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Introduction: (Re-)mediating the Unconscious

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The way media can attune to what rests beneath the level of conscious awareness remains an area of intense popular as well as theoretical fascination. Since the late 19th and early 20th century, screen media and notably cinema have been associated, both in theory and in cultural imagination, with non-conscious and preconscious states, as well as with shifts in consciousness. Symptomatic of this connection are narratives of hypnosis proliferating in films of early cinema until the 1920s – from *At the Hypnotist's* (*Chez le Magnétiseur,* Alice Guy-Blaché 1897), and *Le Mystère des Roches de Kador* (*The Mystery of the Rocks of Kador*, Léonce Perret, 1912), to *The Cabinet of Dr. Caligari* (*Das Cabinet des Dr. Caligari*, Wiene 1920) and *Dr. Mabuse, The Gambler* (*Dr. Mabuse, der Spieler*, Lang 1922), which point at the shared apparatus of hypnosis, psychoanalysis, and cinema, as theorised by Raymond Bellour (see Bellour 2009; Bergstrom 100-2, Radner and Fox 54-55).[1]

The scholarly study of cinema, which emerged in the 1910s and developed throughout the 20th century, addressed and cultivated the connection between the medium of cinema and the unconscious, starting from Walter Benjamin's 1930s concept of the "optical unconscious" – that is, the idea that the visual dimension of reality that escapes conscious perception can be revealed through technical media, such as photography and cinema. This endeavour has been theoretically approached through various perspectives.

In classical psychoanalytic film theory, especially as developed in the 1970s through the writings of Christian Metz, Jean-Louis Baudry, and Laura Mulvey, the cinematic apparatus

[1] See also Eugeni 2019 for more titles of early films involving hypnosis and on how they contributed to the *dispositif* of cinema.

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was seen as structuring the spectator's subjectivity through unconscious mechanisms. Drawing on Freudian and Lacanian models, these theorists emphasized identification, fantasy, repression, and the mirror stage as keys to understanding how film interpellates the viewer as a desiring subject. For these approaches, prereflectivity was often equated with the operations of the unconscious. The cinematic experience was thought to bypass rational thought and engage the viewer through libidinal investments, unconscious identifications, and ideological interpellations. Mulvey's famous analysis of the "male gaze" posited that classical Hollywood cinema naturalized patriarchal structures by positioning the (implicitly male) viewer to identify with the active male protagonist while objectifying the female character. Crucially, these processes were not accessible to the viewer's conscious awareness; they operated at the level of the unconscious and prereflective. Yet, while psychoanalytic theory offered a compelling account of how spectators are positioned and how meaning is produced unconsciously, it often relied on a static model of the subject and ignored the phenomenological and perceptual dynamics of actual film viewing.

Starting from the late-1980s, the cognitive turn in film studies, associated with theorists like David Bordwell and Noël Carroll, sought to move beyond the so far dominant, and according to these theorists, speculative and ideologically deterministic models influenced by psychoanalysis. Drawing on developments in cognitive psychology, these theorists portrayed the viewer as a rational, information-processing agent who actively makes inferences, forms hypotheses, and simulates emotional states. Cognitive theory redefined prereflectivity not as unconscious repression but as automatic and subpersonal processes: low-level perception, attention, affective appraisal, and mirror neuron activation. For instance, Murray Smith's *Engaging Characters* proposed a model of character engagement involving three levels: recognition, alignment, and allegiance. While some of these processes are conscious and deliberate, much of the initial engagement with characters – such as emotional mirroring or

empathic resonance – operates prereflectively. Importantly, cognitive film theory also integrated aspects of affective neuroscience, showing that viewers respond emotionally and physiologically to filmic stimuli in ways that precede conscious interpretation. The prereflective, in this context, refers to the embodied, automatic reactions that scaffold higher-order understanding.

