Lost in styles. Perché nel cognitivismo non c'è abbastanza intelligenza per capire l'intelligenza figurale

In this essay I intend to examine Cognitive Metaphor Theory and show its errors and the narrowness of its horizons, especially from a philosophical point of view. To this end I outline an alternative theory, based on the following premises: (1) every investigation of figural mechanisms (metaphors, etc.) should acknowledge as its guiding principle the notion of ‘styles of thought,’ which I here illustrate; (2) notwithstanding their affinities, metaphors fundamentally can be distinguished into two typologies: familiarizing, i.e. oriented toward effectuality, or estranging, i.e. anti-effectual and prevalently dense – the latter being the metaphors we should consider as most eminent; (3) between literary and everyday languages there is a discontinuity which should not be thought of as a separation: rather, literature should be seen as a language which in a creative way relies on daily life to break stereotypes and offers new points of view on the objects of the world and on our existence; (4) figural mechanisms should be interpreted as mechanisms that preside over the construction of subjective identity.