According to Crane intentionality is nothing less than the mark of the mental. Nonetheless, there are many issues raised by this concept, beginning with the problem of non-existent relata. In this comment-article I discuss the concept of intentionality in its generality, trying to state its ontological status and to assess its explanatory dispensability. In particular, I focus on the argument, addressed by Crane, whereby Wittgenstein eliminates intentionality, characterizing it as a grammatical fiction, a pseudo-entity created by the grammar of the language of mental states ascriptions. I will argue that: (1) although Crane’s specific argument against Wittgenstein is not conclusive, Wittgenstein’s linguistic strategy does not work; and yet (2) we should not be committed to a robust realist (that is, ontologically strong) account of intentionality.
(2016). Is intentionality real enough? [journal article - articolo]. In RIVISTA INTERNAZIONALE DI FILOSOFIA E PSICOLOGIA. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/10446/74644
Is intentionality real enough?
Paternoster, Alfredo
2016-01-01
Abstract
According to Crane intentionality is nothing less than the mark of the mental. Nonetheless, there are many issues raised by this concept, beginning with the problem of non-existent relata. In this comment-article I discuss the concept of intentionality in its generality, trying to state its ontological status and to assess its explanatory dispensability. In particular, I focus on the argument, addressed by Crane, whereby Wittgenstein eliminates intentionality, characterizing it as a grammatical fiction, a pseudo-entity created by the grammar of the language of mental states ascriptions. I will argue that: (1) although Crane’s specific argument against Wittgenstein is not conclusive, Wittgenstein’s linguistic strategy does not work; and yet (2) we should not be committed to a robust realist (that is, ontologically strong) account of intentionality.File | Dimensione del file | Formato | |
---|---|---|---|
Is Intentionality Real Enough? | Paternoster | Rivista internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia.pdf
accesso aperto
Versione:
cover/index - copertina/indice
Licenza:
Creative commons
Dimensione del file
94.96 kB
Formato
Adobe PDF
|
94.96 kB | Adobe PDF | Visualizza/Apri |
485-2538-3-PB.pdf
accesso aperto
Versione:
publisher's version - versione editoriale
Licenza:
Creative commons
Dimensione del file
436.04 kB
Formato
Adobe PDF
|
436.04 kB | Adobe PDF | Visualizza/Apri |
Pubblicazioni consigliate
Aisberg ©2008 Servizi bibliotecari, Università degli studi di Bergamo | Terms of use/Condizioni di utilizzo