We analyze the self-reporting incentives fostered by a leniency program within a criminal network formed by a supplier of an illegal good and his dealers who compete against each other in the product market. We show that when it is viable, a first-informant rule always performs better than an all-informant rule—that is, it induces a lower level of crime. Nevertheless, the viability of a first-informant rule may be compromised if the baseline probability of conviction is sufficiently low, thereby placing disproportionate reliance on leniency over other investigative efforts for securing convictions.
(2024). Criminal network, leniency, and market externalities [journal article - articolo]. In JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMIC THEORY. Retrieved from https://hdl.handle.net/10446/288349
Criminal network, leniency, and market externalities
Piccolo, Salvatore;
2024-01-01
Abstract
We analyze the self-reporting incentives fostered by a leniency program within a criminal network formed by a supplier of an illegal good and his dealers who compete against each other in the product market. We show that when it is viable, a first-informant rule always performs better than an all-informant rule—that is, it induces a lower level of crime. Nevertheless, the viability of a first-informant rule may be compromised if the baseline probability of conviction is sufficiently low, thereby placing disproportionate reliance on leniency over other investigative efforts for securing convictions.File | Dimensione del file | Formato | |
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J Public Economic Theory - 2024 - Immordino - Criminal network leniency and market externalities.pdf
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