, to deceive, to separate, to create distance, although it is not always successful, and the "plan" that it should contribute to shape may be miraculously subverted, consequently creating a sense of astonishment.

The Screen Ladies and Our Simulations: Dante

At this point, a deeper examination is required precisely of that Italian "poetic tradition" to which Calvino alludes regarding the more typical sense of the term "screen." Many exponents could be cited, but the most immediate are Petrarch and especially, even earlier, Dante, to whom we shall now look. Incidentally, it should be noted that these instances narrowly precede what the Oxford English Dictionary documents as the first use of the Old French *escran*, meaning simply a fire screen.[15]

In the *Commedia* and elsewhere, Dante employs the term in its broader sense. Battaglia's *Grande dizionario della lingua italiana* defines *schermo* as "that which is used to cover or shelter someone or something from external agents, inclement weather, or harmful factors, to hide it from view: cover, shelter," and also, figuratively, as "that which is used to combat or avoid a negative circumstance, a

difficult, damaging or unpleasant situation." In fact, the very use of the word in reference to a context of seeing (the screen as protection from the gaze) seems metaphorical and less intuitive to me.

Dante also deploys the term in this figurative sense, with a visual meaning regarding combating an unpleasant situation. He does so in *Vita Nova* (1293-1295), where a few passages of special interest from a *dispositif*-archaeology perspective (and for a history of screen practice) tell of the *screen lady* or *donna schermo* – "nothing less than a theme" of the work, according to Gianfranco Contini.[16] As the rules of courtly love demanded, the beloved woman's identity must remain secret. Therefore, it needs to be concealed from the audience, either by changing her name (as with the *senhal* in troubadour poetry) or, as with Dante's screen lady, by pretending that the love was directed towards another woman, in other words by using another woman as a screen for the love towards the actual beloved.[17] Chapter V of *Vita Nova* describes an actual visual *dispositif*, a spectacular construction evoked in detail, an observer and an observed, straight lines of sight, an audience and a (living) screen:

> Un giorno avvenne che questa gentilissima sedea in parte ove s'udiano parole de la regina de la gloria, ed io era in quel luogo dal quale vedea la mia beatitudine: e nel mezzo di lei e di me per la retta linea sedea una gentile donna di molto piacevole aspetto, la quale mi mirava spesse volte, maravigliandosi del mio sguardare, che parea che sopra lei terminasse. Onde molti s'accorsero de lo suo mirare; e in tanto vi fue posto mente, che, partendomi da questo luogo, mi sentio dicere appresso di me: "Vedi come cotale donna distrugge la persona di costui"; e nominandola, io intesi che dicea di colei che mezzo era stata ne la linea retta che movea da la gentilissima Beatrice e terminava ne li occhi miei. Allora mi confortai molto, assicurandomi che lo mio secreto non era comunicato lo giorno altrui per mia vista. E mantenente pensai di fare di questa gentile donna schermo de la veritade; e tanto ne mostrai in poco di tempo, che lo mio secreto fue creduto sapere da le più persone che di me ragionavano. Con questa donna mi celai alquanti anni e mesi [...].
>
> It happened one day that this most gracious of women was sitting in a place where words about the Queen of Glory were being listened to [i.e., a church], and I was positioned in such a way that I saw my beatitude. And in the middle of a direct line between her and me was seated a gracious and very attractive woman who kept looking at me wondering about my gaze, which seemed to rest on her. Many people were aware of her looking, and so much attention was being paid to it that, as I was leaving the place, I heard people saying, "Look at the state he is in over that woman." And hearing her name I understood they were talking about the woman who had been situated midpoint in the straight line that proceeded from the most gracious lady, Beatrice, and

> reached its end in my eyes. Then I felt relieved, confident my secret had not been betrayed that day by my appearance. And immediately I thought of using the gracious woman as a screen for the truth, and I made such a show over it in a short amount of time that most people who talked about me thought they knew my secret. I concealed myself by means of this woman for a number of years and months [...].[18]

The screen of truth "for this great love of mine" is what the majority must see, to prevent them from contemplating what Dante is really interested in (and marvels at) – Beatrice – and to make them believe that they know something that actually remains secret. It is a defensive, protective, concealing screen, but also a screen of representation, of monstration: "*tanto ne mostrai*," writes Dante – "I made such a show over it." In Dante's spectacular geometry, which uses the terms of medieval geometrical optics,[19] the screen lady is literally the midpoint, the median, the medium: "*colei che mezzo era stata*" – (lit.: she who medium had been). She is an interface, what is seen instead of what must stay hidden to avoid ruin. She is what the audience (the "many") see, for sure, but she is also Dante's means of setting the beloved woman apart, to symbolize her own unattainability. This unattainability is certainly typical of courtly love – a love unfulfilled, by definition, a sensual but disembodied fascination – but in the *Vita Nova*, it acquires nuances that are more markedly supernatural. Indeed, Beatrice is a "miracle" (and able to perform miracles); understandably, a means of mediation, a ritual geometry, is required to experience her, or rather to keep her sacred. For this reason, Dante "makes a virtue of the encounter's impossibility."[20]

The screen lady is a device primarily of protection and segregation but also of illusory, deceptive representation. As emerges in chapter X (1), Beatrice refused to acknowledge Dante because there were too many "indiscreet" rumors "*oltre li termini de la cortesia*" (lit.: beyond the terms of courtesy) about his relationship with the screen lady. The latter is a second screen lady to whom the poet had newly addressed his "*simulato amore*" (lit.: simulated love) to "*mostrar*[*lo*] *ad altri*" (show [it] to others) after the first one left Florence.[21] Beatrice's coldness could not but cast Dante into the deepest despair. In chapter XII, Love thus appears to him in the guise of a young man clad in white, who advises him to finally declare the object of his love, ordering him in Latin: "*Fili mi, tempus est ut pretermictantur simulacra nostra*" – "My son, it is time for our false images [our simulations] to be put aside."[22] The *simulacra nostra*, our simulations, the false images,[23] are actually the screen ladies, or rather what the author wishes the public to believe through them.

