In Adelaster (2016), A. G. Conte proposes a distinction between de dicto and de re attributions of truth and falsity, which he illustrates mostly with documents of legal standing, but also with an artificial object (a false tooth). The present aim is to propose an analogous distinction between monadic (one-place) and polyadic uses of “true” and “false”, and to sketch some features of its logical functioning with closer attention to the monadic pole than is usual. One proposal is that, in these uses, “true” and “false” do not function as opposites under negation.
(2023). Monadic Truth and Falsity [journal article - articolo]. In PHENOMENOLOGY AND MIND. Retrieved from https://hdl.handle.net/10446/258109
Monadic Truth and Falsity
Davies, Richard
2023-01-01
Abstract
In Adelaster (2016), A. G. Conte proposes a distinction between de dicto and de re attributions of truth and falsity, which he illustrates mostly with documents of legal standing, but also with an artificial object (a false tooth). The present aim is to propose an analogous distinction between monadic (one-place) and polyadic uses of “true” and “false”, and to sketch some features of its logical functioning with closer attention to the monadic pole than is usual. One proposal is that, in these uses, “true” and “false” do not function as opposites under negation.| File | Dimensione del file | Formato | |
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