Reductionists about persons believe that persons are nothing over and above impersonal entities. According to them, a taxonomy of everything existing can be perfectly complete while failing to mention persons, and a description of the world can at once be absolutely impersonal and perfectly exhaustive. The paper tries to clarify the nature of reductionism about persons, to map its different forms and to understand their relationships. A strong kind of reductionism about persons is distinguished from a weaker one, it is argued that their opposition is substantive and not merely verbal and it is showed that weak reductionism about persons is logically independent from both materialism and naturalism.

Identità personale senza entità personale

BOTTANI, Andrea Clemente Maria
2012-01-01

Abstract

Reductionists about persons believe that persons are nothing over and above impersonal entities. According to them, a taxonomy of everything existing can be perfectly complete while failing to mention persons, and a description of the world can at once be absolutely impersonal and perfectly exhaustive. The paper tries to clarify the nature of reductionism about persons, to map its different forms and to understand their relationships. A strong kind of reductionism about persons is distinguished from a weaker one, it is argued that their opposition is substantive and not merely verbal and it is showed that weak reductionism about persons is logically independent from both materialism and naturalism.
essay - saggio
2012
Bottani, Andrea Clemente Maria
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/10446/27656
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