Extant empirical studies on the effectiveness of supplementary bargaining with respect to firm performance essentially focus on estimating two functions: the probability of adopting or having in place supplementary bargaining and the impact of such agreements on firm performance, especially with regard to financial incentives or premia. The review undertaken shows that the results of the various estimates are affected by a series of distortions due to either i) the absence of controls for endogeneity for some variables, ii) the use of unrepresentative samples, iii) omitted variables (for example, premia unilaterally granted by managers), and finally, iv) focusing exclusively (with some exceptions) on the premia aspects (so-called performance-related-pay) thereby reducing and compressing the entire contents of a supplementary bargaining agreement into a dichotomous variable, ignoring both the number of matters covered and their intensity. This paper argues that a supplementary bargaining agreement is not a spot event but rather a medium- to long-term investment process that actors sign with a view to increasing organizational capital and divide the expected results over time according to a win-win strategy.

LEONI, Riccardo, Bisio, Laura, (2017). Che cosa sappiamo sull'efficacia della contrattazione integrativa aziendale? Una rassegna della letteratura empirica italiana 2(2017) - MEQ Economics). Bergamo: Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/10446/86251

Che cosa sappiamo sull'efficacia della contrattazione integrativa aziendale? Una rassegna della letteratura empirica italiana

LEONI, Riccardo;
2017

Abstract

Extant empirical studies on the effectiveness of supplementary bargaining with respect to firm performance essentially focus on estimating two functions: the probability of adopting or having in place supplementary bargaining and the impact of such agreements on firm performance, especially with regard to financial incentives or premia. The review undertaken shows that the results of the various estimates are affected by a series of distortions due to either i) the absence of controls for endogeneity for some variables, ii) the use of unrepresentative samples, iii) omitted variables (for example, premia unilaterally granted by managers), and finally, iv) focusing exclusively (with some exceptions) on the premia aspects (so-called performance-related-pay) thereby reducing and compressing the entire contents of a supplementary bargaining agreement into a dichotomous variable, ignoring both the number of matters covered and their intensity. This paper argues that a supplementary bargaining agreement is not a spot event but rather a medium- to long-term investment process that actors sign with a view to increasing organizational capital and divide the expected results over time according to a win-win strategy.
Leoni, Riccardo; Bisio, Laura
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