Many computational modeling approaches of the mind seem to be characterized by an implicit strong physicalism, which frequently leads to confusion in philosophy of AI. This work aims at pointing out some fundamental aspects of this problem, both with respect to the relation between epistemological computationalism and physical realization, and the view of symbol manipulation as constrained computation.
(2012). What kind of machine is the mind? [conference presentation - intervento a convegno]. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/10446/28310
What kind of machine is the mind?
VERDICCHIO, Mario
2012-01-01
Abstract
Many computational modeling approaches of the mind seem to be characterized by an implicit strong physicalism, which frequently leads to confusion in philosophy of AI. This work aims at pointing out some fundamental aspects of this problem, both with respect to the relation between epistemological computationalism and physical realization, and the view of symbol manipulation as constrained computation.File allegato/i alla scheda:
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