Conscious Access in Skilled Action

Can skilled action be considered intentional if the skilled agent performing the ac- tion lacks consciousness of it? Some philosophers embraced the Non-intentional view: skilled action cannot be intentional because the agent does not consciously access action performance. This is supported by the Non-access view: since skilled action is very quickly and automatically executed, it is impossible to consciously access it. Recently, the Non-access view has been explicitly attacked (Brozzo, A role for conscious accessibility in skilled action. Review of Philosophy and Psy- chology 12:683–697, 2021), through arguments supporting the notion that certain aspects of skilled action can be consciously accessed, i.e., the Access view. This would suggest, in turn, that we could save the intentionality of skilled action, i.e., the Intentional view. This paper suggests that the arguments offered for the Access View, in this form, are untenable. So, as I show, the Non-Access View remains un- defeated, for several reasons related to the nature of skilled action, which I describe. The paper remains neutral on whether the Access view is necessary and/or sufficient to hold the Intentional View. However, it follows that those who want to support the Intentional View by relying on the Access View encounter serious problems.