We see how the screen, here too, is linked to a function of monstration, of exhibiting (false) images, albeit in a particular metaphorical sense and certainly with a meaning strictly bound to the main definition of a means of protection. As we have said, Dante himself will use "screens" in the *Commedia* in a more con-

crete and material sense – screens are, for example, the defenses constructed by the Paduans along the River Brenta and by the Flemish at Wissant and Bruges to resist the sea.[24] Yet, on closer reflection, perhaps it is precisely the metaphorical sense, and especially the strand of the metaphor linked to the sense of sight, which – as we have seen – is absolutely central in *Vita Nova*, that enables the two functions of protection and representation to be superposed. In early Dante, the screen as a visual metaphor is already that which conceals and yet shows.

A Shield, Wondrous to Behold: The Shield of Achilles

One of the word's most evocative etymologies associates the screen with the "shield," which shows "how the military pervades – not only technologically but also etymologically – on many different levels of our media history," according to Wanda Strauven.[25] As we see, reading between the lines at least, Strauven is primarily interested in the reference to a military shield as an object made of animal hide, from the media-archaeology viewpoint that considers not only the devices' visual aspect but also their haptic, tactile aspect (besides, naturally, their portability). But should we necessarily ascribe no visual and representative importance to the screen-shield, an instrument of protection and defense *par excellence*, the most concrete expression of the function of a screen?

The most celebrated shield in classical antiquity – the one that Hephaestus forged for Achilles at his mother Thetis's request, after Patroclus had died and the arms that the hero had lent him had fallen into Trojan hands – shows we would be quite wrong to ignore the visual significance of the screen-shield. The shield of Achilles is certainly a formidable (albeit ultimately inadequate) instrument of defense, but it is also a surface of representation. The correlation between these two functions already exists in Homer: Hephaestus, he says, can only wish to be as sure that his shield can protect Achilles as he is sure that it will be beautiful to see.[26] "Across its vast expanse with all his craft and cunning, the god creates a world of gorgeous immortal work"[27] – the 130 verses of book 18 of the *Iliad* (478-608) describe it in full, minute detail. The land, the sky, the sea, the sun, the moon, the constellations, a city in peace with its rituals, a wedding, a banquet, a legal dispute, a city at war besieged by two armies, an ambush scene, agricultural and pastoral scenes (the seasons), ploughing, harvesting crops and grapes, cows attacked by lions, a valley with grazing sheep, music and dancing are shown, all belted by the River Oceanus.

The scenes mostly give an impression of movement and sound. Referring precisely to the succession of scenes and their narrative style, as stories, Umberto Eco comments in *The Infinity of Lists* that it is "as if the shield were a cinema screen."[28] But, in effect, the shield of Achilles is a screen simply because it is a picture, a tableau, a frame, a *dispositif* that delimits space, a textual field and a field of representation. The lengthy description is the archetype and model of

every literary *ekphrasis*, a pause with clearly defined limits in the Iliad story. On one hand, it imitates or even vies with its referent, the object, the shield: it is a medallion, a verbal equivalent of a visible object. On the other, it is a miniature replica of the entire poem, inside it (i.e., a *mise en abyme*);[29] hence, it is an enunciative and metadiscursive configuration, a "secondary screen" or a screen within another screen, in Christian Metz's terms.[30] On a still higher level, the shield is a device that serves to shape, frame, and organize the whole world: Oceanus surrounds it, as it frames the Earth itself and the maps of the *oecumene*. Incidentally, it might be worth remembering that the Ptolemaic instructions for the planar projection of the oecumene, surrounded by Oceanus, underlie the Renaissance rediscovery of perspective, which is what classic apparatus theory saw in turn as the root of cinematic framing.[31] The shield of Achilles is almost a mnemonic device, a theater of the world, a screen of images, an *imago mundi* – shield and *imago* together – an image of the entire Earth, a representative utopia, a synthesis of the whole world.[32] And it is precisely from its imitative character as a "*mimema* of the cosmos" and from the great realism of its images that the shield's wonder and amazement derives: "that any man in the world of men will marvel at / through all the years to come – whoever sees its splendor"; "*hoia tis aute / anthropon poleon thaumassetai, hos ken idetai*" – where *thaumassetai* comes from *thauma*, "wonder," "amazement."[33]

The Part That Lies Opposite, and Plato's Wall

Of course, with the shield of Achilles, we are actually talking about a shield (*sakos*), not a screen. The terms are different. The etymology that Strauven indicates, in fact, involves the Old High German *skirm/skerm*, not the Greek.[34] Besides, it would be pointless to seek such a distant testimony of a word equivalent to "screen" in today's sense(s). Thus, it might be more rational, if anything, to consider functions first, before terminology. Indeed, it is curious to think that, in the cave allegory in Book 7 of Plato's *The Republic*, famously discussed by Jean-Louis Baudry in relation to the cinematic apparatus,[35] the term "screen" is never used, nor (on closer inspection) is an equivalent, in the now current sense. For all the translations speak of the "wall" (*parete*, in Italian) of the cave on which the shadows are projected, although the Greek text does not even use an actual noun, preferring a pronoun followed by a partitive and an adverb of place – the shadows are projected by the fire "towards that [part] of the cave that lies opposite the [prisoners]" (*eis to katantikru auton tou spelaiou*).[36] There is no term to indicate the projection surface, and Plato is forced into circumlocution.

