This paper studies the evolution of trust and trustworthiness by modeling the intergenerational transmission of guilt aversion. The results depend both on features of strategic interaction and on parental transmission. We show that if there is complete information of opponents' traits, independent of parenting style, the share of high-guilt agents in society weakly increases over time, and trust and trustworthiness are maximized. Moreover, when traits are not observable, different levels of guilt always coexist, and trust and trustworthiness might also increase when parents have imperfect empathy in the transmission of traits or if there is homophily in society.

(2023). On the transmission of guilt aversion and the evolution of trust [journal article - articolo]. In GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR. Retrieved from https://hdl.handle.net/10446/275709

On the transmission of guilt aversion and the evolution of trust

Manzoni, Elena;
2023-01-01

Abstract

This paper studies the evolution of trust and trustworthiness by modeling the intergenerational transmission of guilt aversion. The results depend both on features of strategic interaction and on parental transmission. We show that if there is complete information of opponents' traits, independent of parenting style, the share of high-guilt agents in society weakly increases over time, and trust and trustworthiness are maximized. Moreover, when traits are not observable, different levels of guilt always coexist, and trust and trustworthiness might also increase when parents have imperfect empathy in the transmission of traits or if there is homophily in society.
articolo
2023
Della Lena, Sebastiano; Manzoni, Elena; Panebianco, Fabrizio
(2023). On the transmission of guilt aversion and the evolution of trust [journal article - articolo]. In GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR. Retrieved from https://hdl.handle.net/10446/275709
File allegato/i alla scheda:
File Dimensione del file Formato  
1-s2.0-S0899825623001495-main.pdf

Solo gestori di archivio

Versione: publisher's version - versione editoriale
Licenza: Licenza default Aisberg
Dimensione del file 1.02 MB
Formato Adobe PDF
1.02 MB Adobe PDF   Visualizza/Apri
Pubblicazioni consigliate

Aisberg ©2008 Servizi bibliotecari, Università degli studi di Bergamo | Terms of use/Condizioni di utilizzo

Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/10446/275709
Citazioni
  • Scopus 0
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.isi??? 0
social impact