Strategic delegation to an independent regulator with a pure consumer standard improves dynamic regulation by mitigating ratchet effects associated with short-term contracting. A pure consumer standard alleviates the regulator's myopic temptation to raise output after learning the firm is inefficient. Anticipating this tougher regulatory behavior, efficient firms find it less attractive to exaggerate costs. This reduces the need for long-term rents and mitigates ratchet effects. A welfare standard biased toward consumers entails, however, allocative costs arising from partial separation of the firms' cost types. A trade-off results, which favors strategic delegation when efficient firms are relatively likely.
(2015). Consumer Standards as a Strategic Device to Mitigate Ratchet Effects in Dynamic Regulation [journal article - articolo]. In JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS & MANAGEMENT STRATEGY. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/10446/132089
Consumer Standards as a Strategic Device to Mitigate Ratchet Effects in Dynamic Regulation
Fiocco, Raffaele;
2015-01-01
Abstract
Strategic delegation to an independent regulator with a pure consumer standard improves dynamic regulation by mitigating ratchet effects associated with short-term contracting. A pure consumer standard alleviates the regulator's myopic temptation to raise output after learning the firm is inefficient. Anticipating this tougher regulatory behavior, efficient firms find it less attractive to exaggerate costs. This reduces the need for long-term rents and mitigates ratchet effects. A welfare standard biased toward consumers entails, however, allocative costs arising from partial separation of the firms' cost types. A trade-off results, which favors strategic delegation when efficient firms are relatively likely.File | Dimensione del file | Formato | |
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