Nevertheless, those same lines of Plato's text contain a reference to a screen – a different screen – one that conceals the bearers of simulacra, the "puppeteers," from the prisoners. Or rather, the wall (*teichion*) built to divide the space occupied by the audience from that of the "projectionists," if you will, is akin, Plato says,

to those "screens" that the puppeteers place between themselves and the onlookers and over which they move the marionettes. "Screens" is often employed in the English translations and sometimes in the Italian ones – *schermi*. It accurately renders *paraphragmata*; other translations use "partitions" or "parapets."[37] In one instance, "puppeteers," *thaumatopoioi*, has been translated, perhaps more accurately, as "masters of the show."[38] The term is based on *thaumata*, often translated as "puppets," even though the Greek word faithfully describes the *effect* – it is the plural of *thauma*, "wonder," a word that we met earlier – rather than the *means*. As to the *thaumatopoioi*, they are not those who produce (*-poioi*) the marionettes but, of course, those who create the show and its wonders.

Plato's description, however, also contains a certain paradoxical element; unlike what the audience of a marionette performance would do, here the prisoners watch the *thaumata*'s shadows, looking in the opposite direction from the wall-screen. But it matters little. The screen is still used to protect the images' credibility by hiding the mechanics of the show from view: their shadows in the projection, as Baudry notes in his commentary on Plato, must not be *conflated* (associated) with those that comprise the actual (deceptive) show.[39] For, here too, not only before the projection but also during and because of it, the screen serves to define and distinguish a stage and a backstage, an in-frame and an out-of-frame area.

The Film Screen Is Athena's Polished Shield: Medusa

Returning to the screen-shield, we can discuss another example from the classics that is as famous as that of Achilles: the shield of Athena. Perseus used it to vanquish Medusa, whose gaze could not be met directly but only via an instrument of mediation, a medium. According to some traditions, that event also took place in a cave. Perseus uses the shield not only to protect his sight but also to obtain a reflected representation enabling him to see (and thus defeat) what he could not otherwise have tackled.

Athena's shield brings us back to a terrain that cinema theory has already explored. Teresa de Lauretis has offered a feminist reading: "some of us do know how Medusa felt, because we have seen it at the movies, from PSYCHO to BLOW OUT [...]."[40] Frankly, I find it unconvincing, as it seems rather uninteresting to conjecture how the Gorgon might have felt and decidedly reductive to make a comparison with Marion Crane in PSYCHO: Medusa is not a woman, because the otherness that she represents, as Jean-Pierre Vernant says, is more radical, terrifying, monstrous, and unsustainable. Rather, it is what precedes every (definition of) form, every limit: "The usual conventions and typical classifications are syncopated and intermixed. Masculine and feminine, young and old, beautiful and ugly, human and animal, celestial and infernal, upper and lower [...]."[41] It is the embodiment of a rehashing and a total confusion that "no

words can describe"[42] – perhaps like Montale's "nothing," which produces a drunkard's terror and which, rather than a referent, a "nothing" that actually exists, probably indicates the very impossibility of naming something that cannot be spoken because it pre-exists names. Medusa represents a "formless magma" that precedes the introduction of order and number (and gender); Perseus's shield, however, stands for the rationalization and visual domination of this magma. It is no coincidence that Medusa and the other two Gorgons are *beyond* the Oceanus, outside the confines of the world, out of frame.

The most celebrated and persuasive appeal to the myth of Perseus in cinema theory is, of course, Siegfried Kracauer's in the conclusion of *Theory of Film*. "The film screen is Athena's polished shield," "the myth suggests that the images on the shield or screen are a means to an end; they are to enable – or, by extension, induce – the spectator to behead the horror they mirror"; hence, "Perseus' greatest achievement was not to cut off Medusa's head but to overcome his fears and look at its reflection in the shield."[43]

The response to the page and a half that Kracauer dedicates to "The Head of Medusa" – e.g., from Georges Didi-Huberman at the end of *Images in Spite of All* and Miriam Hansen in *Cinema and Experience*, who discusses, among other things, an "anamorphic deformation" of the shield that cannot be traced in the text[44] – has confined Kracauer's argument to literally horrendous and terrifying images only, such as those of LE SANG DES BÊTES (Georges Franju, 1949) and the films shot in Nazi concentration camps. To be sure, those (plus the war films) are what those pages are explicitly referring to. But, in my view, the Athena's shield metaphor must be considered in a broader sense, as a distillation of Kracauer's *entire* theory of film, a theory of *photogénie*, i.e., strictly speaking a theory of the difference between ordinary experience of the world and mediated experience, and of the latter's qualities. (That, fundamentally, is the nub of the difference between the classic theories of realism, Kracauer's and Bazin's.) The passage on Medusa's head can be considered in parallel to the well-known extract from Proust cited towards the beginning of the volume as emblematic of "the photographic approach." It recounts the narrator's entrance, unannounced, into his grandmother's lounge, when he sees her, as if in a photograph, in a situation cleansed of any impediment to an "objective" view: "We never see the people who are dear to us save in the animated system, the perpetual motion of our incessant love for them, which before allowing the images that their faces present to reach us catches them in its vortex, flings them back upon the idea that we have always had of them, makes them adhere to it, coincide with it."[45]

Ultimately, this whirlwind that "captivates" and "blinds" is akin to that paralyzing "returned" one-to-one gaze between Medusa and anyone who looks at her directly. The photographic approach, instead, entails a detachment, an estrangement, the breaking of a bond, a medium that acts as a shield from the giddying whirl of emotions and that interposes itself to afford a better view, making things

"an end in themselves," where their meaning is not based on the subject's personal experience. Even if we speak in one case of "love" and in the other, reflecting the Medusa legend's meaning, of "horror," the relationships' geometry (their entanglement) is similar, like the need for something to interpose itself, to interrupt and channel the field lines.

