In the first part of the paper we describe the philosophical debate on the expansions of cognitive science into the brain and into the environment, take sides against the “revolutionary” positions on them and in favor of a “reformist” approach, and conclude that the most appropriate model for cognitive sciences is pluralistic. This is meant in a two fold sense. On the one hand, mental phenomena require a variety of explanatory levels, whose inter-relations are of two kinds: decomposition and contextualization. On the other hand, the arguably quasi-holistic character of some cognitive tasks suggests that the mechanistic style of explanation has to be integrated in these cases with a dynamical explanatory style. This theoretical picture, however, raises two classes of problems: (a) the compatibility between the mechanistic-computationalist explanation and the dynamical one and (b) the nature of theoretical entities and relations postulated at the different levels of a pluralistic model involving computational explanations. Each point will be discussed in the second part of the paper.

Functions, levels and mechanisms: explanation in cognitive science and its problems

PATERNOSTER, Alfredo
2013-01-01

Abstract

In the first part of the paper we describe the philosophical debate on the expansions of cognitive science into the brain and into the environment, take sides against the “revolutionary” positions on them and in favor of a “reformist” approach, and conclude that the most appropriate model for cognitive sciences is pluralistic. This is meant in a two fold sense. On the one hand, mental phenomena require a variety of explanatory levels, whose inter-relations are of two kinds: decomposition and contextualization. On the other hand, the arguably quasi-holistic character of some cognitive tasks suggests that the mechanistic style of explanation has to be integrated in these cases with a dynamical explanatory style. This theoretical picture, however, raises two classes of problems: (a) the compatibility between the mechanistic-computationalist explanation and the dynamical one and (b) the nature of theoretical entities and relations postulated at the different levels of a pluralistic model involving computational explanations. Each point will be discussed in the second part of the paper.
journal article - articolo
2013
Marraffa, Massimo; Paternoster, Alfredo
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/10446/29430
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