We study how the allocation of power in a voting procedure affects the regulation and extraction of environmental public goods. In an appropriation game experiment, different endowments induce heterogeneous preferences among the three group members regarding their preferred quota, aimed at increasing social efficiency by restricting aggregate extraction. The players vote by submitting a proposal; one among the submitted proposals is implemented, selected at random, but across treatments, we vary the odds that a type sets the regulation.Participants vote for their selfishly preferred quota between half and two-thirds of the time. Although setting quotas decreased aggregate extraction by roughly 10%, we do not find differences between treatments. Once quotas are removed, extraction rises back to inefficient levels. Our results suggest that, although participants are reciprocal, they neglect the positive equilibrium effects of a stricter regulation.

(2023). Economic incentives and political inequality in the management of environmental public goods [journal article - articolo]. In JOURNAL OF BEHAVIORAL AND EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS. Retrieved from https://hdl.handle.net/10446/245271

Economic incentives and political inequality in the management of environmental public goods

Bogliacino, Francesco;
2023-01-01

Abstract

We study how the allocation of power in a voting procedure affects the regulation and extraction of environmental public goods. In an appropriation game experiment, different endowments induce heterogeneous preferences among the three group members regarding their preferred quota, aimed at increasing social efficiency by restricting aggregate extraction. The players vote by submitting a proposal; one among the submitted proposals is implemented, selected at random, but across treatments, we vary the odds that a type sets the regulation.Participants vote for their selfishly preferred quota between half and two-thirds of the time. Although setting quotas decreased aggregate extraction by roughly 10%, we do not find differences between treatments. Once quotas are removed, extraction rises back to inefficient levels. Our results suggest that, although participants are reciprocal, they neglect the positive equilibrium effects of a stricter regulation.
articolo
2023
Bogliacino, Francesco; Mantilla, César; Niño, Daniel
(2023). Economic incentives and political inequality in the management of environmental public goods [journal article - articolo]. In JOURNAL OF BEHAVIORAL AND EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS. Retrieved from https://hdl.handle.net/10446/245271
File allegato/i alla scheda:
File Dimensione del file Formato  
Bogliacino Mantilla Niño JBEE 2023.pdf

Solo gestori di archivio

Versione: publisher's version - versione editoriale
Licenza: Licenza default Aisberg
Dimensione del file 643.41 kB
Formato Adobe PDF
643.41 kB Adobe PDF   Visualizza/Apri
Pubblicazioni consigliate

Aisberg ©2008 Servizi bibliotecari, Università degli studi di Bergamo | Terms of use/Condizioni di utilizzo

Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/10446/245271
Citazioni
  • Scopus 1
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.isi??? 1
social impact