Revealing by Concealing: The Iconostasis

The photogenic economy of gaze proposed by Kracauer implies the need for a mediation tool to enable the subject to truly grasp reality, a shield for the involuntary "emotional" overinvestments that this would automatically trigger if watched or experienced directly. In this revelationist inspiration, perhaps Kracauer evinces an "aura of eschatological longing": consider the last words of the preface, "the trembling upper world in the dirty puddle."[46]

Indeed, religion offers another eloquent example of how the functions of concealing and revealing – specifically in the visual sense that interests us – can or rather must interweave dialectically. Take the case of the iconostasis in eastern Christian churches and its theological significance. It is a barrier, a gateway, but also a place for exhibiting images, as the word itself shows. Its evolution from a low marble parapet to a screen for icons occurred after the iconoclastic period ended,[47] and the iconostasis's full affirmation dates back to the 14th and 15th centuries. Its purpose is to separate a space visible to the congregation, that of the narthex and naves, from a space that must remain invisible and hidden, namely the sanctuary, which is accessible to the priests only. But the sacred space's topography, or perhaps its geography, is obviously symbolic. As is well known, the church's space is literally an oriented space, a metaphor for the visible and invisible worlds, a map of both worlds; the Byzantine church's screened sanctuary, as has often been noted, alludes to the inaccessibility of the supersensory mysteries. As the holy space of the sanctuary is set apart, out of sight, the essence of the divine is unattainable and thus unrepresentable, as Nicholas Constas observes. Nonetheless, it can be known *via mediation*, which is exactly what the iconostasis is for.[48] The religious experience occurs through the symbolic mediation of the icons on the iconostasis, on the threshold of the sacred space. In the Byzantine tradition, these icons participate almost in an indexical sense of their referents' divinity. When discussing the icons' semiotic nature, Florensky spoke precisely of the ontological connection between the images and the archetypes.[49]

The oldest and most cited ideas about the iconostasis's theological function are by Symeon of Thessalonica. The sanctuary barrier (*diastula*), the visible threshold of the invisible, is a kind of firmament (*stereoma*: the vault or *solid* arch of the heavens) that separates the perceptible from the intelligible, he wrote. Centuries later, Florensky said something very similar; the iconostasis is the ar-

chitectural materialization of a theory of knowledge, a knowledge that occurs specifically because of and *through* the screen of icons:

> But this material prop, this material iconostasis, does not conceal from the believers some sharp mystery (as someone in ignorant self-absorption might imagine); on the contrary, the iconostasis points out to the half-blind the Mysteries of the altar, opens for them an entrance into a world closed to them by their own stuckness [...]. Destroy the material iconostasis and the altar itself will, as such, wholly vanish from our consciousness as if covered over by an essentially impenetrable wall. But the material iconostasis does not, in itself, take the place of the living witnesses, existing *instead* of them; rather, it points *toward them*, concentrating the attention of those who pray upon them [...]. To destroy icons thus means to block up the windows.[50]

The iconostasis's function, then, is paradoxical, oxymoronic – that of a "mediated immediacy," of revealing through concealing, unveiling by veiling. It works as a screen, in both senses of the term at once.

Referring to the icons' screens, therefore, "these symbolic 'veils' are not said to obstruct 'communion and comprehension' of divine mysteries, but instead function precisely as the irreducible medium of religious experience, a network of figures, as it were, providing the conditions for perceiving that which is beyond figuration."[51] Constas speaks of veils and curtains in a literal and material sense, too: they can be placed on the iconostasis and, moreover, are metaphorically linked to divine illumination and light, which from a cinema standpoint have particular evocative power: the veiling is a condition of illumination, the latter is subordinate to it.

An analogy between the cinema screen and the iconostasis has, in fact, already been offered by Gian Piero Brunetta:

> Before the invention of cinema, the screen on which the magic lantern's light was projected was a mirror of the visible, at once an element separating and joining the visible and the invisible. In seeking to enhance their symbolic dimension, the screen or simple wall, even, have assumed an absolutely identical spiritual function to the iconostasis, as described by Pavel Florensky in his remarkable essay [...].[52]

Similarly, in an article that Montale apparently referenced for his piece in the cinema edition of *Solaria* in 1927, Antonello Gerbi drew a broader (and semi-serious) parallel between the cinema screen and the altarpiece.[53] Also in 1927, for that matter, Abel Gance presented his "triptych" on Napoléon.[54] The analogy with altarpieces and polyptychs, however, evokes quite a different artistic and liturgical tradition, one that earns Florensky's scorn, because it does not afford

the same ontological dignity to the images – although the altarpiece, like the iconostasis, is still a *retabulum*, a *gran machina*, a spectacular *dispositif* for focusing visual and spiritual attention.[55]

Iconostases are screens of images that serve not only to separate, prosaically to add order to a space, to keep the large congregation at a distance,[56] but also to allude to the distinction between two worlds and to the permeability between them, which depends on the particular way of directing gaze and attention that the screen itself constructs. It is clearly not a theory of *photogénie* – and the "ontological connection" of the icons with their archetypes discussed by Florensky certainly cannot be perfectly superimposed on Kracauer's ontological realism – but it is nonetheless a celebration of the power of mediated vision, of the ability of a screen of images to reveal by concealing.

