The phenomenology of time and the retreat of reason

The controversy between the A- and the B-theoretical understandings of the nature of time remains open as a matter of metaphysics, and supporters of either theory can recognise supporters of the other as worthwhile interlocutors in discussions of the philosophy of time. The present article does not seek to present a decisive argument to break this deadlock. Rather, the aim is to contrast the cast of thought expressed in the B theory with what appear to be humans’ most spontaneous evaluative and emotional engagements with temporal phenomena. In particular, the B-theoretic denial that there are any genuine tensed facts calls forth complications to explain motivation in the present, the widespread asymmetries in our attitudes to the past and the future, and the differences that longer or shorter passages of time can make. If (some version of) the B theory is true, then many of the biases to which we are given are irrational.