In recent years, cognitive science has undergone its own turn – toward embodied, embedded, enactive, and extended models of the mind. These "4E" approaches challenge the idea of cognition as internal information processing and instead view it as a relational process involving body, environment, and action. This shift has significant implications for film theory, particularly in understanding prereflective and unconscious experience. Enactive approaches to film see cinematic experience not as passive reception or even internal simulation, but as a form of embodied action and perceptual coupling. The viewer engages with the film world through sensorimotor expectations, rhythmic entrainment, and affective resonance. These engagements are fundamentally prereflective: they involve bodily attunement, proprioceptive awareness, and felt emotion before conscious narrative comprehension. Vivian Sobchack's phenomenological account of film viewing as an embodied, intersubjective experience exemplifies this approach. She argues that the viewer's "lived body" responds to filmic movement, rhythm, and gesture in a way that is fundamentally prereflective – what she calls a "cinesthetic" relationship (see also Massumi; Shaviro; Hansen; Ivakhiv). More recently, 4E approaches have been applied to immersive media and virtual reality, where the boundaries between viewer and viewed, subject and object, are further blurred, and prereflective engagement is intensified through sensorimotor involvement. In enactive theory, consciousness and unconsciousness are not conceived as separate layers of mental content (as in classical psychoanalysis), but as processual, embodied, and dynamically co-constituted

aspects of sensorimotor engagement with the world.[2] When applied to cinema and moving-image media, this framework shifts the focus from representations in the mind to experience as embodied interaction with cinematic forms. The influence of embodied cognition perspectives on the studies of the moving image (see among others, Tikka, Coegnarts and Kravanja; Gallese and Guerra, D'Aloia and Eugeni; D'Aloia) has motivated new interdisciplinary research in the non-conscious, prereflective and unconscious processes involved in – the widely conceived – cinematic engagement, including "post-screen" media. In the context of a new "crisis of reason" amidst global economic, political and social turmoil, interest in what stays behind the "doors of perception" is gaining new pertinence – and is scientifically updated –in interdisciplinary exchange with current psychology and neuroscience, which shows a re-appreciation for psychoanalytical approaches (see Gallese; Carhart-Harris et al.; Carhart-Harris and Friston). This growing interdisciplinary inquiry shows how fields beyond film theory and cinema/media studies, such as psychology and neuroscience, can contribute their accounts of the unconscious, pre-conscious, and altered states of consciousness to screen media analysis.

The title of this issue, "(Re-)mediating the unconscious", might seem paradoxical, as the unconscious is something that, by definition, lies beyond the reach of conscious awareness, conceptualization and linguistic articulation. Nonetheless it is exactly because of this, that addressing mediation is a way to address not the unconscious per se, but its ways of finding expression through habitual, embodied, imaginative and affective inscriptions in (cinematic) media forms.

Beyond a Freudian conception of the unconscious, a spatial, "Gestalt-like" approach to it, which can be found in both neuroscientific and philosophical-phenomenological accounts,

[2] In their *Philosophy in the Flesh*, Lakoff and Johnson emphasize that most of our conceptual system operates unconsciously, not because it is repressed, but because it is bodily-based, automatic, and inaccessible to introspection. The "cognitive unconscious" includes all those mental operations that structure and make possible our conscious experience but are not themselves accessible to consciousness (see Lakoff and Johnson 9-15).

makes it easier to think of mediations of the unconscious, emphasizing its continuity with the conscious. Such approach is not new; its traces can be found in several accounts of the unconscious in the 20th century. For example, Gestalt psychologist Kurt Koffka was insisting that "There is no break between the conscious and the unconscious" (165); and he argued for a dynamic link between unconscious "traces" and consciousness, offering another perspective on how "the unconscious looms up as a powerful determiner of conscious life." (161) According to the gestaltist, holistic view of mental processing, the unconscious is continuous with the conscious, and "structured" as well, with "stressed areas" that are ready to be activated and belong to the same wholes / strains with the conscious thoughts with which they are connected (Koffka 161). Gestalt psychology, which influenced Rudolf Arnheim and others in the early development of film theory, offered a different model of prereflectivity – one grounded not in the unconscious drives but in perceptual organization. Arnheim's *Film as Art* applied these principles to the cinema, arguing that film is not a medium meant to reproduce reality but a formal medium whose aesthetic effects depend on the viewer's active organization of sensory inputs into meaningful wholes. In contrast to psychoanalysis, the prereflective here is not unconscious desire but the perceptual structuring that allows us to make sense of complex visual stimuli. Gestalt theory thus foregrounded the embodied, immediate, and dynamic nature of perception – laying important groundwork for later developments in film and media theory.[3]

