Leader-follower (LF) equilibria play a central role in several applications of game theory. In spite of this, the literature only presents sporadic results for the case with two or more followers. In this work, we address the problem of computing LF equilibria in this setting, assuming that the followers play a Nash Equilibrium after the leader’s commitment.

(2016). Methods for Finding Leader-Follower Equilibria with Multiple Followers . Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/10446/229386

Methods for Finding Leader-Follower Equilibria with Multiple Followers

Coniglio, Stefano;
2016

Abstract

Leader-follower (LF) equilibria play a central role in several applications of game theory. In spite of this, the literature only presents sporadic results for the case with two or more followers. In this work, we address the problem of computing LF equilibria in this setting, assuming that the followers play a Nash Equilibrium after the leader’s commitment.
Basilico, Nicola; Coniglio, Stefano; Gatti, Nicola
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/10446/229386
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