We study the Tullock contest model with loss aversion and endogenouslyformed reference points. In a contest with n possibly heterogeneous players andconvex effort costs, we establish sufficient conditions for a unique Nash equi-librium in pure strategies. Subsequently, we analyze the impact of loss aversionon players' spending behavior, probability of winning, and rent dissipation.
(2024). Tullock contest with reference‐dependent preferences [journal article - articolo]. In ECONOMIC INQUIRY. Retrieved from https://hdl.handle.net/10446/278913
Tullock contest with reference‐dependent preferences
Fallucchi, Francesco;
2024-01-01
Abstract
We study the Tullock contest model with loss aversion and endogenouslyformed reference points. In a contest with n possibly heterogeneous players andconvex effort costs, we establish sufficient conditions for a unique Nash equi-librium in pure strategies. Subsequently, we analyze the impact of loss aversionon players' spending behavior, probability of winning, and rent dissipation.File allegato/i alla scheda:
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