Democratic backsliding: populism and independent regulatory authorities in Italy during the Conte and Meloni governments

During the last decade, concerns have arisen regarding democratic erosion, suggesting that a global democratic recession is underway. Despite the significance of this issue and the growth of related academic literature, the connection between democratic erosion and public administration has been underexplored. Public administration directly impacts the quality of public services, economic prosperity, and human well-being. The weakening of democratic norms could negatively affect the quality of public administration. However, public institutions may also serve as a safeguard against democratic erosion. This study explores the relationship between populism and Italian independent regulatory authorities that were established to operate with technical expertise, shielded from direct political pressure, to ensure greater stability and transparency in strategic areas of public policy. Thus, the research will focus on the different levels of narratives of the Data Protection independent authority, analysing three episodes of conflict between two populistic governments and Data Authority Protection. The research aims to understand whether and how the presence of populist parties in government affects Data Authority Protection autonomy and legitimacy. In this context, we question the mechanisms through which populist-led governments in Italy have sought to exert their influence over independent authorities.