The dialogue towards the future: new and emerging technologies

Assisted reproductive technologies are often conceived as tools that increase our procreative freedom. Nowadays, thanks to In Vitro Fertilization (IVF), Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis (PGD), and prenatal testing among others, prospective parents have a wide range of reproductive choices available. Alongside this line of thought, some bioethicists argue that the aforementioned reproductive techniques also raise unprecedented moral obligations towards progeny and a balance between procreative autonomy and responsibility is needed. Accordingly, some models have been proposed such as the Child’s Right to an Open Future and the Principle of Procreative Beneficence. Stemming from a consequentialist person-affecting perspective, I first argue that these models cannot be accepted. We should instead embrace the least demanding Minimal Threshold Model (MTM), according to which every reproductive choice is permissible, except for creating children whose lives will not be worth living. Then I argue that whereas MTM is plausible in a context in which only selective reproductive technologies are available, things can change if we consider the future and still hypothetical availability of reproductive Genome Editing (rGE). After claiming that rGE can be considered a person-affecting technique, I argue that prospective parents have a greater moral obligation toward their progeny than in a context in which only selective technologies are available such as a PGD. I then investigate when parents-to-be face this new moral obligation by proposing two models: the Bold Restriction of Procreative Freedom and the Mild Restriction of Procreative Freedom. According to the former, every reproducer has a prima facie moral obligation to procreate through IVF and then transfer into the uterus an embryo free from genetic diseases that, although compatible with a life worth living, significantly harm the future child and for which, at the moment of the procreative decision, safe treatment with rGE to avoid this condition is available. I argue that this model is too demanding and difficult to defend from a consequentialist person-affecting perspective. Therefore, I present and defend the Mild Restriction of Procreative Freedom, arguing that the aforementioned prima facie moral obligations apply only to prospective parents who are already in the IVF process.