This paper clarifies the differences between retail and wholesale price-parity agreements in vertical industries. In contrast to traditional wide and narrow retail price-parity arrangements, the competitive effects of wholesale price-parity depend on the complexity of the vertical supply chain, the business model operated by sellers and distributors, and the strength of competition between direct and indirect distribution channels. While retail price-parity agreements are almost always anticompetitive, wholesale price-parity agreements may positively affect consumer welfare when direct and indirect distribution channels are close substitutes. To demonstrate the relevance of our analysis for competition policy, we illustrate our findings by referring to an industry that has recently attracted policy and regulatory interest on both sides of the Atlantic: the airline ticket distribution industry. We find that, in this industry, while wholesale price-parity agreements always harm airlines, Global Distribution Systems (GDSs) have preferences more aligned with consumers: when consumers benefit from these provisions, GDSs benefit too.
(2021). The Simple Economics of Wholesale Price-Parity Agreements: The Case of the Airline Tickets Distribution Industry [journal article - articolo]. In JOURNAL OF COMPETITION LAW & ECONOMICS. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/10446/169616
The Simple Economics of Wholesale Price-Parity Agreements: The Case of the Airline Tickets Distribution Industry
Piccolo, Salvatore;
2021-01-01
Abstract
This paper clarifies the differences between retail and wholesale price-parity agreements in vertical industries. In contrast to traditional wide and narrow retail price-parity arrangements, the competitive effects of wholesale price-parity depend on the complexity of the vertical supply chain, the business model operated by sellers and distributors, and the strength of competition between direct and indirect distribution channels. While retail price-parity agreements are almost always anticompetitive, wholesale price-parity agreements may positively affect consumer welfare when direct and indirect distribution channels are close substitutes. To demonstrate the relevance of our analysis for competition policy, we illustrate our findings by referring to an industry that has recently attracted policy and regulatory interest on both sides of the Atlantic: the airline ticket distribution industry. We find that, in this industry, while wholesale price-parity agreements always harm airlines, Global Distribution Systems (GDSs) have preferences more aligned with consumers: when consumers benefit from these provisions, GDSs benefit too.File | Dimensione del file | Formato | |
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