Some Propositions of Approaches for Measuring Indirect Control Power of Firms and Mutual Connections in Corporate Shareholding Structures

This paper discusses some game-theoretical methods that use power indices for measuring the indirect control power of firms and mutual connections in complex corporate shareholding networks. Only a few of the methods considered in the literature so far measure the control power of all firms involved in shareholding networks; meanwhile, none of them regard measuring the importance of linkages. The intention of this article is first to propose a modification of the Mercik-Łobos and Mercik-Stach methods using the Banzhaf index to measure the direct and indirect control of investors and stock companies. Second, having already estimated the control power of nodes (firms) in a network, we consider the relationship of this power to the power of the linkages that connect the companies in directed networks. Then, we present our own idea of how such link’s power can be measured. We regard to the power of the link in relation to the firms as well as (more significantly) in relation to the entire corporate network.