We experimentally investigate the role of moral concerns in three-player ultimatum bargaining. In our experimental paradigm, proposers can increase the overall size of the pie at the expenses of an NGO that conducts humanitarian aid in emergency areas. In a first study, we find that responders are not willing to engage in ‘immoral’ transactions only when fully informed about proposers’ behavior toward the NGO. Under complete information, their willingness to reject offers increases with the strength of the harm to the NGO. Moreover, the possibility to compensate the NGO through rejection further increases their willingness to reject. In a second study aimed at gauging the importance of different motives behind rejections, we show that the two most prevalent motives are to compensate the NGO or to diminish inequality between responders and proposers. Punishing proposers’ unkind intentions towards the NGO or rejecting on the basis of pure deontological reasons constitute less important motives.

(2019). The role of morals in three-player ultimatum games [journal article - articolo]. In JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PSYCHOLOGY. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/10446/228092

The role of morals in three-player ultimatum games

Fallucchi, Francesco;
2019

Abstract

We experimentally investigate the role of moral concerns in three-player ultimatum bargaining. In our experimental paradigm, proposers can increase the overall size of the pie at the expenses of an NGO that conducts humanitarian aid in emergency areas. In a first study, we find that responders are not willing to engage in ‘immoral’ transactions only when fully informed about proposers’ behavior toward the NGO. Under complete information, their willingness to reject offers increases with the strength of the harm to the NGO. Moreover, the possibility to compensate the NGO through rejection further increases their willingness to reject. In a second study aimed at gauging the importance of different motives behind rejections, we show that the two most prevalent motives are to compensate the NGO or to diminish inequality between responders and proposers. Punishing proposers’ unkind intentions towards the NGO or rejecting on the basis of pure deontological reasons constitute less important motives.
articolo
Casal, Sandro; Fallucchi, Francesco; Quercia, Simone
(2019). The role of morals in three-player ultimatum games [journal article - articolo]. In JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PSYCHOLOGY. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/10446/228092
File allegato/i alla scheda:
File Dimensione del file Formato  
WP_n_2018_15.pdf

embargo fino al 31/01/2021

Versione: postprint - versione referata/accettata senza referaggio
Licenza: Creative commons
Dimensione del file 1.32 MB
Formato Adobe PDF
1.32 MB Adobe PDF Visualizza/Apri
1-s2.0-S016748701730466X-main.pdf

Solo gestori di archivio

Versione: publisher's version - versione editoriale
Licenza: Licenza default Aisberg
Dimensione del file 1.04 MB
Formato Adobe PDF
1.04 MB Adobe PDF   Visualizza/Apri
Pubblicazioni consigliate

Caricamento pubblicazioni consigliate

Aisberg ©2008 Servizi bibliotecari, Università degli studi di Bergamo | Terms of use/Condizioni di utilizzo

Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: http://hdl.handle.net/10446/228092
Citazioni
  • Scopus 1
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.isi??? 0
social impact