A Combination of Functions and Their Permutations

The episodes that I have discussed are not intended as cornerstones of a history of the screen or of a prehistory of the cinema screen. They are separate, mutually distant episodes belonging to particular, different cultures. I neither wish, nor think it possible to identify a universal foundation for an idea of screen that would unite Homer with Dante or Montale with classical Greece and the Christian East. I began by refuting the affirmation that the functions of monstration and representation come chronologically after those of concealing and protecting, to show how these two categories of functions often occur together and are logically correlated. Furthermore, even among those scholars advocating a chronological development of the term, one finds lines of reasoning, such as Huhtamo's, that cautiously left ample scope for this kind of analysis. As I have argued, the term's meaning underwent no radical shift in the 19th century. Therefore, I suggest, the importance of the advent of cinema and pre-cinema devices in (re?)defining the concept also needs to be brought into perspective, and perhaps scaled down.

Analogously to Christian Jacob's writing about what a map is,[57] I have preferred to consider the screen not as an object but as a function. Or rather, as I have already mentioned, as a set of functions that may seem contradictory but in reality are often complementary. In the examples discussed, the screen is always a crucial element in a schema, a framework or arrangement of subjects and objects of gaze, an instrument to channel the field lines. This arrangement, this spectacular set-up, may, on the one hand, entail a deception, the production of false images; on the other, it is often associated with the production of a miracle, a wonder, a revelation.

Concealing and showing: the permutations between these two aspects can be manifold. The images may serve to produce the wonder, the wonder *of* images that seem real; or the wonder may be produced by revealing what lies behind the

images (*despite* the images); or, on the contrary, it may be protected *by* the images; or, again, the revelation may be produced *through* them. The very connotations of the mediated experience range from complete dysphoria (of the Platonic variety) to the most inspired eschatology. A wide variety of relationships exists between concealing and showing in the history of the concept of screen, but they are often underpinned by a similar framework or general set-up – precisely, indeed, in that it combines these two functions and conjures with these two aspects, albeit in different ways.

To conclude, an open question. Montale's poetry, with which we began our exploration, cannot but bring to the contemporary viewer's mind many recent conspiratorial films – films that, unlike those from the 1970s that Fredric Jameson studied in *The Geopolitical Aesthetic*, show that the conspiracy has failed, not succeeded.[58] This is, above all, the representation of a failure of the screen, of both its functions: of producing fictional images and of concealing the real. Perhaps the insistent representation of this failure of the screen in contemporary film is trying to tell us something about how cinema's ability to present the world has changed? Might the *post-panoramic* paradigm that these films seem to announce be a comment on a (sublime) difficulty in arranging the real? On the other hand, maybe these films reassert and relaunch, albeit in negative form, the screen's very power to fascinate – as, for that matter, also did "Maybe One Morning" (although there the poet avoided any rebellion)?

Or rather, are the screen and its functions really in crisis, due to a shift in the media landscape and in the functions and cultural meaning of the *dispositifs*? The metaphor of the screen as "display," discussed by Francesco Casetti,[59] of a screen that deals with other images only and not the world, that excludes every dimension other than the image itself, could actually suggest a grim outlook for the survival of the functions that we have discussed, a radical alteration of the spectacular frameworks in which the screen traditionally operates. It may well be, on the other hand, that the display function, of intercepting images circulating in the mediasphere, is thematized and problematized in the texts themselves – as, for example, a certain self-reflexive, hyperrealist cinematic poetics has done in the past and continues to do, from Peter Bogdanovich's THE LAST PICTURE SHOW (1971) to Todd Haynes's I'M NOT THERE (2007).[60] The screen would then return to being the screen, to exploring its own substance, its own depth, its own permeability.

13. Marc Augé, *Non-Places: Introduction to an Anthropology of Supermodernity*, trans. John Howe (London and New York: Verso, 1995).
14. Erkki Huhtamo, "Gulliver in Figurine Land," *Mediamatic* 4, no. 3 (1990): 101-105.
15. Laura U. Marks, *The Skin of the Film: Intercultural Cinema, Embodiment, and the Senses* (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2000).
16. Frank Kessler, "The Cinema of Attractions as *Dispositif*," in *The Cinema of Attractions Reloaded*, ed. Wanda Strauven (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2006), 57-66.

Rectangle-Film [25x19] (1918)

1. This article was originally published in *Penombra* 1, no. 3 (August 25, 1918): 121-123.

Intersections between Showing and Concealment in the History of the Concept of Screen

1. Erkki Huhtamo, "Elements of Screenology: Toward an Archaeology of the Screen," *Iconics: International Studies of the Modern Image* 7 (2004): 31-82: "In the 19th century, and probably even earlier, the word 'screen' gained meanings that anticipated its uses as a means of displaying and transmitting information. The earliest such reference recorded in the Oxford English Dictionary is from 1810: 'To make Transparent Screens for the Exhibition of the Phantasmagoria.'" Huhtamo also notes an example from 1846 in the OED, where "screen" refers to the screen of the magic lantern, demonstrating how the "new" meaning became common around the middle of the century. Thomas Elsaesser and Malte Hagener, *Film Theory: An Introduction through the Senses* (New York: Routledge, 2010), 38: "The word 'screen' developed in the early fourteenth century from the old Germanic term 'scirm' which opens up a rich semantic field. A 'scirm' acts like a shield and protects us from enemies or adverse influences (such as the heat from a fire or the weather), thus allowing us to get closer. Yet again, a screen also denotes an arrangement that hides something or someone by dividing a space (e.g., by putting up a paravent). *In this sense, the screen can mean the exact opposite of displaying something, making something visible* or bringing something closer, but refers instead to keeping a safe distance. A further meaning of screen as a protective filter or coating is that of a curtain retraining sunlight and thus protecting light-sensitive persons or objects. This attribute is also linked to visibility and light, but in contrast to the screen in the cinema auditorium it does so in a negative sense. By way of analogy, the word can furthermore denote an object that is being used with the purpose of protecting, hiding or blocking, also implying a division or filter. *The first known occurrence of the word 'screen' as a designation of a surface that can be used to depict an image or object was in 1864*" [my italics].
2. I prefer the term "monstration" (which, for me, equates to "showing") to "displaying," seeking to create a link with Dante's terminology and recalling the reflections of André Gaudreault, thus avoiding confusion with the metaphor of the screen as "display" discussed by Francesco Casetti, to which we shall return at the

end. See André Gaudreault, *From Plato to Lumière: Narration and Monstration in Literature and Cinema* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009).