Much more recent accounts of consciousness, such as that of neuroscientist Bernard Baars, persist in giving the unconscious the role of the context/ground that shapes the conscious contents of our thoughts, in a reciprocal relationship: "Conscious *contents* trigger a host of unconscious processes and are shaped in turn by unconscious *contexts*." (Baars x; emphasis added) As Baars claims, most theories of consciousness use the theater metaphor to describe it as a stage – or a "central workspace" – where a level of integration of distributed processes is

[3] See D'Aloia and Verstegen.

achieved (Baars viii-ix). Baars borrows Francis Crick's idea of the spotlight of visual attention[4] to refer to "players" (outer and inner senses and ideas) competing to get to the "spotlight of attention shining on the stage of working memory" (Baars 42) – which he equates with the conscious. The spotlight reveals what becomes conscious, while the stage is "observed" – following the same theatrical metaphor – by an unseen audience: unconscious processes including mnemonic, semantic, motivational and knowledge systems, as well as automatisms (Baars 42). There is a constant interaction between what is on and off stage – as conscious content feeds into unconscious processes, and the other way around. As the *dispositif* of cinema is a direct descendent of that of the stage play, the former can be seen as another materialization of (extended) consciousness, as a dynamic field where processes of attention and awareness play off, in a similarly constant interaction between what is on and off screen.

Ultimately, a "spatial" conception of the unconscious like the one sketched above might not be as incompatible with psychoanalysis as it first seems. Freud used a similar metaphor to distinguish the role of the preconscious, as a space between the conscious and the unconscious:

> The impulses in the entrance hall of the unconscious are out of sight of the conscious, which is in the other room; to begin with they must remain unconscious. If they have already pushed their way forward to the threshold and have been turned back by the watchman, then they are inadmissible to consciousness; we speak of them as *repressed.* But even the impulses which the watchman has allowed to cross the threshold are not on that account necessarily conscious as well; they can only become so if they succeed in catching the eye of consciousness. We are therefore justified in calling this second room the system of the *preconscious*. (Freud 332)

[4] See Crick 62.

> It is the preconscious which, according to Freud, is a constantly present ground to be activated and provide consciousness with its (intentional) objects. And the objects of this in-between ground or "room" are always in a state of possible "leakage" between the three spaces. There is a certain mobility implied through this spatial model of the different states and levels of consciousness, according to Freud.

Other dynamic models of the relationship between conscious and unconscious could be traced back in the work of American psychologist and philosopher William James. Even though an account of the unconscious has been considered missing from James' major work *Principles of Psychology* and his well-known notion of the stream of thought (see Baars 16), this view has been contested. The stream, as conceptualized by James, is composed of "substantive parts" – those to which our interest is momentarily attached, making them the centre of our attention – and of "transitive parts", which are volatile and diffuse, surrounding the substantive parts but not brought into the focus of attention, thus being unconscious (243). These gaps between the substantive parts are described by James as "aching" to be filled; any thought and mental image or state we experience in those gaps "swims in a felt fringe of relations" (259) with the substantive part to which attention as well as fully conscious perception is attracted.[5]

James was mostly interested in the destabilizing dynamics sustaining the successive "stable" states of consciousness, and in this "twilight of consciousness" in-between salient thoughts and percepts. As it is known, he was particularly interested in the now so-called "altered states of consciousness", including hypnagogic hallucinations, trance, habit, reverie, etc. – his inquiry gaining pertinence in the context of a renewed interest in experiences of

[5] James' concept of consciousness is impressively akin to more recent neurological accounts of consciousness in dynamical systems neuroscience (e.g. Tognoli and Kelso), where conscious thoughts are conceived as attractors in a state space, and the mental system as a continuous stream tending towards them but never "dwelling" in them.

absorption, transportation and trance in film and other media (see Hakemulder et al; Green and Brock).[6]

The transitive parts of the stream are for James diffuse, and not entirely conscious, but they make this "glue" connecting the substantive parts, creating the unity of consciousness which serves as the background and container of the whole range of its distinct states. Particularly the notion of the fringe surrounding and accompanying the "substantive parts" of the stream, is "clearly a model of unconscious processing", according to Joel Weinberger. "The fringe is not directly represented in consciousness. It is the latent (unconscious) connotation of our thoughts." (442)

