Rhetoric is an important element for various aspects of legal reasoning and expression. Various argumentative structures are known to have clear and specific functions in legal debate. The importance of the argument from the absurd in legal judgments is observed, and various tentative explanations are proposed. The rhetorical form of this argument is distinguished on the one hand from the logical reductio from which it is derived, and on the other from simple indications of legal incoherence. Examples are given from diverse areas of the law over an extended period to show its rhetorical power. However, although informally convincing, the argument from the absurd does not constitute a logical proof, and may therefore be classed as fallacial. It is pointed out that it has been used to secure judgments which now seem regrettable.
La retorica è un elemento importante dell’argomentazione legale. E’ noto infatti che varie strutture argomentative svolgono chiare e precise funzioni nel dibattito legale. Nell’articolo si discute l’importanza dell’argomentazione ad absurdam e ne vengono proposte diverse spiegazioni possibili. La struttura retorica di questa forma di argomentazione si distingue sia dalla logica reductio da cui deriva, sia dalle semplici indicazioni di incoerenza legale. La sua forza retorica è illustrata con esempi tratti da diversi momenti temporali. Benché convincente sul piano informale, questo tipo di argomentazione non costituisce una prova logica; tuttavia, in alcuni casi è stata utilizzata per addivenire a sentenze che oggi risultano riprovevoli.
(2002). Refutation in Common Law Judgments: The Use and Abuse of the Argument from the Absurd [journal article - articolo]. In LINGUISTICA E FILOLOGIA. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/10446/257
Refutation in Common Law Judgments: The Use and Abuse of the Argument from the Absurd
2002-01-01
Abstract
Rhetoric is an important element for various aspects of legal reasoning and expression. Various argumentative structures are known to have clear and specific functions in legal debate. The importance of the argument from the absurd in legal judgments is observed, and various tentative explanations are proposed. The rhetorical form of this argument is distinguished on the one hand from the logical reductio from which it is derived, and on the other from simple indications of legal incoherence. Examples are given from diverse areas of the law over an extended period to show its rhetorical power. However, although informally convincing, the argument from the absurd does not constitute a logical proof, and may therefore be classed as fallacial. It is pointed out that it has been used to secure judgments which now seem regrettable.File | Dimensione del file | Formato | |
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