3. Michel Foucault, *Archaeology of Knowledge* (London: Routledge, 2002), 73.
4. Eugenio Montale, *L'opera in versi*, eds. Rosanna Bettarini and Gianfranco Contini (Turin: Einaudi, 1980), 40. Eugenio Montale, *Collected Poems: 1920–1954*, trans. and annotated by Jonathan Galassi (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1998), 54.
5. Italo Calvino, "Eugenio Montale, 'Forse un mattino andando,'" in *Why Read the Classics?* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1999), 216. In fact, in *Cuttlefish Bones* it is possible to find a reference to the magic lantern; see "Flussi," in *L'opera in versi*, 74: "[...] il passato / lontano, franto e vivido, stampato / sopra immobili tende / da un'ignota *lanterna*" [my italics]. The English translation ("Flux," in *Collected Poems*, 103) does not pick up on the reference: "[...] the past, someday, / long-gone, shattered, vivid, / printed on still curtains / by an unknown light."
6. The Battaglia dictionary considers *campo* as, among other things, not only "a closed, circumscribed, limited space," "a space circumscribed by a geometrical figure," etc., but also "a space (in a painting or relief) on which the figures are distributed and stand out; a background (referring also to a description, a way of relating)," "background of the shield, flag or banner on which the *impresa* appears." For *campo*'s meaning as "region of space on which the gaze is focused," see also Nicolò Tommaseo and Bernardo Bellini, *Dizionario della lingua italiana* (Turin: Unione tipografico-editrice, 1865-1879). See also "field" in the OED: "The surface on which something is portrayed," "The surface of an escutcheon or shield on which the 'charge' is displayed," "The space or range within which objects are visible through an optical instrument [...]."
7. I am referring to "Spesso il male di vivere ho incontrato" ("Often I've Encountered Evil"), "In limine" ("On the Threshold"), and "I limoni" ("The Lemons"). On the "miracle" see also Romano Luperini, *Storia di Montale* (Bari: Laterza, 1992), 20. Montale's poetry contains several occurrences of the terms *telo* (cloth / canvas), *velo* (veil), and *veste* (dress) (plus *nome*, name, as the dress of identity), and terms belonging to the semantic range of "disclosing" (*schiudersi*) and "revealing" (*rivelare*). See e.g., Montale, "Ciò che di me sapeste," in *L'opera in versi*, 34: "[...] la scialbatura / la tonaca che riveste / la nostra umana ventura. / Era forse oltre il telo / l'azzurro tranquillo." For the English translation see: Montale, "What You Knew of Me," in *Collected Poems*, 49: "[...] a coat of paint / the veil that clothes / our human fate. / And maybe behind the canvas / was the still blue."
8. Montale, *L'opera in versi*, 138; *Collected Poems*, 197.
9. The theme of the distortion of the image and of memory is already frequent in *Cuttlefish Bones*. The only other occurrence of the term *schermo* in Montale's verse oeuvre is in "Gli elefanti" (1975), in *Quaderno di quattro anni*, in *L'opera in versi*, 571. There, although rather obscure, the meaning initially seems less metaphorical and more explicitly related to a spectacular situation: some jokers appear on the screen to make the crowd laugh, who soon forget that they have just witnessed the sad scene of a baby elephant's burial.

10. Eugenio Montale, "Espresso sul cinema," *Solaria* 2, no. 3 (1927): 55-59, 57: "Rather than opinions, one would say effusions." Unless otherwise indicated, and if English editions of the works do not exist, translations are my own.
11. That was his answer to the question, "If you were given the absolute power to decree one thing, what would it be?"
12. Quoted in Gian Piero Brunetta, *Gli intellettuali italiani e il cinema* (Milan: B. Mondadori, 2004), 113. Although the primary source is not stated, the quotation is credible; see e.g., Eugenio Montale, "Un film nero può portare un uomo debole al delitto," *Corriere della Sera* (11 September 1960), reprinted in *Il secondo mestiere. Prose 1920–1979* (Milan: Mondadori, 1996), 2313-2317.
13. Eugenio Montale, "Cinema e libertà," *Corriere della Sera* (13 September 1962), reprinted in *Il secondo mestiere*, 2476-2480, 2479. The author quotes and endorses the comments in Enrico Fulchignoni's speech at the Cini Foundation's "Cinema and liberty" conference. Remarks on the mimicry of cinema can often be found in his journalistic reports on the Cini Foundation conferences.
14. Montale, "Espresso sul cinema," 59. E.g., it is curious how he strongly insists on the presumed difficulty of the comedy of Charlie Chaplin, whom he defends as a complex, "inaccessible" artist. See *Ibid*., 57.
15. "According the Oxford English Dictionary, the English word 'screen' probably derives from the Old French *escran* in its Old North French variant *escren*. The first documented occurrence of *escran* dates from 1318, in the meaning of a screen against heat [...]." Quoted from: Wanda Strauven, "Early Cinema's Touch(able) Screens: From Uncle Josh to Ali Barbouyou," *NECSUS* 1, no. 2 (2012): 163.
16. Gianfranco Contini, "Un nodo della cultura medievale: la serie *Roman de la Rose – Fiore – Divina Commedia*," in *Un'idea di Dante. Saggi danteschi* (Turin: Einaudi, 1976), 271.
17. The rules of courtly love were codified in Andreas Capellanus's *De amore* in the second half of the 12th century. See rule XIII, *De amore* (Milan: Guanda, 1980), 282: *Amor raro consuevit durare vulgatus*. Translation: "When made public, love rarely endures": Andreas Capellanus, *The Art of Courtly Love*, trans. John Jay Parry (New York: Columbia University Press, 1960), 185. See also *De amore*, 120; a passage partially cited by Domenico De Robertis in his edition of *Vita Nuova* (Milan: Ricciardi, 1980), 47: *Aliae igitur dominae nil mihi possunt ex debito postulare, nisi ut vestrae contemplationis intuitu mea sibi debeam beneplacita largiri obsequia et obsequiorum originem cauto reticere silentio; vobis autem tantum debiti obligatione constringor in cunctis laudabilia meis actibus operari et nullius improbitatis macula vitiari*. Translation: "Therefore the other ladies can ask me nothing as their due except that, with an eye to your contemplation, I grant them such services as are acceptable to them and that I keep discreetly silent as to the source of these services; but by the obligation I owe you I am bound to be worthy of praise in all that I do and to avoid all stain of depravity": Capellanus, *The Art of Courtly Love*, 97.
18. Dante Alighieri, *Vita Nova*, V. 1-4. I follow Michele Barbi's chapter division, *La Vita Nuova* (Florence: Soc. Dantesca Italiana, 1907). Dante Alighieri, *Vita Nova*, trans. and annotated by Andrew Frisardi (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2012), 6-7.

