This paper proposes a fully distributed Demand-Side Management system for Smart Grid infrastructures, especially tailored to reduce the peak demand of residential users. In particular, we use a dynamic pricing strategy, where energy tariffs are function of the overall power demand of customers. We consider two practical cases: (1) a fully distributed approach, where each appliance decides autonomously its own scheduling, and (2) a hybrid approach, where each user must schedule all his appliances. We analyze numerically these two approaches, showing that they are characterized practically by the same performance level in all the considered grid scenarios. We model the proposed system using a non-cooperative game theoretical approach, and demonstrate that our game is a generalized ordinal potential one under general conditions. Furthermore, we propose a simple yet effective best response strategy that is proved to converge in a few steps to a pure Nash Equilibrium, thus demonstrating the robustness of the power scheduling plan obtained without any central coordination of the operator or the customers. Numerical results, obtained using real load profiles and appliance models, show that the system-wide peak absorption achieved in a completely distributed fashion can be reduced up to 55%, thus decreasing the capital expenditure (CAPEX) necessary to meet the growing energy demand.
(2015). A distributed demand-side management framework for the smart grid [journal article - articolo]. In COMPUTER COMMUNICATIONS. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/10446/106046
A distributed demand-side management framework for the smart grid
Barbato, Antimo;Martignon, Fabio;
2015-01-01
Abstract
This paper proposes a fully distributed Demand-Side Management system for Smart Grid infrastructures, especially tailored to reduce the peak demand of residential users. In particular, we use a dynamic pricing strategy, where energy tariffs are function of the overall power demand of customers. We consider two practical cases: (1) a fully distributed approach, where each appliance decides autonomously its own scheduling, and (2) a hybrid approach, where each user must schedule all his appliances. We analyze numerically these two approaches, showing that they are characterized practically by the same performance level in all the considered grid scenarios. We model the proposed system using a non-cooperative game theoretical approach, and demonstrate that our game is a generalized ordinal potential one under general conditions. Furthermore, we propose a simple yet effective best response strategy that is proved to converge in a few steps to a pure Nash Equilibrium, thus demonstrating the robustness of the power scheduling plan obtained without any central coordination of the operator or the customers. Numerical results, obtained using real load profiles and appliance models, show that the system-wide peak absorption achieved in a completely distributed fashion can be reduced up to 55%, thus decreasing the capital expenditure (CAPEX) necessary to meet the growing energy demand.File | Dimensione del file | Formato | |
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