As James writes in his work *Pluralistic Universe*,

> My present field of consciousness is a centre surrounded by a fringe that shades insensibly into a subconscious more. … Which part of it properly is in my consciousness, which out? If I name what is out, it already has come in. The centre works in one way while the margins work in another, and presently overpower the centre and are central themselves. What we conceptually identify ourselves with and say we are thinking of at any time is the centre; but our *full* self is the whole field, with all those indefinitely radiating subconscious possibilities of increase that we can only feel without conceiving, and can hardly begin to analyze. (130)

In this description, a figure-ground relation between conscious and unconscious becomes again prominent. Such "Gestalt" conception of the unconscious has been also advanced by Maurice Merleau-Ponty, who, in *The Visible and the Invisible*, writes that "This unconscious is to be sought not at the bottom of ourselves, behind the back of our 'consciousness', but in front of

[6] In his seminal study *Suspension of Perception*, Jonathan Crary draws on James to refer to the historical linkage between cinema and trance.

us, as articulations of our field. It is 'unconscious' by the fact that it is not an *object*, but it that through which objects are possible." (180) In this phenomenological conception the unconscious is encompassing all that stays in the periphery – rather than the centre of attention and awareness – but still influences everything that is attended to and thus brought to conscious awareness.

"Re-mediating the unconscious" thus seeks to address the constant interplay between unconscious and conscious processes; and the way modulations of consciousness encompass both areas of awareness and unawareness. The concept of mediation is key for such inquiry, and its function as seen in the context of this issue is twofold: first, mediation refers to the relational ground in-between conscious and unconscious, awareness and unawareness, and those "indefinitely radiating subconscious possibilities of increase" (in James' words). And second, it refers to media as the cultural-technological means for realizing such possibilities. The articles of this issue shed light on this two-fold function of mediation, taking on the challenge to re-think the unconscious in non-traditional, relational, dynamic, permeable, and creative ways.

Re-mediation refers to both a theoretical gesture of rethinking mediation and its role in consciousness, and, in line with Bolter and Grusin's coinage of the term "remediation", of calling attention to the way established media practices and related ways of perception might become unconscious, habitual and unattended – but still inform and shape new media uses and responses in ways that are not always obvious.[7] Focusing on mediated modulations of consciousness can shed new light on how media affect us in multiple ways.

[7] While remediation described how new media refashion older media through the complementary logics of immediacy and hypermediacy, the notion of "premediation" (Grusin 2010) introduced the idea that contemporary media do not simply represent events but constantly anticipate possible futures, operating affectively to prepare subjects emotionally for what might happen. More recently, Grusin (2015) advances the theory of "radical mediation", in which mediation is no longer seen as a neutral channel for transmitting content, but as a constitutive force of experience itself. No longer secondary or derivative, mediation is ontologically primary: it involves bodies, atmospheres, objects, and infrastructures, and operates both below and above the threshold of awareness, radically reshaping our understanding of perception and media experience.

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The issue's first four articles are devoted to mediated modulations of consciousness, contributing to thinking how (post-)screen media, in both narrative and non-narrative forms, address, express and "exploit" unconscious and preconscious processes – in particular habitual behaviours, biases, dreams, attentional fluctuations, and processes of identification and transportation into a narrative world.

In the first article, Enrico Carocci discusses the way social media platforms engage, condition and exploit the affective mind, through habits (scrolling, image-based reactions, etc.) that contribute to transformations and shifts in consciousness, particularly referring to the case of the "oddly satisfying videos" proliferating on TikTok. Carocci focuses on a side-effect of habitual engagement with media, namely the attitude of "impatience" characterizing media responses, defined as "an affective habit that is unreflexively enacted when experiential processes do not flow smoothly". Drawing on affective neuroscience, which postulates that the biological locus of affective disposition and preconscious habits lies in subcortical structures of the "mammalian brain", the paper suggests new ways to reflect on how seamless interfaces involve the affective mind and operate below the level of consciously mediated thoughts and emotions.

The next article takes issue of different media developments and the way they influence cultural but also scientific imagination regarding the unconscious. Giancarlo Grossi postulates that, just like the panorama in the 19th century, VR is now the technology that serves as a model of the dream state for science, stimulating new conceptions and explanations of the dream as a major expression of the unconscious. Grossi takes a contemporary "complex narrative" film, *Paprika*, as symptomatic of an epistemological paradigm shift regarding the unconscious, and the dream in particular. The film continues a lineage of VR and VR-inspired narratives that

since the 1980s made new models of dreaming emerge in cultural imagination and science as well, models "that radically cut ties with the psychoanalytic conception that dominated the episteme of the twentieth century". In popular culture as well as in recent neuroscientific theories, Grossi postulates, the dream is not just visualized but navigable (as a VR machine), presented "no longer as unconscious, but as a conscious model of the world acting offline rather than online." Grossi here echoes Benjamin showing how current narratives (circulating in-between culture, technology and science) apart from externalizing the unconscious, act as protective mechanisms and training tools against the uncertainties of late-capitalist societies.