19. "Linea retta" and "terminare" are terms used also by Albertus Magnus. See "Giving up Simulacra: The *Vita nuova*" in Suzanne Conklin Akbari, *Seeing through the Veil: Optical Theory and Medieval Allegory* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004), 116-125.
20. Marco Santagata, *Amate e amanti. Figure della lirica amorosa tra Dante e Petrarca* (Bologna: Il mulino, 1999), 9. On the "lady of the miracle" see 13-61.
21. Dante, *Vita Nova*, IX. 6. The *Vita Nova* translation by Andrew Frisardi uses the term "fiction." See Frisardi, trans., *Vita Nova*, 10.
22. Dante, *Vita Nova*, XII. 3. Frisardi, trans., *Vita Nova*, 12.
23. See Frisardi, trans., *Vita Nova*, 151.
24. Dante, *Inferno*, Canto 15. 4-9.
25. Strauven, "Early Cinema's Touch(able) Screens," 166.
26. Homer, *Iliad*, 18. 464-467. Homer, *The Iliad*, trans. Robert Fagles (New York: Penguin, 1990), 482: "If only I could hide him away from pain and death [...] as surely as glorious armor shall be his."
27. Fagles, trans., *The Iliad*, 483.
28. Umberto Eco, *The Infinity of Lists* (Milan: Rizzoli, 2009), 11.
29. Andrew S. Becker, *The Shield of Achilles and the Poetics of Ekphrasis* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1995), 4-7.
30. Christian Metz, *L'Énonciation impersonnelle, ou, le site du film* (Paris: Méridiens Klincksieck, 1991).
31. Samuel Edgerton, *The Renaissance Rediscovery of Linear Perspective* (New York: Basic Books, 1975). I am obviously referring to the theories of Jean-Louis Baudry and Jean-Louis Comolli.
32. P.R. Hardie, "Imago Mundi: Cosmological and Ideological Aspects of the Shield of Achilles," *The Journal of Hellenic Studies* 105 (1985): 11-31. See also Gotthold E. Lessing, *Laocoon: An Essay on the Limits of Painting and Poetry* (London: Longman, 1853), 245: "Homer made his shield an epitome of everything that happens in the world."
33. Homer, *Iliad*, 18. 466-467. Fagles, trans., *The Iliad*, 482. The *thauma idesthai* (a marvel to behold) trope is typically connected to the sight of the shield: on the pseudo-Hesiodic *Shield of Herakles*, see Becker, *The Shield of Achilles*, 23-40.
34. Wanda Strauven, "The Observer's Dilemma: To Touch or Not to Touch," in *Media Archaeology: Approaches, Applications, and Implications*, eds. Erkki Huhtamo and Jussi Parikka (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011), 158. See also Strauven, "Early Cinema's Touch(able) Screens," 165-166.
35. Jean-Louis Baudry, "Le dispositif: Approches métapsychologiques de l'impression de réalité," *Communications* 23 (1975): 56-72, reprinted in *L'effet cinéma* (Paris: Albatros, 1978), 27-49.
36. Plato, *Respublica*, VII. 515a-b.
37. "Screen(s)" is used in most English editions, but it is "partitions" in Allan Bloom's translation, *The Republic of Plato* (New York: Basic Books, 1968). It is *parapetti* (parapets), for example, in Mario Vegetti's Italian translation, *La Repubblica* (Naples: Bibliopolis, 1998).

