In the theory of psychological games it is assumed that players' preferences on material consequences depend on endogenous beliefs. Most of the applications of this theoretical framework assume that the psychological utility functions representing such preferences are common knowledge. However, this is often unrealistic. In particular, it cannot be true in experimental games where players are subjects drawn at random from a population. Therefore, an incomplete-information methodology is needed. We take a first step in this direction, focusing on guilt aversion in the Trust Game. In our models, agents have heterogeneous belief hierarchies. We characterize equilibria where trust occurs with positive probability. Our analysis illustrates the incomplete-information approach to psychological games and can help to organize experimental results in the Trust Game.

(2016). Incomplete-information models of guilt aversion in the Trust Game [journal article - articolo]. In MANAGEMENT SCIENCE. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/10446/191572

Incomplete-information models of guilt aversion in the Trust Game

Manzoni, Elena
2016-01-01

Abstract

In the theory of psychological games it is assumed that players' preferences on material consequences depend on endogenous beliefs. Most of the applications of this theoretical framework assume that the psychological utility functions representing such preferences are common knowledge. However, this is often unrealistic. In particular, it cannot be true in experimental games where players are subjects drawn at random from a population. Therefore, an incomplete-information methodology is needed. We take a first step in this direction, focusing on guilt aversion in the Trust Game. In our models, agents have heterogeneous belief hierarchies. We characterize equilibria where trust occurs with positive probability. Our analysis illustrates the incomplete-information approach to psychological games and can help to organize experimental results in the Trust Game.
articolo
2016
Attanasi, Giuseppe; Battigalli, Pierpaolo; Manzoni, Elena
(2016). Incomplete-information models of guilt aversion in the Trust Game [journal article - articolo]. In MANAGEMENT SCIENCE. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/10446/191572
File allegato/i alla scheda:
File Dimensione del file Formato  
1_AttanasiBattigalliManzoni(2016)MS.pdf

Solo gestori di archivio

Versione: publisher's version - versione editoriale
Licenza: Licenza default Aisberg
Dimensione del file 763.94 kB
Formato Adobe PDF
763.94 kB Adobe PDF   Visualizza/Apri
Pubblicazioni consigliate

Aisberg ©2008 Servizi bibliotecari, Università degli studi di Bergamo | Terms of use/Condizioni di utilizzo

Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/10446/191572
Citazioni
  • Scopus 35
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.isi??? 34
social impact