In a model of competing managerial firms I show that the equilibrium number of firms decreases with uncertainty if entry is relatively more costly than monitoring. The result adds to the earlier contributions and is consistent with the available evidence.
(2011). A note on free entry under uncertainty: The role of asymmetric information [journal article - articolo]. In ECONOMICS LETTERS. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/10446/145214
A note on free entry under uncertainty: The role of asymmetric information
Piccolo, Salvatore
2011-01-01
Abstract
In a model of competing managerial firms I show that the equilibrium number of firms decreases with uncertainty if entry is relatively more costly than monitoring. The result adds to the earlier contributions and is consistent with the available evidence.File allegato/i alla scheda:
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