The following article also takes issue of complex narratives expressing cultural conceptions of the unconscious. This time the focus is not on the dream but on mental illness as a state diverging from normative consciousness, and on films with plot twists that feature unreliable, "neuro-non-normative" protagonists. Melanie Kreitler connects two types of "unconscious" processes involved in such narratives: what she calls the "fictional unconscious", meaning what is not revealed by the narrative (leading to the plot twist, usually through devices of unreliable narration), and the "viewers' unconscious" – what the viewer remains unaware of – the biases related to mental illness that when narratively exploited, make the plot twist work. Using as case study a film by Joe Wright (*The Woman in the Window* 2021), Kreitler focuses on the processes of meaning-making employed by viewers and primed by plot twist films, as well as on the cognitive and enculturated unconscious biases involved in these processes that promote judging neuro-non-normativity as external and unreliable. Kreitler finds the "political" potential of films like *The Woman in the Window* in making us aware and conscious of our culturally biased conceptions of mental illness. Thus Kreitler's chapter addresses an important issue regarding the re-mediation of the unconscious, that is, the political and ideological stakes of mediated modulations of consciousness.

The fourth article of the issue, written by Irina Andreeva and Melanie Green, investigates narrative complexity and identification in a "hybrid" medium; that of "actual play narratives" – role-playing games performed by a cast of players and streamed for an audience. Taking a social psychological perspective, the authors take issue of unconscious processes involved in narrative engagement. They particularly use the concept of "narrative transportation" (a concept previously extensively researched by Green – see Green; Green and Brock "The Role of Transportation"; Green and Brock "In the Mind's Eye") as a state of immersion into a narrative world involving "an intense focus and loss of self-consciousness", therefore classified as relatively unconscious in the sense of one's losing the sense of "the external world or their self-concept". But instead of considering conscious or unconscious narrative processing as a binary, on/off situation, the authors investigate its nuances in a spectrum, through multiple shifts in consciousness happening during playing time. Thus, even though transportation is generally considered relatively unconscious, as audience members surrender a large part of their awareness of their self and surroundings, the flexible and dynamic concept of engagement with narratives suggested in this paper highlights how both conscious and unconscious processes feed into one another allowing for a more complex and enjoyable narrative experience.

The issue's following articles focus on prereflective and "embodied mediations of consciousness" through cinema and cinematic media.

Taking a wider perspective on narrative as an emergent mental process, Pia Tikka and Mauri Kaipainen suggest a method to "capture" and understand narrative's emergence "from the depths of the human mind" up until its articulation in media artifacts and intersubjectively shared stories. They use film as a medium ideal for excavating the paths of narrative emergence; as a laboratory for simulating lived experience under controlled experimental conditions. The combination of neurocinematic methods (such as MRI scanning to monitor

viewers' brain responses to events narrated in specific film scenes, as well as collection of various biometrical data showing emotional involvement, for example), with micro-phenomenological interviews of viewers, cross-referenced with some objective data about film narratives (annotations of narrative events usually undertaken by film professionals, such as editors), allows to reveal minuscule pre-conscious, pre-verbal and prereflective experiential aspects of "core experience" that give rise to initial forms of "autonarration" (making sense of the complexity of a plethora of different stimuli), and potentially, through embodied intersubjectivity, to (verbally) mediated narratives, thus "communicative narration".

In his contribution Maarten Coëgnarts also uses cinema as springboard to explore the notion of the cognitive, rather than psychoanalytical, unconscious, based on theories of embodied cognition, especially George Lakoff's and Mark Johnson's concept of "embodied metaphors" that structure thought and language. Using as a case study the film *Portrait of a Lady on Fire* (Sciamma 2019), Coëgnarts proposes a model of film analysis that "excavates" such embodied metaphors in the stylistic system of the film (editing, cinematography, *mise en scene* and sound). As he suggests, "the meanings that are fleshed out in the work's design parallel the intrinsically embodied operations of every human brain in everyday life, and it is precisely this trade-off of shared embodied knowledge that makes it possible for artists to communicate with viewers in a very engaging unconscious and bodily way." Thus the issue of intersubjectivity and communicativeness in (cinematic) narration is here again lit from a different angle.