38. Although that may be a choice dictated by a forced interpretation, see Plato, *Republic: The Greek Text, vol. 3: Notes*, eds. Lewis Campbell and Benjamin Jowett (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1894), 315.
39. See Baudry, "Le dispositif," 33.
40. Teresa de Lauretis, *Alice Doesn't: Feminism, Semiotics, Cinema* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984), 134.
41. Jean-Pierre Vernant, "Death in the Eyes: Gorgo, Figure of the *Other*," in *Mortals and Immortals: Collected Essays* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), 137. The head of Medusa (*gorgoneion*), as it is well-known, is also a typical decoration of Greek shields (e.g., Agamemnon's shield in the *Iliad*).
42. Jean-Pierre Vernant, "Death with Two Faces," in *Reading the Odyssey: Selected Interpretive Essays*, ed. Seth L. Schein (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 60.
43. Siegfried Kracauer, *Theory of Film: The Redemption of Physical Reality* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1960), 305-306.
44. Georges Didi-Huberman, *Images in Spite of All: Four Photographs from Auschwitz* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008), 177-179; Miriam B. Hansen, *Cinema and Experience: Siegfried Kracauer, Walter Benjamin and Theodor W. Adorno* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2012), 257, 277. Another classic text on the subject, where Caravaggio's head of Medusa is analyzed as a metaphor for the apparatus of enunciation and representation (of painting), actually discusses anamorphic deformation about Athena's shield: see Louis Marin, *Détruire la peinture* (Paris: Galilée, 1977), 134-170.
45. Marcel Proust, *Remembrance of Things Past*, vol. 1 (New York: Random House, 1932), 814, quoted in Kracauer, *Theory of Film*, 14.
46. Kracauer, *Theory of Film*, xi. The observation about the "aura" is discussed in Hansen, *Cinema and Experience*, 21.
47. Even though it is actually an iconoclastic text (dated 824) that refers to the veneration of icons in churches. See Peter Galadza, "The Role of Icons in Byzantine Worship," *Studia Liturgica* 21 (1991): 118. However, the veneration of icons begins outside of worship and outside of the church – indeed "as late as the fourteenth century an *eikonostasion* is still usually only a stand with icons to be venerated privately in one's home" (*ibid.*, 119). See also Christopher Walter, "A New Look at the Byzantine Sanctuary Barrier," *Revue des études byzantines* 51 (1993): 203-228; A.W. Epstein, "The Middle Byzantine Sanctuary Barrier: Templon or Iconostasis?," *Journal of the British Archaeological Association* 134 (1981): 1-28.
48. Nicholas P. Constas, "Symeon of Thessalonike and the Theology of the Icon Screen," in *Thresholds of the Sacred: Architectural, Art, Historical, Liturgical, and Theological Perspectives on Religious Screens, East and West*, ed. Sharon E.J. Gerstel (Washington: Dumbarton Oaks, 2006), 163-183.
49. On the semiotic nature of icons and their ontological aspect see also Boris A. Uspenskij, *The Semiotics of the Russian Icon* (Lisse: Peter de Ridder Press, 1976), 10, 21.
50. Pavel A. Florensky, *Iconostasis* (Crestwood, NY: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1996), 62-63. See also Constas, "The Theology of the Icon Screen," 179: "[...] because when these [veils] are removed, there is "nothing" there, nothing, that is, which

can be given to human comprehension." The "nothing," as that which is beyond predication, may again remind us of Montale's "nothing," as we have interpreted it.

51. Constas, "The Theology of the Icon Screen," 169. The "veils" are *parapetasmata*.
52. Gian Piero Brunetta, *Il viaggio dell'icononauta. Dalla camera oscura di Leonardo alla luce dei Lumière* (Venice: Marsilio, 2009), 14.
53. Antonello Gerbi, "Iniziazione alle delizie del cinema," in *Preferisco Charlot. Scritti sul cinema (1926–1933)*, eds. Gian Piero Brunetta and Sandro Gerbi (Savigliano: Aragno, 2011), 41, first published in *Il Convegno* 7, no. 11-12 (25 November - 25 December 1926): 836-848. Montale's reference (to "effusions," cited above) seems primarily to the previous "Teorie sul Cinema (A proposito di un 'Cahier du Mois')," first published in *Il Convegno* 7, no. 10 (25 October 1926): 766-781.
54. Jean-Jacques Meusy, "La Polyvision, espoir oublié d'un cinéma nouveau," *1895* 31 (2000): 153-211, and note 5.
55. See André Chastel, *Histoire du retable italien. Des origines à 1500* (Paris: Editions Liana Levi, 2005).
56. Galadza, "The Role of Icons in Byzantine Worship," 120.
57. Christian Jacob, *The Sovereign Map: Theoretical Approaches in Cartography throughout History* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2006), 11: "The map is not an object but a function."
58. Fredric Jameson, *The Geopolitical Aesthetic: Cinema and Space in the World System* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991), 9-84.
59. Francesco Casetti, *The Lumière Galaxy: Seven Key Words for the Cinema to Come* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2015), 155-178.
60. On New Hollywood hyperrealism see Franco La Polla, *Il nuovo cinema americano (1967–1975)* (Venice: Marsilio, 1978), 163-187.

Archaic Paradigms of the Screen and Its Images

1. Paul Valéry, "The Centenary of Photography," in *Classic Essays on Photography*, ed. Alan Trachtenberg (New Haven: Leete's Island Books, [1939] 1980), 197.
2. Plato, *Republic*, Book 7, trans. Benjamin Jowett (New York, London, Toronto, Sydney: Simon & Schuster Paperbacks, 2010), 302.
3. Marcel Proust, *Swann's Way*, trans. Lydia Davis (New York: Penguin Books, 2003), 18.
4. Plato, *Republic*, 298.
5. Dominique Païni, "Faut-il en finir avec la projection?," in *Projections, les transports de l'image*, exhibition catalogue, Le Fresnoye (Tourcoing, France: Hazan / Le Fresnoy / AFAA, 1997), 163-165.
6. *Ibid.*, 165.
7. Pliny the Elder (Caius Plinius Secundus Maior), *Natural History*, IX, XXXV, trans. H. Rackman (Cambridge: Loeb Classical Library, 1952), 43.
8. Athenagoras of Athens, *A Plea for the Christians*, chapter 17, trans. B.P. Pratten, in *Ante-Nicene Fathers*, vol. 2, eds. Alexander Roberts, James Donaldson, and A. Cleveland Coxe (Buffalo, NY: Christian Literature Publishing Co., 1885).