Leader-follower (LF) equilibria play a central role in several applications of game theory. In spite of this, the literature only presents sporadic results for the case with two or more followers. In this work, we address the problem of computing LF equilibria in this setting, assuming that the followers play a Nash Equilibrium after the leader’s commitment.
(2016). Methods for Finding Leader-Follower Equilibria with Multiple Followers . Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/10446/229386
Methods for Finding Leader-Follower Equilibria with Multiple Followers
Coniglio, Stefano;
2016-01-01
Abstract
Leader-follower (LF) equilibria play a central role in several applications of game theory. In spite of this, the literature only presents sporadic results for the case with two or more followers. In this work, we address the problem of computing LF equilibria in this setting, assuming that the followers play a Nash Equilibrium after the leader’s commitment.File allegato/i alla scheda:
| File | Dimensione del file | Formato | |
|---|---|---|---|
|
2016-AAMAS.pdf
Solo gestori di archivio
Versione:
publisher's version - versione editoriale
Licenza:
Licenza default Aisberg
Dimensione del file
771.18 kB
Formato
Adobe PDF
|
771.18 kB | Adobe PDF | Visualizza/Apri |
Pubblicazioni consigliate
Aisberg ©2008 Servizi bibliotecari, Università degli studi di Bergamo | Terms of use/Condizioni di utilizzo
