We consider in this paper a dynamic resource allocation scheme between several Mobile Virtual Network Operators (MVNOs), sharing common radio resources at a Cloud-based Radio Access Network (C-RAN) run by a central operator. We specifically propose a two-level coupled auction so as to enhance resource utilization and maximize the revenues both for the central operator and the MVNOs: at the lower level, end users belonging to a given MVNO bid for resources and, at the higher-level, MVNOs compete for resources at the central operator based on the output of the lower-level auction. We show fundamental economic properties of our proposal: truthfulness and individual rationality, and propose a greedy algorithm to enhance its computational efficiency. We prove the existence of Nash equilibrium for the global auction and its uniqueness in a typical duopoly scenario. Further numerical results illustrate the performance of our proposal in various network settings.
(2018). A Two-level Auction for Resource Allocation in Multi-tenant C-RAN [journal article - articolo]. In COMPUTER NETWORKS. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/10446/118688
A Two-level Auction for Resource Allocation in Multi-tenant C-RAN
Martignon, Fabio
2018-01-01
Abstract
We consider in this paper a dynamic resource allocation scheme between several Mobile Virtual Network Operators (MVNOs), sharing common radio resources at a Cloud-based Radio Access Network (C-RAN) run by a central operator. We specifically propose a two-level coupled auction so as to enhance resource utilization and maximize the revenues both for the central operator and the MVNOs: at the lower level, end users belonging to a given MVNO bid for resources and, at the higher-level, MVNOs compete for resources at the central operator based on the output of the lower-level auction. We show fundamental economic properties of our proposal: truthfulness and individual rationality, and propose a greedy algorithm to enhance its computational efficiency. We prove the existence of Nash equilibrium for the global auction and its uniqueness in a typical duopoly scenario. Further numerical results illustrate the performance of our proposal in various network settings.File | Dimensione del file | Formato | |
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