This chapter positions the study of signals in crowdfunding within the broader literature on signaling in entrepreneurial finance. I deliver a theoretical discussion and definition of signals in crowdfunding, including examples of penalty and handicap signals, differentiating them from passive characteristics and cheap talk. I propose a taxonomy of signals that matches the senders—namely, such organizations as firms and nongovernmental organizations, and individuals, including both proponents and fellow crowd-funders—and receivers, such as backers, lenders, and investors. Existing studies are classified in this taxonomy based on the definitions of reward- and donation-based crowdfunding, crowd-investing, and crowd-lending. I conclude by identifying future research directions and calling for studies on post-signal performance.

(2018). Signaling to overcome inefficiencies in crowdfunding markets . Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/10446/133598

Signaling to overcome inefficiencies in crowdfunding markets

Vismara, Silvio
2018-01-01

Abstract

This chapter positions the study of signals in crowdfunding within the broader literature on signaling in entrepreneurial finance. I deliver a theoretical discussion and definition of signals in crowdfunding, including examples of penalty and handicap signals, differentiating them from passive characteristics and cheap talk. I propose a taxonomy of signals that matches the senders—namely, such organizations as firms and nongovernmental organizations, and individuals, including both proponents and fellow crowd-funders—and receivers, such as backers, lenders, and investors. Existing studies are classified in this taxonomy based on the definitions of reward- and donation-based crowdfunding, crowd-investing, and crowd-lending. I conclude by identifying future research directions and calling for studies on post-signal performance.
2018
Vismara, Silvio
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/10446/133598
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