Il “ciclo economico” nell’art. 81 Cost.: un concetto costituzionale a sovranità limitata?

The article examines the concept of “economic cycle” introduced into Article 81 of the Italian Constitution following the 2012 reform, questioning its legal meaning and constitutional implications. It argues that, although central to the regulation of budget balance and public borrowing, the concept is neither defined by the Constitution nor by implementing legislation, but instead deferred to European Union criteria. By analysing the econometric methodologies used to estimate variables such as the output gap and potential GDP, the author demonstrates that the system relies on non-observable variables and discretionary technical choices, only apparently objective. The empirical analysis of the period 2012–2025 reveals a weak correlation between the economic cycle and fiscal policies, suggesting that the cyclical clause has functioned more as a legitimising device than as an effective countercyclical mechanism. The 2024 reform of European economic governance, shifting from a cycle-based logic to a net expenditure framework, further intensifies the tension between constitutional text and practical implementation. This leads to a broader critical reflection on the relationship between law and technical expertise, democracy and technocracy, and the role of state sovereignty in shaping fiscal policy.