Causa libera oder causa finalis? Überlegungen zur Regressverbotslehre Hruschkas

Hruschka elaborates in the frame of his doctrine of imputation a theory of “prohibition of regression” as a requirement of “Täterschaft”, grounded on a strict causal concept. In particular, Hruschka’s theory is based on three cornerstones: first, Pufendorf’s distinction between entia physica and entia moralia; second, the difference between “strong causal concept” (condicio per quam) and “weak causal concept” (condicio sine qua non); third, the idea of “free cause” as a basis of Regressverbot and, consequently, of free action as a new beginning. In this paper some criticisms have been raised about this conception: the causal interpretation looses the complexity of the human behaviour; and Hruschka’s whole theory of actio libera overlooks its final aspect, because of its orientation to an aim. Hence it has been emphasised the importance of the Aristotelian concept of final cause, in order to highlight the positive dimension of human freedom. Furthermore, it has been suggested to investigate which kind of intersubjective relation justifies the punishment of persons, who have given only an indirect contribution to the commission of the crime.