Esternalità nell'Industria dell'Aviazione

This thesis analyzes competition at a different level in the presence of market distortions in the aviation industry. In particular, the thesis focuses on the distortion introduced in the airline market by the COVID-19 pandemic and on the implications of environmental policies implemented by competing regulators in a distorted aviation market. The three papers presented in this thesis use a wide range of methodologies. The first paper belongs to the econometrics domain with a focus on time series analysis and forecasting practices. The second and third papers bridge optimization algorithms with game-theoretic models, with a focus on finding a solution to complex games. The first paper provides estimates of the disruptive impact of the COVID-19 outbreak on air transport at the macroregional level. To this end, weekly data on air service volumes are analyzed through an ITS SARIMA model and a counterfactual analysis covering 2016-2020. This paper shows that the real effect of COVID-19 has been greater than any previous crisis. By investigating the European aviation market, the second paper assesses how the form of aid offered during the COVID-19 outbreak may lead to changes in market equilibrium outcomes over the coming years. The impact of government bailouts is addressed by identifying changes in social welfare, taking into account passengers, airlines, and governments. The results suggest that the European Commission has likely distorted the competition in aviation markets by allowing Member States to provide different types of rescue packages. The third paper presents a game-theoretic model to analyze market equilibria in the presence of environmental policies at national and supranational levels. In a two-stage game, regulators maximize social welfare over their jurisdiction by setting emission charges, whilst airlines compete through frequencies, fares, and fleet choice. Consequently, airlines decide whether to absorb the costs of the environmental charges, pass them on to consumers, replace part of their fleet with new and less polluting and more fuel efficient aircraft, redistribute the inefficient fleet to less regulated itineraries, or adapt their networks. This paper shows that a reduction in the emissions produced comes at the expense of welfare and that the effectiveness of the policy is limited when regulators interact in their own interests in presence of market distortions.