The symposium, centered on Andrea Conzutti’s book, promotes a dialogue between constitutional law scholars and economists on the complex relationship between monetary policy and democratic principles in the Eurozone. Lucarelli examines the issue from an economic perspective, expressing reservations about the proposal to “deconstitutionalize” the euro and emphasizing the need for technical pragmatism modeled on Draghi’s ECB, to be integrated with a common fiscal policy. Esposito discusses the complex political feasibility of the proposal within the current geopolitical framework, highlighting the historical role of central banks. Finally, Conzutti responds to the criticisms, clarifying that the reform aims to repoliticize fundamental decisions through the European Parliament, while preserving the ECB’s operational independence as a technical institution. Taken together, the three contributions highlight the need for multidisciplinary reflection to address the dysfunctions of the Eurozone’s current institutional architecture.
(2026). Forum su Conzutti A. (2024), Il governo della moneta nella prospettiva del diritto costituzionale, Torino: Giappichelli, pp. 336, ISBN: 9791221109115 [journal article - articolo]. In MONETA E CREDITO. Retrieved from https://hdl.handle.net/10446/337545
Forum su Conzutti A. (2024), Il governo della moneta nella prospettiva del diritto costituzionale, Torino: Giappichelli, pp. 336, ISBN: 9791221109115
Lucarelli, Stefano;
2026-01-01
Abstract
The symposium, centered on Andrea Conzutti’s book, promotes a dialogue between constitutional law scholars and economists on the complex relationship between monetary policy and democratic principles in the Eurozone. Lucarelli examines the issue from an economic perspective, expressing reservations about the proposal to “deconstitutionalize” the euro and emphasizing the need for technical pragmatism modeled on Draghi’s ECB, to be integrated with a common fiscal policy. Esposito discusses the complex political feasibility of the proposal within the current geopolitical framework, highlighting the historical role of central banks. Finally, Conzutti responds to the criticisms, clarifying that the reform aims to repoliticize fundamental decisions through the European Parliament, while preserving the ECB’s operational independence as a technical institution. Taken together, the three contributions highlight the need for multidisciplinary reflection to address the dysfunctions of the Eurozone’s current institutional architecture.| File | Dimensione del file | Formato | |
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4-5-6_MC3-2026_FORUM_Lucarelli_Esposito_Conzutti.pdf
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