Can the Leibnizian principle of the indiscernibility of identicals be used as an argument against the psych-neural type identity, that is, against the theory according to which mental propertiens are nothing but neural properties? We argue that (1) Leibniz's law cannot provide a reason to reject the identity theory and (2) it makes very hard to distinguish between two different versions of the psycho-neural identity theory, the weaker 'token identity' theory and the stronger 'type identity' theory.

(2018). Leibniz's principle and psycho-neural identity . Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/10446/133284

Leibniz's principle and psycho-neural identity

Bottani, Andrea;Paternoster, Alfredo
2018-01-01

Abstract

Can the Leibnizian principle of the indiscernibility of identicals be used as an argument against the psych-neural type identity, that is, against the theory according to which mental propertiens are nothing but neural properties? We argue that (1) Leibniz's law cannot provide a reason to reject the identity theory and (2) it makes very hard to distinguish between two different versions of the psycho-neural identity theory, the weaker 'token identity' theory and the stronger 'type identity' theory.
2018
Bottani, Andrea Clemente Maria; Paternoster, Alfredo
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/10446/133284
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