Solving the Interface Problem Without Translation: The Same Format Thesis

In this article, we propose a new account concerning the interlock between intentions and motor representations (henceforth: MRs), showing that the interface problem is not as deep as previously proposed. Before discussing our view, in the first section we report the ideas developed in the literature by those who have tried to solve this puzzle before us. The article proceeds as follows. In Sections 2 and 3, we address the views by Butterfill and Sinigaglia, and Mylopoulos and Pacherie, respectively, and argue that both solutions entail a translation between representational formats, which both accounts aim to avoid. In Section 4, we present our brand-new claim, according to which intentions and MRs partially share the same motor format, inasmuch as executable action concepts are naturally represented in the agent’s motor system together with the action’s outcomes. Indeed, since intentions are constituted by executable action concepts and since there is evidence that action concepts are represented (and, thus, built) in the same motor format as action outcomes, the interlock between intentions and MRs no longer constitutes a problem. Then, in Section 5, we report empirical evidence in support of our claim, and before concluding, in Section 6 we briefly clarify our relations with two very recent accounts that criticized the pro- posals by Mylopoulos and Pacherie and Butterfill and Sinigaglia: Shepherd’s and Burnston’s. Finally, in Section 7, we offer some remarks about the philosoph- ical idea defended here. The basic insight is that interface without translation is possible because action concepts are such stuff as MRs are made on.