This paper examines the role of reserved activities (riserve di attività) and supervisory regulation as key instruments for balancing public and private interests within regulated markets, particularly in the field of financial law. Starting from the traditional framework of Italian economic law, the analysis explores how activity reservations function as entry barriers not to restrict competition, but to ensure that only suitably qualified operators may access sensitive markets. Such reservations are closely linked to supervisory oversight and to the principle of exclusivity of corporate purpose, aimed at isolating regulated activities from unrelated risks and safeguarding the integrity of regulated entities’ assets. The contribution traces the historical evolution of activity reservations in the Italian financial system, with reference to banks, insurance companies, investment firms, and other regulated intermediaries, highlighting their connection with investor protection, market stability, and the prevention of conflicts of interest. It further discusses the growing complexity of supervisory models in light of digitalization and globalization, which challenge territorially bounded regulatory frameworks and call for new approaches to oversight. The paper also reflects on the emergence of complementary regulatory tools, such as the golden power, and their implications for legal certainty and regulatory predictability. Ultimately, it argues that effective supervision and well-calibrated activity reservations remain essential for preserving trust in financial markets, while avoiding excessive constraints that could hinder innovation and competition.

(2025). La riserva di attività nel diritto dell'economia . Retrieved from https://hdl.handle.net/10446/316386

La riserva di attività nel diritto dell'economia

Bani, Elisabetta
2025-01-01

Abstract

This paper examines the role of reserved activities (riserve di attività) and supervisory regulation as key instruments for balancing public and private interests within regulated markets, particularly in the field of financial law. Starting from the traditional framework of Italian economic law, the analysis explores how activity reservations function as entry barriers not to restrict competition, but to ensure that only suitably qualified operators may access sensitive markets. Such reservations are closely linked to supervisory oversight and to the principle of exclusivity of corporate purpose, aimed at isolating regulated activities from unrelated risks and safeguarding the integrity of regulated entities’ assets. The contribution traces the historical evolution of activity reservations in the Italian financial system, with reference to banks, insurance companies, investment firms, and other regulated intermediaries, highlighting their connection with investor protection, market stability, and the prevention of conflicts of interest. It further discusses the growing complexity of supervisory models in light of digitalization and globalization, which challenge territorially bounded regulatory frameworks and call for new approaches to oversight. The paper also reflects on the emergence of complementary regulatory tools, such as the golden power, and their implications for legal certainty and regulatory predictability. Ultimately, it argues that effective supervision and well-calibrated activity reservations remain essential for preserving trust in financial markets, while avoiding excessive constraints that could hinder innovation and competition.
2025
Bani, Elisabetta
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