We extend the study of behavioural types in voluntary contribution games, adapting the elicitation method of Fischbacher et al. (2001) to a broader range of economic and strategic incentives. Our results in the standard VCM game align with previous findings in many respects; in particular, we identify one-quarter of participants as a distinctive group of “strong” conditional cooperators. We provide an explanation for the behaviour of this group by tracking their contribution strategies as the financial incentives of the game vary. We find that conditional cooperators follow a sophisticated rule, matching contributions only when doing so leads to an overall welfare improvement. This favours an account of conditional cooperation based on social norm compliance, rather than confusion, inequity aversion, or warm-glow giving.

(2022). The sophistication of conditional cooperators: Evidence from public goods games [journal article - articolo]. In GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/10446/228249

The sophistication of conditional cooperators: Evidence from public goods games

Fallucchi, Francesco;
2022

Abstract

We extend the study of behavioural types in voluntary contribution games, adapting the elicitation method of Fischbacher et al. (2001) to a broader range of economic and strategic incentives. Our results in the standard VCM game align with previous findings in many respects; in particular, we identify one-quarter of participants as a distinctive group of “strong” conditional cooperators. We provide an explanation for the behaviour of this group by tracking their contribution strategies as the financial incentives of the game vary. We find that conditional cooperators follow a sophisticated rule, matching contributions only when doing so leads to an overall welfare improvement. This favours an account of conditional cooperation based on social norm compliance, rather than confusion, inequity aversion, or warm-glow giving.
articolo
Fallucchi, Francesco; Luccasen, R. Andrew; Turocy, Theodore L.
(2022). The sophistication of conditional cooperators: Evidence from public goods games [journal article - articolo]. In GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/10446/228249
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: http://hdl.handle.net/10446/228249
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