The next article takes a phenomenological perspective, focusing on the work of renown animators Quay brothers, and particularly on the use of sound in film and its role in mediating the unconscious. Through a detailed analysis of Quays's first live action film, *Institute Benjamenta*, Martine Huvenne suggests an embodied, prereflective experience of cinema as it is instantiated in the particular film, mainly driven from sound and movement rather than image

– thus destabilizing the usual analytical hierarchy that prioritizes the visual over the auditory in film analysis but also in Western culture more broadly. Film is thus here theoretically approached and – as argued – experienced as a choreography of sonic and visual movements, interweaved in a non-hierarchical way. Listening plays a vital role – guiding attention and creating "spaces from within", spheres connecting characters and expressing emotions, inhabited by the bodies of the audience. Thus "narrative arises" without the use of dialogue or words, and meaning is made pre-verbally as the audience co-creates the film as a synthesis, a com-position of gestures. Huvenne sketches film experience in terms of spatial, dynamic, sonic resonances among animate and inanimate, on-screen and off-screen bodies.

The following article by Jay Hetrick, also focusing on cinema, contributes a philosophical approach to the mediation of the unconscious. It is well-known how Gilles Deleuze is perhaps the founder of what is now called film-philosophy, a philosophical inquiry based on film. In Deleuze's philosophy the unconscious is derived from Leibnizian, rather than Freudian, concepts like the "dark chamber", which enfolds a multitude of things that are not immediately available to conscious perception and which is described, rather cinematically, as a "screen in a dark room". This "dark consciousness", Hetrick explains, is a "non-stratified substance", "a relatively undifferentiated mass" –where images are "formlessness and unrecognizable". Hetrick particularly focuses on film theorist Raymond Bellour, who, influenced by Deleuze, introduced the concept of *entre-images* in order to trace these formless and unrecognizable yet strongly affective images in cinema. Being also significantly inspired by artist Henri Michaux, Bellour configured cinema as a chamber that "reconstructs sensory data" "from the perspective of the body-subject", as the latter is "filled with impersonal and transpersonal affects." Hetrick follows Bellour to further explore the cinema-brain as a system and "place of encounter" of spectator and cinematic images inside the dark chamber of

consciousness, potentially tracing unexpected neuronal paths and creating "aberrant movements" of thought and action.

Lastly, Guido Devadder's, Steven Devleminck's and Roel Vande Winkel's contribution offers a glimpse on how filmmakers and media artists and practitioners potentially engage with psychological as well as philosophical notions of unconscious processes. The article introduces Devadder's practice-based research and his artwork *Hungry Ghost* in particular. The authors' engagement with the notion of the unconscious is pluralistic, drawing on Buddhism (where the "hungry ghost" is a spirit going through many reincarnations in endless suffering, as it does not ever fulfill its greed), as well as on Western philosophy and psychology – from Schopenhauer's notion of the body as objectification of the will, to the Freudian notion of unconscious drives, and philosopher Byung-Chul Han's association of the death drive with capitalism. *Hungry Ghost* is crafted as a hybrid animation-live action remediation of early optical toys such as phenakistiscopes and zoetropes, or indeed a "reincarnation" of these, transferring the same sense of uncanny, and the same spirit of a perpetual quest for the satisfaction of psychic drives. The article offers an appropriate conclusion to an issue devoted to the (re-)mediation of the unconscious as a self-reflexive quest that involves the remediation of cinema itself.

Collectively, the articles in this issue illuminate the diverse ways in which media – ranging from social platforms and VR to narrative cinema and hybrid performance – mediate unconscious and preconscious processes. Moving beyond classical psychoanalytic frameworks, the contributions explore how media forms engage affective habits, perceptual thresholds, embodied metaphors, and immersive states, often operating below or outside conscious awareness. Together, they advance a multifaceted understanding of the unconscious not as a static repository of hidden content, but as a dynamic field shaped by cultural,

technological, and sensory modulations – reconfigured through and within contemporary media experience.

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