The debate about the differences between seeing objects in a picture and seeing real objects is still open. Understanding this difference means to understand what are the peculiar constraints governing the functioning of our visual system in order to enter the peculiar visual state we are in during picture perception. Depicted objects exhibit shape constancy. Empirical evidence clearly suggests that picture perception is possible even if we are not conscious of either the surface or the depicted object. If both the surface and the depicted object were simultaneously part of the visual phenomenology, pictorial experience would be a very weird visual experience. Subjects are made to look at a depicted scene monocularly through an oval aperture. The subject’s report that the depicted object is perceived to have presence, occupying a portion of the action space in front of the subject. Accordingly, when the visual representation of the surface is not possible, what effectively is a depicted object looks present.
(2019). Perceiving surfaces (and what they depict) . Retrieved from https://hdl.handle.net/10446/285189
Perceiving surfaces (and what they depict)
Ferretti, Gabriele
2019-01-01
Abstract
The debate about the differences between seeing objects in a picture and seeing real objects is still open. Understanding this difference means to understand what are the peculiar constraints governing the functioning of our visual system in order to enter the peculiar visual state we are in during picture perception. Depicted objects exhibit shape constancy. Empirical evidence clearly suggests that picture perception is possible even if we are not conscious of either the surface or the depicted object. If both the surface and the depicted object were simultaneously part of the visual phenomenology, pictorial experience would be a very weird visual experience. Subjects are made to look at a depicted scene monocularly through an oval aperture. The subject’s report that the depicted object is perceived to have presence, occupying a portion of the action space in front of the subject. Accordingly, when the visual representation of the surface is not possible, what effectively is a depicted object looks present.File | Dimensione del file | Formato | |
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