In this paper, we study a duopoly model in which two symmetric firms exploit the same public renewable resource as an input for the production of a homogeneous good. We consider the case where the firms are provided with public incentives in order to prevent the resource exhaustion in a finite time horizon which coincides with the harvestinglicense period. As a consequence, we consider a differential game in finite time horizon and compute the Open Loop and linear Feedback Nash Equilibria of the game. We study the social welfare and the optimal incentives polices derived from the solutions.

(2017). A duopoly with common renewable resource and incentives [journal article - articolo]. In INTERNATIONAL GAME THEORY REVIEW. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/10446/118941

A duopoly with common renewable resource and incentives

Bisceglia, Michele
2017-01-01

Abstract

In this paper, we study a duopoly model in which two symmetric firms exploit the same public renewable resource as an input for the production of a homogeneous good. We consider the case where the firms are provided with public incentives in order to prevent the resource exhaustion in a finite time horizon which coincides with the harvestinglicense period. As a consequence, we consider a differential game in finite time horizon and compute the Open Loop and linear Feedback Nash Equilibria of the game. We study the social welfare and the optimal incentives polices derived from the solutions.
journal article - articolo
2017
Grilli, Luca; Bisceglia, Michele
(2017). A duopoly with common renewable resource and incentives [journal article - articolo]. In INTERNATIONAL GAME THEORY REVIEW. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/10446/118941
File allegato/i alla scheda:
File Dimensione del file Formato  
s0219198917500189.pdf

Solo gestori di archivio

Versione: publisher's version - versione editoriale
Licenza: Licenza default Aisberg
Dimensione del file 244.31 kB
Formato Adobe PDF
244.31 kB Adobe PDF   Visualizza/Apri
Pubblicazioni consigliate

Aisberg ©2008 Servizi bibliotecari, Università degli studi di Bergamo | Terms of use/Condizioni di utilizzo

Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/10446/118941
Citazioni
  • Scopus 7
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.isi??? 7
social impact